10: The constitution and illiberal democracies
In the twenty years since the end of the last ‘wave of democratization’ it has become clear that, along with traditional liberal-constitutional democracies, an important number of countries have embraced different forms of ‘illiberal’ democracy, that is, they are regimes in which there are competitive elections of political authorities but that concentrate power around the executive office, to the point that even the courts are under the control of the government.
Even though in the past there have been many regimes with such characteristics, the surprising new development is that now there are some constitutional scholars who openly call for the abandonment of ‘obsolete’ notions developed over two centuries ago (such as the ‘separation of powers’) and its replacement by the supposedly more modern one of a ‘unity of powers’, particularly in countries with widespread and persistent social and economic inequalities in which, the argument goes, only a strong concentration of power around the executive branch will deliver true social justice.
The Workshop invites contributions that assess the compatibility of ‘illiberal democracy’ with constitutionalism, as well as those exploring the nature of the link between liberal-democracy and constitutionalism (Just historically contingent? Or philosophically necessary?)