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Remedies for Non-performance - Perspectives from CISG, UNIDROIT Principles and PECL,
Liu Chengwei  * 

INTRODUCTION

[INTRODUCTION]

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A. For Documents
B. For Journals
C. For Organizations
D. For Citations

PART I. GENERAL REVIEW

CHAPTER 1. SOURCES OF INSPIRATION

[CHAPTER 1. SOURCES OF INSPIRATION]

1.1 INTRODUCTION

1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDIED INSTRUMENTS

1.2.1 CISG
1.2.2 UNIDROIT Principles
1.2.3 PECL
1.2.4 Brief Comparison

1.3 MAJOR SOURCES OF INFORMATION

CHAPTER 2. REMEDIES AVAILABLE UPON NON-PERFORMANCE

[CHAPTER 2. REMEDIES AVAILABLE UPON NON-PERFORMANCE]

2.1 INTRODUCTION

2.2 THE CONCEPTS: BREACH OF CONTRACT vs. NON-PERFORMANCE

2.3 REMEDIAL SCHEMES OF THE STUDIED INSTRUMENTS

2.3.1 CISG Part III (Partial)
2.3.2 UNIDROIT Principles Chapter 7
2.3.3 PECL Chapters 8, 9
2.3.4 Concluding Remarks

2.4 STRUCTURE OF THIS PRESENTATION

PART II. PRESERVING PERFORMANCE
PART III. TERMINATION
PART IV. DAMAGES
PART V. EXCUSES

PART II. PRESERVING PERFORMANCE

CHAPTER 3. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

[CHAPTER 3. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE]

3.1 COMPRISED APPROACH UNDER THE CISG

3.1.1 Introduction
3.1.2 Primacy of Specific Performance under Arts. 46/62
3.1.3 Forum's Rule under Art. 28

3.2 BUYER'S RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: CISG ART. 46

3.2.1 Introduction
3.2.2 General Rule: Art. 46(1)
3.2.2.1 Right to require performance
3.2.2.2 Non-resorting to inconsistent remedies
3.2.3 Right to Demand Cure: Arts. 46(2) and 46(3)
3.2.3.1 In general
3.2.3.2 Delivery of substitute goods: Art. 46(2)
3.2.3.3 Right to repair: Art. 46(3)
3.2.3.4 Time limit restriction
3.2.3.5 A summary

3.3 SELLER'S RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE: CISG ART. 62

3.3.1 Rationale of Art. 62
3.3.2 General Application
3.3.3 Potential Problems

3.4 UNIFORM REMEDY IN UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES / PECL

3.4.1 Introduction
3.4.2 Performance of Monetary Obligation
3.4.2.1 Money due generally recoverable
3.4.2.2 Money not yet due
3.4.3 Performance of Non-monetary Obligation: In General
3.4.4 Exceptions to Performance of Non-monetary Obligation
3.4.4.1 The principle and exceptions
3.4.4.2 Performance impossible
3.4.4.3 Unreasonable burden
3.4.4.4 Performance from another source available
3.4.4.5 Performance of an exclusively personal character
3.4.4.6 Unreasonable delay in requiring performance
3.4.5 Right to Require Remedying of Defective Performance
3.4.6 Other Issues

CHAPTER 4. NACHFRIST FOR LATE PERFORMANCE

[CHAPTER 4. NACHFRIST FOR LATE PERFORMANCE]

4.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

4.2 RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE OPTIONAL APPROACH

4.2.1 Optional Approach under the Studied Instruments
4.2.2 Underlying Rationale
4.2.3 Granting Additional Period in Two Situations

4.3 SETTING OF A NACHFRIST NOTICE

4.3.1 Transmission of the Intention
4.3.1.1 Form of the notice
4.3.1.2 Risk in transmission
4.3.2 Fixing of the Time-limit
4.3.2.1 Fixed period
4.3.2.2 Reasonable length

4.4 EFFECTS OF SERVING A NACHFRIST NOTICE

4.4.1 Remedies Available/Suspended during the Period
4.4.2 Early End of the Existing Uncertainty upon Rejecting Notice
4.4.3 Termination upon Expiry of the Extension
4.4.3.1 In general
4.4.3.2 CISG approach
4.4.3.3 UNIDROIT Principles / PECL approach

CHAPTER 5. CURE BY NON-PERFORMING PARTY

[CHAPTER 5. CURE BY NON-PERFORMING PARTY]

5.1 INTRODUCTION

5.2 CONDITIONS FOR INVOKING CURE

5.2.1 In General
5.2.2 Reasonableness of Notice
5.2.3 Appropriateness of Cure

5.3 SELLER'S RIGHT TO CURE AND BUYER'S RIGHT TO TERMINATION

5.4 EFFECTS OF EFFECTIVE NOTICE

5.4.1 Right to Inquire vs. Duty to Accept Cure
5.4.2 Suspension of Inconsistent Remedies
5.4.3 Retained Rights of the Aggrieved Party

CHAPTER 6. PRICE REDUCTION FOR NON-CONFORMITY

[CHAPTER 6. PRICE REDUCTION FOR NON-CONFORMITY]

6.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

6.2 FEATURES OF CISG ART. 50

6.2.1 Unique Role and Justification
6.2.2 Self-help Remedy
6.2.3 Seeming Advantages

6.3 IN CONTRAST WITH DAMAGES

6.3.1 Introduction
6.3.2 Distinctions from Damages under the CISG
6.3.2.1 Diverse ratio legis
6.3.2.2 Different manner in calculation
6.3.2.3 Other differences
6.3.2.4 A summary
6.3.3 An Alternative to Damages
6.3.3.1 Introduction
6.3.3.2 In conjunction with force majeure
6.3.3.3 In case of falling market
6.3.3.4 Upon difficulty in proving damages
6.3.3.5 A summary

6.4 ESSENTIALS OF CISG ART. 50

6.4.1 Scope of Application
6.4.1.1 General application in case of non-conformity
6.4.1.2 Ambiguity over defects in title
6.4.2 Exercise of the Right to Price Reduction
6.4.3 Calculation of Proportional Reduction
6.4.3.1 Decisive point: time of delivery
6.4.3.2 Place for comparing
6.4.4 Limited by the Cure

6.5 STATUS OF THE PRICE REDUCTION UNDER UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES / PECL

6.5.1 Exclusion under the UNIDROIT Principles
6.5.2 Inclusion under the European Principles

PART III. TERMINATION

CHAPTER 7. RIGHT TO TERMINATION

[CHAPTER 7. RIGHT TO TERMINATION]

7.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

7.2 GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

7.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER 8. FUNDAMENTAL NON-PERFORMANCE

[CHAPTER 8. FUNDAMENTAL NON-PERFORMANCE]

8.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

8.2 FORESEEABLE SUBSTANTIAL DETRIMENT

8.2.1 Introduction
8.2.2 Substantial Detriment
8.2.2.1 Existing detriment
8.2.2.2 Substantial deprivation
8.2.2.3 Discernible expectations
8.2.3 Foreseeability
8.2.3.1 Introduction
8.2.3.2 Test for foreseeability
8.2.3.3 Time for foreseeability
8.2.3.4 Burden to prove unforeseeability

8.3 OTHER ELEMENTS IN DEFINING FUNDAMENTAL NON-PERFORMANCE

8.3.1 Strict Compliance of Essence
8.3.2 Intentional Non-performance
8.3.3 No Reliance on Future Performance
8.3.4 Disproportionate Loss

8.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER 9. ANTICIPATORY NON-PERFORMANCE

[CHAPTER 9. ANTICIPATORY NON-PERFORMANCE]

9.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

9.2 GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION

9.3 SELLER'S RIGHT TO STOP GOODS IN TRANSIT UPON SUSPENSION

9.4 DUTY TO GIVE NOTICE IN EXERCISING SUSPENSION

9.5 RESTORING PERFORMANCE BY GIVING ADEQUATE ASSURANCE

9.6 TERMINATION UPON ANTICIPATORY FUNDAMENTAL NON-PERFORMANCE

9.6.1 In General
9.6.2 Clear Indication of A Fundamental Non-performance
9.6.3 Notice Given in case of Termination

9.7 ADEQUATE ASSURANCE OF DUE PERFORMANCE

9.7.1 Purpose of Rule
9.7.2 Non-receipt of Adequate Assurance

9.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER 10. TERMINATION OF BREACHED INSTALLMENT OR PART

[CHAPTER 10. TERMINATION OF BREACHED INSTALLMENT OR PART]

10.1 TERMINATION OF INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS: CISG ART. 73

10.2 TERMINATION OF FUTURE INSTALLMENTS: CISG ART. 73(2)

10.3 TERMINATION OF A CONTRACT AS A WHOLE: CISG ART. 73(3)

10.4 PARTIAL TERMINATIO: CISG ART. 51

10.5 COMBINED APPROACH: PECL ART. 9:302

10.6 CONCLLUDING REMARKS

CHAPTER 11. DECLARATION OF TERMINATION

[CHAPTER 11. DECLARATION OF TERMINATION]

11.1 NO AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

11.2 INFORMALITY OF THE NOTICE

11.3 TRANSMISSION OF THE INTENTION

11.4 RISK IN COMMUNICATION

11.4.1 CISG Approach
11.4.2 Receipt Principle under the UNIDROIT Principles
11.4.3 Combined Approach under the PECL

11.5 TIME LIMIT FOR THE DECLARATION: IN GENERAL

11.6 DECLARATION WITHIN REASONABLE TIME

11.6.1 Definition of reasonable time
11.6.2 CISG Approach
11.6.3 UNIDROIT Principles / PECL Approach
11.6.4 Concluding Remarks

CHAPTER 12. EFFECTS OF TERMINATION

[CHAPTER 12. EFFECTS OF TERMINATION]

12.1 INTRODUCTION

12.2 RELIEF OF FUTURE PERFORMANCE

12.3 RETROSPECTIVE OR PROSPECTIVE APPROACH

12.4 UNAFFECTED RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AFTER TERMINATION

12.4.1 Continuing Right to Claim Damages
12.4.2 Unaffected Clauses Intended to Apply despite Termination

12.5 RESTITUTION

12.5.1 In General
12.5.2 Entitlement of Parties to Restitution on Termination
12.5.3 Restitution under the PECL
12.5.3.1 Property reduced in value: Art. 9:306
12.5.3.2 Recovery of money paid and property: Arts. 9:306, 9:307
12.5.3.3 Concluding remarks
12.5.4 Restitution of Benefits Received
12.5.5 Exceptions: Restitution Not Possible or Appropriate
12.5.5.1 CISG approach: making restitution a prerequisite for avoidance
12.5.5.2 UPICC/PECL approach: focusing on the allowance upon impossible restitution
12.5.5.3 Comparative perspectives
12.5.5.4 Concluding remarks

PART IV. DAMAGES

CHAPTER 13. GENERAL MEASURE OF DAMAGES

[CHAPTER 13. GENERAL MEASURE OF DAMAGES]

13.1 RIGHT TO DAMAGES

13.2 FULL COMPENSATION

13.3 RECOVERABLE LOSSES

13.4 COMPENSATION OF NON-PECUNIARY LOSS

13.5 COMPUTATION OF LOSSES AND GAINS

CHAPTER 14. LIMITS TO CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES

[CHAPTER 14. LIMITS TO CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES]

14.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

14.2 FORESEEABILITY OF LOSS

14.2.1 In General
14.2.2 Test for Foreseeability
14.2.3 Party Concerned and Reference Point
14.2.4 Evaluation of Foreseeability
14.2.5 Content of Foreseeability
14.2.6 Concluding Remarks

14.3 CERTAINTY OF HARM

14.4 CONTRIBUTION TO HARM

14.4.1 In General
14.4.2 Ways of Contributing to the Harm
14.4.3 Remedies Affected by the Contribution
14.4.3.1 Remedies available upon non-performance caused solely by the contribution
14.4.3.2 Damages proportionately reduced due to partial contribution

14.5 DUTY TO MITIGATE

14.5.1 In General
14.5.2 Reasonable Measures Taken
14.5.3 Effects of Failure to Mitigate

CHAPTER 15. DAMAGES UPON TERMINATION

[CHAPTER 15. DAMAGES UPON TERMINATION]

15.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

15.2 DAMAGES UPON SUBSTITUTE TRANSACTIONS

15.2.1 Introduction
15.2.2 Presupposed Situations Calling for Concrete Calculation
15.2.3 Substitute Transaction must be Reasonable Substitute

15.3 DAMAGES UPON CURRENT PRICE

15.3.1 Introduction
15.3.2 Presupposed Situations Calling for Abstract Calculation
15.3.3 Determination of "Current Price"
15.3.3.1 In general
15.3.3.2 Reference point
15.3.3.3 Relevant place

15.4 FURTHER DAMAGES

CHAPTER 16. AGREED PAYMENT FOR NON-PERFORMANCE

[CHAPTER 16. AGREED PAYMENT FOR NON-PERFORMANCE]

CHAPTER 17. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES

[CHAPTER 17. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES]

17.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

17.1.1 Introduction
17.1.2 Recoverability under "Loser-pays" Principle
17.1.3 Excluded by "American Rule"

17.2 CISG DECISIONS CONCERNING ATTORNEYS' FEES

17.3 PROBLEMATIC RECOVERY UNDER ART. 74 CISG

CHAPTER 18. PAYMENT OF INTEREST

[CHAPTER 18. PAYMENT OF INTEREST]

18.1 INTRODUCTION

18.2 GENERAL ENTITLEMENT TO INTEREST

18.3 ADDITIONAL DAMAGES

18.4 INTEREST ON DAMAGES

18.5 ACCRUAL OF INTEREST

18.6 RATE OF INTEREST

PART V. EXCUSES

CHAPTER 19. CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES

[CHAPTER 19. CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES]

19.1 INTRODUCTION

19.2 UNSDERLYING DOCTRINCE; REBUS SIC STANTIBUS

19.3 DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

19.3.1 Historical Review
19.3.2 National Doctrines
19.3.3 International Perspective
19.3.3.1 Public international law
19.3.3.2 International commercial practice
19.3.4 Conclusion

19.4 DEFINITIONS OF force majeure AND HARDSHIP

19.4.1 Force Majeure
19.4.2 Hardship
19.4.3 Comparison

19.5 GENERAL APPROACHES IN THE STUDIED INSTRUMENTS

19.5.1 Approach under the CISG
19.5.2 Approach under the UNIDROIT Principles
19.5.3 Approach under the PECL
19.5.4 Concluding Remarks

CHAPTER 20. force majeure

[CHAPTER 20. force majeure]

20.1 INTRODUCTION

20.2 RELEVANT TEXTS

20.2.1 Exemptions: CISG Art. 79
20.2.2 Force Majeure: UNIDROIT Principles Art. 6.1.7
20.2.3 Excuse Due to an Impediment: PECL Art. 8:108
20.2.4 Comparison

20.3 GENERAL RULE

20.3.1 Scope of Excusable Non-performance
20.3.2 Existence of Qualifying Impediment
20.3.2.1 Introduction of a new word
20.3.2.2 Interpretation of the word
20.3.2.3 Problematic situations
20.3.3 Conditions for Exempting Impediment
20.3.3.1 Beyond control
20.3.3.2 Unforeseeable
20.3.3.3 Unavoidable or insurmountable
20.3.3.4 Causation

20.4 RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIRD PARTIES

20.5 TEMPORARY IMPEDIMENT

20.6 DUTY TO NOTIFY

20.7 EFFECTS

20.7.1 In General
20.7.2 Effect on Right to Damages
20.7.3 Effect on Right to Performance
20.7.4 Effect on Right to Termination

CHAPTER 21. HARDSHIP

[CHAPTER 21. HARDSHIP]

21.1 GAP IN THE CISG?

21.2 INTERPLAY BETWEEN CISG EXCUSE AND UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES / PECL HARDSHIP

21.2.1 Hardship: UNIDROIT Principles Arts. 6.2.1 through 6.2.3
21.2.2 Change of Circumstances: PECL Art. 6:111
21.2.3 Gap-filling Application of Hardship Provisions?

21.3 CONDITIONS FOR INVOKING HARDSHIP

21.3.1 In General
21.3.2 Crucial Point: Fundamental Alteration of Equilibrium
21.3.3 Additional Requirements for Hardship to Arise
21.3.3.1 Time factor: occurrence after conclusion
21.3.3.2 Unforeseeability
21.3.3.3 Risk not assumed

21.4 EFFECTS OF HARDSHIP

21.4.1 In General
21.4.2 Triggering of Renegotiation
21.4.2.1 Request for renegotiation
21.4.2.2 Renegotiation in good faith
21.4.3 Court Measures in case of Hardship
21.4.4 Concluding Remarks

CHAPTER 22. FORCE MAJEURE and HARDSHIP CLAUSES

[CHAPTER 22. FORCE MAJEURE and HARDSHIP CLAUSES]

22.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

22.2 FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE

22.2.1 Introduction
22.2.2 Drafting Considerations

22.3 HARDSHIP CLAUSE

22.3.1 Introduction
22.3.2 Drafting Considerations

22.4 OVERLAPPING OF THE CLAUSES

22.5 USE OF STANDARD FORMS: ICC No. 421 (partial)

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Remedies for Non-performance - Perspectives from CISG, UNIDROIT Principles and PECL,
Liu Chengwei

PART V. EXCUSES

CHAPTER 19. CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES

19.4 DEFINITIONS OF force majeure AND HARDSHIP

19.4.1 Force Majeure
19.4.2 Hardship
19.4.3 Comparison

Generally, changes in circumstances may have two different effects on a contract: they can render the contractual performance either impossible or (only) more burdensome for a party so as to create a "hardship" for it.  1061  This leads us to the important and crucial question as to the concepts of hardship and force majeure. However, a clear distinction of the meaning of both terms in commercial practice is not always easy. There are indeed borderline cases, which cannot be labelled as falling in one or the other basket exclusively. Practitioners of international arbitration will also agree that there is a great confusion as to the use of these two terms. Even in important international contracts, they are often inserted as synonyms.  1062  Nonetheless, the following paragraphs attempt to review the two concepts on a general and theoretical basis.

1185

The concept of force majeure, providing for the discharge of one or both parties when a contract has become impossible to perform, "has evolved progressively in international trade practice by assuming many original and autonomous features distinct from similar legal concepts."  1063  It is said that the roots of force majeure are in the Roman concept of vis maior, which serves as a limit to liability not based on fault.  1064  Others submit that the roots of the classic concept lie in the Code Napoléon, from which the words force majeure (an irresistible compulsion or coercion) are taken.  1065 

The term force majeure does not have an authoritative definition. As outlined above, the approach of municipal legal systems to situations of force majeure varies from country to country. In the practice of the European Court of Justice, force majeure has been defined to be an event unusual, unforeseeable and beyond the trader's control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided even if all due care had been exercised.  1066  On the other hand, the Court has emphasized that the concept of force majeure differs in content in different areas of law and in its various spheres of application and that the precise meaning of the concept therefore has to be decided by reference to the legal context in which it is intended to operate.  1067 

Generally, the term may be used as a general term referring to some kind of event that serves as a basis for an exemption from liability, and therefore certain general characteristics of the conception of force majeure can be determined: "The legal elements for the qualification of an event as force majeure (vis maior, act of God, etc.) are essentially the same in most legislations, and court decisions show a universal trend to a comparable restrictive interpretation. These elements are (i) that the event is of an external nature, (ii) that it could not be foreseen or prevented and (iii) that it renders performance of a contractual obligation impossible at all or for a certain time."  1068  This is confirmed by Art. 7.1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles where, under the headline of "force majeure", it is stated that a party's non-performance is excused if that party proves that the non-performance was due to an impediment beyond its control, and that it could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome the impediment or its consequences.

In most cases the term force majeure refers to an external event that is unforeseeable and irresistible which makes the performance of the contract at least practically impossible. If we accept this definition we can also say that the relation of impossibility to force majeure is that force majeure can be defined as qualified impossibility: it is impossibility restricted by the type of cause and foreseeability.  1069  In more general terms, it can be said that force majeure occurs when the performance of a contract is impossible due to unforeseeable events beyond the control of the parties.  1070 

1190

As discussed above, force majeure, which is aimed to settle the problems resulting from non-performance either by suspension or termination, is a fundamental change in the circumstances beyond the control of the parties that affects the existing contractual obligations and is ground for relief from some or all contractual duties. But in many cases where either or both parties maintain an economic interest in continued contractual cooperation as is typical for long-term contracts interrupted halfway in their execution, there is a sort of consensus that other solutions must be found. Such solutions are usually found in the context of "hardship clauses", which are frequently introduced into contracts in international trade.

Hardship can be understood as a situation, which does not quite amount to being a force majeure. It means that the performance of a contract has become more onerous for the performing party. A typical example of hardship would be a steep rise in the prices of raw materials after the conclusion of the contract.  1071  Although most modern legislations have rules to cope with such hardship situations (which roughly fall under the so-called clausula rebus sic stantibus), accepted solutions by national laws as well as court decisions and legal doctrine show a remarkable degree of variation. Nonetheless, the circumstances in which hardship generally exists (as usually set out in hardship clauses) normally incorporate three elements. First, the circumstances must have arisen beyond the control of either party; self-induced hardship is irrelevant. Second, they must be of fundamental character. Third, they must be entirely uncontemplated and unforeseeable.  1072 

A clear descriptive definition of hardship is contained in Art. 6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Principles. This article defines hardship as a situation where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract, provided that those events meet the requirements laid down therein.  1073  According to this definition, hardship can also occur in situations where the value of what the performing party is to receive in return for his performance has diminished, whether or not this has affected his ability to perform. This definition of hardship would seem to include force majeure (qualified impossibility) and some cases of impossibility outside force majeure as well as other types of events that fundamentally affect the balance of the contract. Impossibility of performance is not necessarily required and there is no reference to not being able to avoid or overcome the situation.  1074  The concept of hardship contained in the UNIDROIT Principles intends to solve problems of such fundamentally altered circumstances by adapting the contract to the new situation. It appears justifiable to speak today, with respect to complex long-term contracts, of a duty on the parties, to renegotiate in good faith on the needed adjustment.  1075 

1194

The concepts of hardship and force majeure seem to be related to each other, particularly since they share some features: they both cater to situations of changed circumstances. The concepts of hardship and force majeure constitute exceptions to the principle pacta sunt servanda; they apply in situations where the circumstances existing at the conclusion of the contract have subsequently changed so drastically that the parties would not have made the contract, or would have made it differently had they known what was going to happen. This impression is intensified by the fact that contractual hardship clauses on the one hand and force majeure clauses on the other hand have developed a certain parallelism. To some extent, the concepts of force majeure and hardship overlap.

Nevertheless, these conceptions also differ from each other and no specific overall trend may be traced.  1076  They are implemented in different ways. The difference between the two concepts is most aptly described in such a way: hardship is at stake where the performance of the disadvantaged party has become much more burdensome, but not impossible, while force majeure means that the performance has become impossible for the party concerned, at least temporarily. Moreover, there seems to be a functional difference between the two concepts. Hardship constitutes a reason for a change in the contractual program of the parties and has a deeper influence on the implementation of the contract than normal variants which come up in this process, however hardship is nevertheless related to the fulfillment of the contract. The aim of the parties remains to implement the contract. force majeure, however, is situated in the context of non-performance, and deals with the suspension or termination of the contract.  1077  In other words, hardship occurs where the performance of the disadvantaged party has become much more burdensome, but not impossible. On the other hand, force majeure, means that the performance of the party concerned has, at least temporarily, become impossible. The classical concept of force majeure is primarily directed at settling the problems resulting from non-performance, either by suspension or by termination. The concept of hardship, however, is mainly directed at the adaptation of the contract.  1078 

The comparison of force majeure and hardship stated above may give a primary insight into the structure and functioning of these concepts in general. With the international contractual practice, measures oriented towards uniform general concepts of force majeure and hardship have been developed. In order to understand the two major concepts, a particular regard will be had below to the deliberations on force majeure and hardship in the three studied instruments, which are useful for the interpretation of force majeure or hardship clauses and even relevant to tackling contracts affected by changed circumstances in the absence of such clauses.


 1061. Supra. note 22.

 1062. See Melis, Werner in "Force Majeure and Hardship Clauses in International Commercial Contracts in View of the Practices of the ICC Court of Arbitration": 1 J.Int'l Arb. (1984); p. 215. TLDB Document ID: 126600.

 1063. See Ugo Draetta in "Force Majeure Clauses in International Trade Practice": 5 Int'l Bus. L. J.(1996); p. 547.

 1064. Supra. note 2.

 1065. See, e.g., The Oxford Companion to Law (1980); p. 478; see also James Stroud's Judicional Dictionary II (1986); p. 1008.

 1066. See, e.g., Case 266/84 (1987) 3 CMLR 202, p. 223 ((1986) ECR 149).

 1067. See e.g., Case 158-73, ECR (1974) 101; Case 4-68, ECR (1968) 549.

 1068. Supra. note 50.

 1069. Supra. note 2.

 1070. See Wouter Den Haerynck in "Drafting Hardship Clauses in International Contracts": Structuring International Contracts, Dennis Campbell ed. (1996); pp. 231-232.

 1071. Supra. note 2.

 1072. See Clive M. Schmitthoff in "Hardship and Intervener Clauses": J. Bus. L. (1980). 82 at 85.

 1073. See Comment 1 on Art. 6.2.2 UPICC.

 1074. Supra. note 2.

 1075. Supra. note 22, p. 27.

 1076. Supra. note 25, p. 242.

 1077. Supra. note 9, pp. 663-664; see also supra. note 24, pp. 201-202.

 1078. Supra. note 64.


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