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Remedies for Non-performance - Perspectives from CISG, UNIDROIT Principles and PECL,
Liu Chengwei  * 

INTRODUCTION

[INTRODUCTION]

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A. For Documents
B. For Journals
C. For Organizations
D. For Citations

PART I. GENERAL REVIEW

CHAPTER 1. SOURCES OF INSPIRATION

[CHAPTER 1. SOURCES OF INSPIRATION]

1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIED INSTRUMENTS

1.2.1 CISG
1.2.2 UNIDROIT Principles
1.2.3 PECL
1.2.4 Brief Comparison

1.3 MAJOR SOURCES OF INFORMATION

CHAPTER 2. REMEDIES AVAILABLE UPON NON-PERFORMANCE

[CHAPTER 2. REMEDIES AVAILABLE UPON NON-PERFORMANCE]

2.1 INTRODUCTION

2.2 THE CONCEPTS: BREACH OF CONTRACT vs. NON-PERFORMANCE

2.3 REMEDIAL SCHEMES OF THE STUDIED INSTRUMENTS

2.3.1 CISG Part III (Partial)
2.3.2 UNIDROIT Principles Chapter 7
2.3.3 PECL Chapters 8, 9
2.3.4 Concluding Remarks

2.4 STRUCTURE OF THIS PRESENTATION

PART II. PRESERVING PERFORMANCE
PART III. TERMINATION
PART IV. DAMAGES
PART V. EXCUSES

PART II. PRESERVING PERFORMANCE

CHAPTER 3. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

[CHAPTER 3. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE]

3.1 COMPRISED APPROACH UNDER THE CISG

3.1.1 Introduction
3.1.2 Primacy of Specific Performance under Arts. 46/62
3.1.3 Forum's Rule under Art. 28

3.2 BUYER'S RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: CISG ART. 46

3.2.1 Introduction
3.2.2 General Rule: Art. 46(1)
3.2.2.1 Right to require performance
3.2.2.2 Non-resorting to inconsistent remedies
3.2.3 Right to Demand Cure: Arts. 46(2) and 46(3)
3.2.3.1 In general
3.2.3.2 Delivery of substitute goods: Art. 46(2)
3.2.3.3 Right to repair: Art. 46(3)
3.2.3.4 Time limit restriction
3.2.3.5 A summary

3.3 SELLER'S RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: CISG ART. 62

3.3.1 Rationale of Art. 62
3.3.2 General Application
3.3.3 Potential Problems

3.4 UNIFORM REMEDY IN UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES / PECL

3.4.1 Introduction
3.4.2 Performance of Monetary Obligation
3.4.2.1 Money due generally recoverable
3.4.2.2 Money not yet due
3.4.3 Performance of Non-monetary Obligation: In General
3.4.4 Exceptions to Performance of Non-monetary Obligation
3.4.4.1 The principle and exceptions
3.4.4.2 Performance impossible
3.4.4.3 Unreasonable burden
3.4.4.4 Performance from another source available
3.4.4.5 Performance of an exclusively personal character
3.4.4.6 Unreasonable delay in requiring performance
3.4.5 Right to Require Remedying of Defective Performance
3.4.6 Other Issues

CHAPTER 4. NACHFRIST FOR LATE PERFORMANCE

[CHAPTER 4. NACHFRIST FOR LATE PERFORMANCE]

4.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

4.2 RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE OPTIONAL APPROACH

4.2.1 Optional Approach under the Studied Instruments
4.2.2 Underlying Rationale
4.2.3 Granting Additional Period in Two Situations

4.3 SETTING OF A NACHFRIST NOTICE

4.3.1 Transmission of the Intention
4.3.1.1 Form of the notice
4.3.1.2 Risk in transmission
4.3.2 Fixing of the Time-limit
4.3.2.1 Fixed period
4.3.2.2 Reasonable length

4.4 EFFECTS OF SERVING A NACHFRIST NOTICE

4.4.1 Remedies Available/Suspended during the Period
4.4.2 Early End of the Existing Uncertainty upon Rejecting Notice
4.4.3 Termination upon Expiry of the Extension
4.4.3.1 In general
4.4.3.2 CISG approach
4.4.3.3 UNIDROIT Principles / PECL approach

CHAPTER 5. CURE BY NON-PERFORMING PARTY

[CHAPTER 5. CURE BY NON-PERFORMING PARTY]

5.1 INTRODUCTION

5.2 CONDITIONS FOR INVOKING CURE

5.2.1 In General
5.2.2 Reasonableness of Notice
5.2.3 Appropriateness of Cure

5.3 SELLER'S RIGHT TO CURE AND BUYER'S RIGHT TO TERMINATION

5.4 EFFECTS OF EFFECTIVE NOTICE

5.4.1 Right to Inquire vs. Duty to Accept Cure
5.4.2 Suspension of Inconsistent Remedies
5.4.3 Retained Rights of the Aggrieved Party

CHAPTER 6. PRICE REDUCTION FOR NON-CONFORMITY

[CHAPTER 6. PRICE REDUCTION FOR NON-CONFORMITY]

6.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

6.2 FEATURES OF CISG ART. 50

6.2.1 Unique Role and Justification
6.2.2 Self-help Remedy
6.2.3 Seeming Advantages

6.3 IN CONTRAST WITH DAMAGES

6.3.1 Introduction
6.3.2 Distinctions from Damages under the CISG
6.3.2.1 Diverse ratio legis
6.3.2.2 Different manner in calculation
6.3.2.3 Other differences
6.3.2.4 A summary
6.3.3 An Alternative to Damages
6.3.3.1 Introduction
6.3.3.2 In conjunction with force majeure
6.3.3.3 In case of falling market
6.3.3.4 Upon difficulty in proving damages
6.3.3.5 A summary

6.4 ESSENTIALS OF CISG ART. 50

6.4.1 Scope of Application
6.4.1.1 General application in case of non-conformity
6.4.1.2 Ambiguity over defects in title
6.4.2 Exercise of the Right to Price Reduction
6.4.3 Calculation of Proportional Reduction
6.4.3.1 Decisive point: time of delivery
6.4.3.2 Place for comparing
6.4.4 Limited by the Cure

6.5 STATUS OF THE PRICE REDUCTION UNDER UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES / PECL

6.5.1 Exclusion under the UNIDROIT Principles
6.5.2 Inclusion under the European Principles

PART III. TERMINATION

CHAPTER 7. RIGHT TO TERMINATION

[CHAPTER 7. RIGHT TO TERMINATION]

7.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

7.2 GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

7.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER 8. FUNDAMENTAL NON-PERFORMANCE

[CHAPTER 8. FUNDAMENTAL NON-PERFORMANCE]

8.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

8.2 FORESEEABLE SUBSTANTIAL DETRIMENT

8.2.1 Introduction
8.2.2 Substantial Detriment
8.2.2.1 Existing detriment
8.2.2.2 Substantial deprivation
8.2.2.3 Discernible expectations
8.2.3 Foreseeability
8.2.3.1 Introduction
8.2.3.2 Test for foreseeability
8.2.3.3 Time for foreseeability
8.2.3.4 Burden to prove unforeseeability

8.3 OTHER ELEMENTS IN DEFINING FUNDAMENTAL NON-PERFORMANCE

8.3.1 Strict Compliance of Essence
8.3.2 Intentional Non-performance
8.3.3 No Reliance on Future Performance
8.3.4 Disproportionate Loss

8.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER 9. ANTICIPATORY NON-PERFORMANCE

[CHAPTER 9. ANTICIPATORY NON-PERFORMANCE]

9.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

9.2 GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION

9.3 SELLER'S RIGHT TO STOP GOODS IN TRANSIT UPON SUSPENSION

9.4 DUTY TO GIVE NOTICE IN EXERCISING SUSPENSION

9.5 RESTORING PERFORMANCE BY GIVING ADEQUATE ASSURANCE

9.6 TERMINATION UPON ANTICIPATORY FUNDAMENTAL NON-PERFORMANCE

9.6.1 In General
9.6.2 Clear Indication of A Fundamental Non-performance
9.6.3 Notice Given in case of Termination

9.7 ADEQUATE ASSURANCE OF DUE PERFORMANCE

9.7.1 Purpose of Rule
9.7.2 Non-receipt of Adequate Assurance

9.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER 10. TERMINATION OF BREACHED INSTALLMENT OR PART

[CHAPTER 10. TERMINATION OF BREACHED INSTALLMENT OR PART]

10.1 TERMINATION OF INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS: CISG ART. 73

10.2 TERMINATION OF FUTURE INSTALLMENTS: CISG ART. 73(2)

10.3 TERMINATION OF A CONTRACT AS A WHOLE: CISG ART. 73(3)

10.4 PARTIAL TERMINATIO: CISG ART. 51

10.5 COMBINED APPROACH: PECL ART. 9:302

10.6 CONCLLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER 11. DECLARATION OF TERMINATION

[CHAPTER 11. DECLARATION OF TERMINATION]

11.1 NO AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

11.2 INFORMALITY OF THE NOTICE

11.3 TRANSMISSION OF THE INTENTION

11.4 RISK IN COMMUNICATION

11.4.1 CISG Approach
11.4.2 Receipt Principle under the UNIDROIT Principles
11.4.3 Combined Approach under the PECL

11.5 TIME LIMIT FOR THE DECLARATION: IN GENERAL

11.6 DECLARATION WITHIN REASONABLE TIME

11.6.1 Definition of reasonable time
11.6.2 CISG Approach
11.6.3 UNIDROIT Principles / PECL Approach
11.6.4 Concluding Remarks

CHAPTER 12. EFFECTS OF TERMINATION

[CHAPTER 12. EFFECTS OF TERMINATION]

12.1 INTRODUCTION

12.2 RELIEF OF FUTURE PERFORMANCE

12.3 RETROSPECTIVE OR PROSPECTIVE APPROACH

12.4 UNAFFECTED RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AFTER TERMINATION

12.4.1 Continuing Right to Claim Damages
12.4.2 Unaffected Clauses Intended to Apply despite Termination

12.5 RESTITUTION

12.5.1 In General
12.5.2 Entitlement of Parties to Restitution on Termination
12.5.3 Restitution under the PECL
12.5.3.1 Property reduced in value: Art. 9:306
12.5.3.2 Recovery of money paid and property: Arts. 9:306, 9:307
12.5.3.3 Concluding remarks
12.5.4 Restitution of Benefits Received
12.5.5 Exceptions: Restitution Not Possible or Appropriate
12.5.5.1 CISG approach: making restitution a prerequisite for avoidance
12.5.5.2 UPICC/PECL approach: focusing on the allowance upon impossible restitution
12.5.5.3 Comparative perspectives
12.5.5.4 Concluding remarks

PART IV. DAMAGES

CHAPTER 13. GENERAL MEASURE OF DAMAGES

[CHAPTER 13. GENERAL MEASURE OF DAMAGES]

13.1 RIGHT TO DAMAGES

13.2 FULL COMPENSATION

13.3 RECOVERABLE LOSSES

13.4 COMPENSATION OF NON-PECUNIARY LOSS

13.5 COMPUTATION OF LOSSES AND GAINS

CHAPTER 14. LIMITS TO CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES

[CHAPTER 14. LIMITS TO CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES]

14.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

14.2 FORESEEABILITY OF LOSS

14.2.1 In General
14.2.2 Test for Foreseeability
14.2.3 Party Concerned and Reference Point
14.2.4 Evaluation of Foreseeability
14.2.5 Content of Foreseeability
14.2.6 Concluding Remarks

14.3 CERTAINTY OF HARM

14.4 CONTRIBUTION TO HARM

14.4.1 In General
14.4.2 Ways of Contributing to the Harm
14.4.3 Remedies Affected by the Contribution
14.4.3.1 Remedies available upon non-performance caused solely by the contribution
14.4.3.2 Damages proportionately reduced due to partial contribution

14.5 DUTY TO MITIGATE

14.5.1 In General
14.5.2 Reasonable Measures Taken
14.5.3 Effects of Failure to Mitigate

CHAPTER 15. DAMAGES UPON TERMINATION

[CHAPTER 15. DAMAGES UPON TERMINATION]

15.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

15.2 DAMAGES UPON SUBSTITUTE TRANSACTIONS

15.2.1 Introduction
15.2.2 Presupposed Situations Calling for Concrete Calculation
15.2.3 Substitute Transaction must be Reasonable Substitute

15.3 DAMAGES UPON CURRENT PRICE

15.3.1 Introduction
15.3.2 Presupposed Situations Calling for Abstract Calculation
15.3.3 Determination of "Current Price"
15.3.3.1 In general
15.3.3.2 Reference point
15.3.3.3 Relevant place

15.4 FURTHER DAMAGES

CHAPTER 16. AGREED PAYMENT FOR NON-PERFORMANCE

[CHAPTER 16. AGREED PAYMENT FOR NON-PERFORMANCE]

CHAPTER 17. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES

[CHAPTER 17. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES]

17.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

17.1.1 Introduction
17.1.2 Recoverability under "Loser-pays" Principle
17.1.3 Excluded by "American Rule"

17.2 CISG DECISIONS CONCERNING ATTORNEYS' FEES

17.3 PROBLEMATIC RECOVERY UNDER ART. 74 CISG

CHAPTER 18. PAYMENT OF INTEREST

[CHAPTER 18. PAYMENT OF INTEREST]

18.1 INTRODUCTION

18.2 GENERAL ENTITLEMENT TO INTEREST

18.3 ADDITIONAL DAMAGES

18.4 INTEREST ON DAMAGES

18.5 ACCRUAL OF INTEREST

18.6 RATE OF INTEREST

PART V. EXCUSES

CHAPTER 19. CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES

[CHAPTER 19. CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES]

19.1 INTRODUCTION

19.2 UNSDERLYING DOCTRINCE; REBUS SIC STANTIBUS

19.3 DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

19.3.1 Historical Review
19.3.2 National Doctrines
19.3.3 International Perspective
19.3.3.1 Public international law
19.3.3.2 International commercial practice
19.3.4 Conclusion

19.4 DEFINITIONS OF force majeure AND HARDSHIP

19.4.1 Force Majeure
19.4.2 Hardship
19.4.3 Comparison

19.5 GENERAL APPROACHES IN THE STUDIED INSTRUMENTS

19.5.1 Approach under the CISG
19.5.2 Approach under the UNIDROIT Principles
19.5.3 Approach under the PECL
19.5.4 Concluding Remarks

CHAPTER 20. force majeure

[CHAPTER 20. force majeure]

20.1 INTRODUCTION

20.2 RELEVANT TEXTS

20.2.1 Exemptions: CISG Art. 79
20.2.2 Force Majeure: UNIDROIT Principles Art. 6.1.7
20.2.3 Excuse Due to an Impediment: PECL Art. 8:108
20.2.4 Comparison

20.3 GENERAL RULE

20.3.1 Scope of Excusable Non-performance
20.3.2 Existence of Qualifying Impediment
20.3.2.1 Introduction of a new word
20.3.2.2 Interpretation of the word
20.3.2.3 Problematic situations
20.3.3 Conditions for Exempting Impediment
20.3.3.1 Beyond control
20.3.3.2 Unforeseeable
20.3.3.3 Unavoidable or insurmountable
20.3.3.4 Causation

20.4 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIRD PARTIES

20.5 TEMPORARY IMPEDIMENT

20.6 DUTY TO NOTIFY

20.7 EFFECTS

20.7.1 In General
20.7.2 Effect on Right to Damages
20.7.3 Effect on Right to Performance
20.7.4 Effect on Right to Termination

CHAPTER 21. HARDSHIP

[CHAPTER 21. HARDSHIP]

21.1 GAP IN THE CISG?

21.2 INTERPLAY BETWEEN CISG EXCUSE AND UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES / PECL HARDSHIP

21.2.1 Hardship: UNIDROIT Principles Arts. 6.2.1 through 6.2.3
21.2.2 Change of Circumstances: PECL Art. 6:111
21.2.3 Gap-filling Application of Hardship Provisions?

21.3 CONDITIONS FOR INVOKING HARDSHIP

21.3.1 In General
21.3.2 Crucial Point: Fundamental Alteration of Equilibrium
21.3.3 Additional Requirements for Hardship to Arise
21.3.3.1 Time factor: occurrence after conclusion
21.3.3.2 Unforeseeability
21.3.3.3 Risk not assumed

21.4 EFFECTS OF HARDSHIP

21.4.1 In General
21.4.2 Triggering of Renegotiation
21.4.2.1 Request for renegotiation
21.4.2.2 Renegotiation in good faith
21.4.3 Court Measures in case of Hardship
21.4.4 Concluding Remarks

CHAPTER 22. FORCE MAJEURE and HARDSHIP CLAUSES

[CHAPTER 22. FORCE MAJEURE and HARDSHIP CLAUSES]

22.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

22.2 FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE

22.2.1 Introduction
22.2.2 Drafting Considerations

22.3 HARDSHIP CLAUSE

22.3.1 Introduction
22.3.2 Drafting Considerations

22.4 OVERLAPPING OF THE CLAUSES

22.5 USE OF STANDARD FORMS: ICC No. 421 (partial)

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Remedies for Non-performance - Perspectives from CISG, UNIDROIT Principles and PECL,
Liu Chengwei

PART I. GENERAL REVIEW

CHAPTER 1. SOURCES OF INSPIRATION

1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIED INSTRUMENTS

1.2.1 CISG
1.2.2 UNIDROIT Principles
1.2.3 PECL
1.2.4 Brief Comparison
99

In April, 1964, twenty-eight states approved two conventions which were the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULF) referred to collectively as the 1964 Hague Conventions, which were not very successful.  5  The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which is the core legal body within the UN system in the field of international trade law and was tasked by the UN General Assembly to further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international trade, set out to study the 1964 Hague Conventions to improve and reform them hopefully ending up with a product more successful than the first. Finally, after several drafts after the realization that an entirely new text was needed, the General Assembly convened a conference on a product that is today the CISG.

As suggested by the legislative history, consideration of each individual article of the CISG proceeded on the basis of compromise. For this reason, there was a conscious desire to restrict the content of the CISG to those areas on which it was possible to agree.  6  As a result, certain kinds of sales were excluded according to Art. 2 and matters such as the validity of the contract and the passing of property (Art. 4), the liability of the seller for death or personal injury caused by the goods to any person (Art. 5) were not included. In addition, there was a deliberate attempt not to rely on existing legal definitions which could then be subject to contradicting interpretations in different member states. The aim was not to take the best from every jurisdiction, but to develop an empirical code which, where possible, used independent terms to convey its meaning. Indeed, no international commercial legal regime can expect to be perfect, especially when it is developed on the basis of compromise between legal systems.

While the drafters of the CISG represented various legal systems that possessed their own unique methods of solving certain problems, a commonality existed among the majority of the drafters. So while the remedies provided for by the CISG might not represent part of the "consistent and universal form of international mercantile law" desired by a modern lex mercatoria, they do represent a step forward in that process. From the point of view of legislation as well as from the point of view of practical application, the Convention seems to be a success. Moreover, this success may fuel further uniformity as it is already influencing other fields of international trade law. Indeed, after it came into force on January 1, 1988, the CISG has gained tremendous political and economic significance as the uniform sales law for sixty-two countries that account for two-thirds of all world trade.  7 

As for the application issue, the CISG is the domestic law of each Contracting State. Important conclusions and recommendations follow from this: For parties with their relevant places of business in different Contracting States, where their contract falls within the scope of the CISG, the contract is automatically governed by the CISG, unless the parties indicate otherwise. In other words, where without reference to the CISG, the parties state that the contract is governed by the law of a Contracting State or the applicable law so holds, the contract is likely to be governed by the CISG. For parties to such international sales transactions who do not wish to have them governed by the CISG, the recommended procedure is to so state in their contracts. The above conclusion and recommendation can also apply when only one of the parties has his relevant place of business in a Contracting State of the applicable domestic law regards the law of that Contracting State as the governing law. In these two situations -- contracting parties from different Contracting States, and a contract between a party from a Contracting State and a party from a non-Contracting State -- the relevant CISG provisions are Arts. 1(1) and 95. On the other hand, there are also cases in which principles of the CISG can apply to transactions between parties neither of whom has his relevant place of business in a Contracting State. The CISG can apply to such a contract solely by the election of the parties.

One should note that, however, subject to the fact that when the CISG applies by law it can supersede otherwise applicable domestic law to the contrary; when the CISG applies solely by contract, it acts somewhat like a set of terms and conditions incorporated in the contract -- in other words, in this situation it does not supersede mandatory provisions of the applicable domestic law where that law does not so permit.  8 

105

The regime covering the greatest geographical scope among the studied instruments is the UNIDROIT Principles resulted from the work of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), which was set up in 1929 as an auxiliary organ of the League of Nations and whose primary task was to draft a uniform sales law which aimed to combat the problems of trading goods across different jurisdictions.  9  The UNIDROIT Principles do not apply to domestic contracts and are intended to operate globally, which are broader in scope and more detailed in provisions than the CISG.

Because the UNIDROIT Principles are not in the form of a convention or a model law, they do not have a binding effect. They will be applied in practice only because of their persuasive character. According to the Preamble, application of the UNIDROIT Principles to international commercial contracts in four different contexts is possible: (a) Where the parties agree that their contract shall be governed by the UNIDROIT Principles, the Principles are undoubtedly applicable because they are incorporated into the contract like any other contractual clause. Here, the principles will bind the parties only to the extent that they do not contradict mandatory rules of the applicable law. (b) The Principles may also apply when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed by "general principles of law" or the lex mercatoria. (c) The Principles may also be of relevance if the contract is governed by a particular domestic law, even though the application of the Principles is not provided for in the contract. This is the case, whenever dealing with a specific issue, it proves impossible to establish the relevant rule of that particular domestic law and a solution can be found in the Principles. Recourse to the Principles, however, as a substitute for otherwise applicable domestic law is a last resort. (d) The Principles may further serve as instruments for the interpretation and filling the gap of international uniform law. The main idea is to preclude an easy resort to the domestic law indicated by the conflict of laws rule by the forum. In conclusion, it can be said that the UNIDROIT Principles apply only if incorporated into the contract, or if they find enough favour with an arbitrator or judge looking for a rule to fill a gap encountered in the regulation of a given international commercial contract.  10 

A stated purpose as suggested in the Preamble is to be stressed: "They may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law instruments". In practice the question is particularly relevant in the context of the CISG, Art. 7 of which expressly states that "[i]n the interpretation of this Convention regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application" and that "[q]uestions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based". In this respect, Bonell, one of the principal architects of the Principles has stated: "The answers given are sharply divided. On the one hand there are those who categorically deny that the UNIDROIT Principles can be used to interpret or supplement the CISG, invoking the rather formalistic and not necessarily convincing argument that the UNIDROIT Principles were adopted later in time than the CISG and therefore cannot be of any relevance to the latter. On the other hand there are those who, perhaps too enthusiastically, justify the use of the UNIDROIT Principles for this purpose on the mere ground that they are 'general principles of international commercial contracts'. The correct solution would appear to lie between these two extreme positions. In other words, there can be little doubt that in general the UNIDROIT Principles may well be used to interpret or supplement even pre-existing international instruments such as the CISG; on the other hand in order for individual provisions to be used to fill gaps in the CISG, they must be the expression of general principles also underlying the CISG."  11 

It is said that to the extent that the two instruments address the same issues, the rules laid down in the UNIDROIT Principles are normally taken either literally or at least in substance from the corresponding provisions of CISG; cases where the former depart from the latter are exceptional.  12  On the other hand, to the extent that they formulate general principles which cannot be derived directly from the CISG, these Principles can be utilized for filling gaps in the Convention.  13  However, an important caveat to recourse to the UNIDROIT Principles to interpret the general principles of the CISG has been pointed out by Bonell: there is a need to show that the relevant provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles are the expression of a general principle underlying the CISG. This need is, of course, not satisfied where the Principles and the CISG adopt different solutions -- for example, in their approach to the battle of the forms.  14 

Indeed, the approach in developing the Principles appears appropriate with respect to the current state of attempts to unify law.  15  The UNIDROIT Principles was published in 1994 as a result of comparative research and deliberations by a group composed of representatives of all the major legal systems of the world. The UNIDROIT Principles have, in practice, only a persuasive value. The Principles can, however, have significant role in international and domestic legislator's adoption policy, court and arbitration proceedings, contract drafting or choice of law clauses. The reason for such significance can generally be seen in the modern and functional solutions adopted in the principles. The potential users of the UNIDROIT Principles to which they are addressed to are especially international law firms, corporate lawyers, arbitration courts and the like. The Principles have so far proved to be successful and widely accepted.  16  The UNIDROIT Principles are regarded to be especially useful in arbitration proceedings. Although there have been only a handful of cases actually decided solely by reference to the UNIDROIT Principles, research has shown that the Principles are being referred to in a growing number of cases as representative of the general principles and established trade practices on which international trade is based.  17 

According to the Preamble, the UNIDROIT Principles set forth "general rules for international commercial contracts". It is also said that the aim of UNIDROIT was to specifically elaborate a general regulatory system which could apply universally and restate the general principles of contract law, thus reflecting all the major legal systems of the world.  18 

112

Unlike the CISG which is a uniform sales law adopted by countries that account for over two-thirds of all world trade in goods, the PECL, like the UNIDROIT Principles except for their sphere of application, are a set of principles whose objective is to provide general rules of contract law in the EU, and will apply when the parties have agreed to incorporate them into their contract or that their contract is to be governed by them.

The PECL (also known as the "Lando-Principles") is the product of work carried out by the Commission on European Contract Law (the "Lando Commission"). The Lando Commission was founded in 1982, which is a body of lawyers drawn from all of the Member States of the European Union (EU), under the chairmanship of Professor Ole Lando. The Commission ran with funding from the European Community (EC) and its work was specifically endorsed by the European Parliament in a Resolution in 1994. In 1989, the European Parliament passed a resolution in favour of pursuing a European Code of Private Law. In 1994, this intent manifested itself with a resolution in favour of the Lando Commission's efforts at the harmonisation of contract law. The ambit of the Commission was to draft a European Restatement of Contract law which was to serve as: a basis for the future codification of European contract law; a legal guide for the EU Organs; a text to be used by member states in future codification or updates of their own law; and a text which parties could chose as the applicable law of their contracts. In 1995, the Lando Commission published the first part of its Principles of European Contract Law (the PECL). After three years, a second version were finalized in 1998, and reflects aspects of contract law from many of the EU's member states.

Unlike the UNIDROIT Principles (as well as the CISG) which applies exclusively to international contracts, the European Principles are to be applicable (a) to domestic European contracts as well as to trans-European Union international contracts and (2) to virtually all European contracts, including merchant consumer contracts as well as contracts between commercial parties. Moreover, in addition to the express purpose, similar to the UNIDROIT Principles, of being applied "as general rules of contract law in the European Union" (Art. 1:101), the PECL is intended to represent a modern European lex mercatoria and most importantly for future legal developments, "as a model on which [European] harmonisation work may be based". If the PECL will in fact be used by EU entities in interpreting European contract law or as the basis for further harmonisation efforts, it is a particularly important document to consider as indicating future legal developments.  19  Furthermore, work is already underway to compile a third version of the Principles, and it is envisaged that the Principles will eventually form part of a future European Civil Code. At present, though, the principles are more of academic value as opposed to being applied in practice.  20 

116

So far as the general nature of the studied instruments is concerned, there already exists one important binding instrument in the field of international commercial law - the CISG, which contains the core of a true international commercial code.  21  The Convention has already codified a substantial part of the lex mercatoria and is currently adopted as the law in sixty-two countries. The Convention elaborates the common law and practices of international sales and the common core of domestic commercial rules.  22 

In contrast to the governmental negotiation and compromise leading to the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL were fundamentally born of the same need for a uniform body of law applicable to contracts and do not have the status of an international convention; therefore, their applications mainly rely on express or implied incorporation into a contract by the parties. On the other hand, the two Principles, unlike the CISG, where, due to the divergent legal regimes and views, consensus could only be reached on compromise solutions with some ambiguous wording and gaps in coverage, were not bound to take the viewpoints of every single country, legal regime or rule into account. The final choice among possibly conflicting rules was made on the persuasiveness or suitability of the rule within the overall regime. These efforts can thus be seen as more unified and coherent regimes than the CISG. These regimes definitely are a step forward in legal thinking and the number of similarities between the two regimes suggests that they represent the main directions being taken by international contract law.  23 

As for the relationship between the two sets of Principles, it is also found that the PECL covers similar areas of law to the UNIDROIT Principles, but its geographical sphere of application is confined to the EU. The material scope of the application of the PECL is, however, wider than that of the UNIDROIT Principles, as it is intended to apply to all contracts including domestic transactions and those involving consumers and merchants.  24  So while the PECL is of a narrower geographic focus than the UNIDROIT Principles, it covers a wider area of law. Despite of this, the substantial scope of application of the two Principles is identical in that they both aspire to be general principles of contract law. To use an expression well known in the world of international commerce, both are held out as a sort of codification of the modern lex mercatoria. Both of the two undertakings aspire to be models for national and international legislators, they each describe themselves as formulations of the lex mercatoria, and to some extent promote the harmonization of the law of contracts. It may be said that in the not too far future principles for international commercial contracts as elaborated in the UPICC and the PECL, in the light of the CISG which is the only one among the three instruments with mandatory application to the signatory States, will be developed and worthy of the name lex mercatoria which expresses rules accepted and observed by the international economic community.  25 

The need for uniformity and harmony in international trade can be expected to lead to growth of international transactions subject to the CISG, UNIDROIT Principles, and PECL. In a summary fashion as to the relationship between the three instruments, to some extent it can be described briefly that they enable themselves to supplement each other and fit well with each other as part of the multi-layered approach that is becoming dominant, rather than compete or claim to displace the other harmonizing projects. In so far as the three instruments seem to have their own raison d'être they not only do not compete with each other but may actually fulfil very important functions side by side. Particularly, so as to preclude an easy resort to the domestic law indicated by the conflict of law rule of the forum, the two sets of Principles serve a gap-filling role for the interpretation of CISG contracts; they endorse and promote many of the principles outlined in the CISG. Although, in this instance, the articles are not drafted in an identical or substantially similar manner, it is nonetheless possible to identify some supports and the two Principles can be used to: (1) interpret the CISG; (2) answer unresolved questions that fall within the scope of the CISG; or (3) resolve issues that are not addressed in the CISG.

Finally, one must become aware of the existence and basic content of different concepts contained in these instruments, because they will be shaping the rules for contractual dealings in the future. Particularly, one must be on the lookout for superficial harmony which merely mutes a deeper discord and for verbal conflict which hides a fundamental identity of aim. In both cases the key lies in the conceptual presuppositions of each system or family of systems. The deeper discord escapes notice because the same formula means different things according to the frame-work in which it is read; the fundamental agreement on the end to be achieved is not seen because the conceptual routes which lead that to end are different.  26 


 5. Few countries signed the treaties and there were many criticisms that the treaties "primarily reflected the legal traditions and economic realities of continental Western Europe".

 6. Supra. note 2.

 7. As of 10 October 2002, the UN Treaty Section reports that 62 States have adopted the CISG: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, China (PRC), Columbia, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent & Grenadines, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Uganda, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. ( ‹http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/countries/cntries.html› )

 8. See General Information on the Application of the CISG; available online at ‹http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/cisgintro.html› In addition, there are situations in which principles of the CISG can be deemed applicable even when neither party has his relevant place of business in a Contracting State and the parties have made no reference to the CISG in their contract. There are cases in which tribunals have so held (see, for example, ICC Arbitration Case No. 5713 of 1989).

 9. The fruits of its efforts were the 1964 Hague Conventions. These Conventions, as mentioned previously, since entering into force in 1972, have, however, failed to achieve widespread acceptance. Other works of UNIDROIT have met with greater success; most notably in the area of international trade are the 1994 UNIDROIT Principles.

 10. See Joern Rimke in "Force majeure and hardship: Application in international trade practice with specific regard to the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts": Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Kluwer (1999-2000); pp. 237-238. Available online at ‹http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rimke.html

 11. See Michael Joachim Bonell in "General Report: A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts": XVth International Congress of Comparative Law, Bristol, 26 July-1 August 1998, Kluwer Law International (1999); p. 13.

 12. See Michael Joachim Bonell in "THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND CISG -- ALTERNATIVES OR COMPLEMENTARY INSTRUMENTS?": 26 Uniform Law Review (1996); pp. 26-39. Available online at ‹http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ulr96.html

 13. See Ulrich Magnus in "Die allgemeinen Grundsätze im UN-Kaufrecht": 59 Rabels Zeitschrift (1995); pp. 492-493. English version: General Principles of UN-Sales Law, Lisa Haberfellner, trans. Available online at ‹http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/magnus.html

 14. See Albert H. Kritzer in "General observations on use of the UNIDROIT Principles to help interpret the CISG". Available online at ‹http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/matchup/general-observations.html

 15. Supra. note 13.

 16. Supra. note 4.

 17. See Austrian Arbitral Proceeding SCH-4318 and Arbitral Proceeding SCH-4366 (both dated 15 June 1994); see also ICC Arbitral Award No. 8128 of 1995 and the ruling of the French Court of Appeal of Grenoble 23 October 1996, examples of cases in which tribunals have referred to the UNIDROIT Principles as it helped them reason through the CISG. One can anticipate many such references to the UNIDROIT Principles in CISG proceedings. (Supra. note 14.)

 18. See Michael Joachim Bonell in "Unification of Law by Non-Legislative Means: The UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts", 40 Am. J. Intl L. (1992); p. 618.

 19. See Peter A. Piliounis in "The Remedies of Specific Performance, Price Reduction and Additional Time (Nachfrist) under the CISG: Are these worthwhile changes or additions to English Sales Law?"(1999). Available online at ‹http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/piliounis.html

 20. Supra. note 2.

 21. Nonetheless, the parties have the general right to derogate from or modify any of the provisions in the CISG (subject to Art. 12) and they may even make the decision to exclude the CISG in its entirety. This need not be done explicitly. One example of implicit exclusion of the CISG is the choice of the law of a non-contracting state. The crucial factor is to be able to determine the will of the parties and in determining this will, Art. 8 is applicable.

 22. See Bernard Audit in "The Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria": Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration, rev. ed. [reprint of a chapter of the 1990 edition of this text], Juris Publishing (1998); p. 194. Available online at ‹http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/audit.html› While compromises were made on all fronts, and all Contracting States will notice distinctions between their domestic law and that of the CISG, the common lawyer as opposed to the civil lawyer will face greater obstacles in understanding and applying the CISG. As compared to those schooled in the common law, the majority of the drafters had been trained in civil law. Thus, it is not surprising to find that the CISG is highly reflective of civil law principles. (See Erika Sondahl in "Understanding the Remedy of Price Reduction - A Means to Fostering a More Uniform Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" (2003); available online at ‹http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sondahl.html)

 23. Supra. note 19.

 24. While the UNIDROIT Principles are designed only for international commercial contracts, they are in no way intended to take over the distinction traditionally made in some legal systems between "civil" and "commercial" parties and/or transactions, i.e. to make the application of the Principles dependent on whether the parties have the formal status of "merchants" (commerçants, Kaufleute) and/or the transaction is commercial in nature. The idea is rather that of excluding from the scope of the Principles so-called "consumer transactions" which are within the various legal systems being increasingly subjected to special rules, mostly of a mandatory character, aimed at protecting the consumer, i.e. a party who enters into the contract otherwise than in the course of its trade or profession. The criteria adopted at both national and international level also vary with respect to the distinction between consumer and non-consumer contracts. The Principles do not provide any express definition, but the assumption is that the concept of "commercial" contracts should be understood in the broadest possible sense, so as to include not only trade transactions for the supply or exchange of goods or services, but also other types of economic transactions, such as investment and/or concession agreements, contracts for professional services, etc. (See Comment 2 on the Preambles of the UPICC.)

 25. Notably, it is also said that the Convention itself purports to formulate the most common practice and therefore qualifies as an expression of lex mercatoria". (See Bernard Audit, supra. note 22.)

 26. See Barry Nicholas in "Force Majeure and Frustration": 27 American Journal of Comparative Law (1979); pp. 231-245. Available online at ‹http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas.html


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