SILENCE AND MEMORY IN CRIMINOLOGY—
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY
2009 SUTHERLAND ADDRESS*

NICOLE RAFTER
College of Criminal Justice
Northeastern University

KEYWORDS: criminological modernism, history of criminology, history and memory, scientific modernism

Two recent American Society of Criminology presidential addresses have identified as a key problem the fact that criminology lacks a history. In this address, I ask why criminology (in contrast to closely related fields) has generated so few studies of its past; I also identify some results of this failure and discuss why intellectual fields need a sense of their origins and development. History molds individual and collective identities; it lays a foundation for sociologies of knowledge; it encourages reflexivity, teaches us where our ideas came from, and gives us a sense of where we are going. To encourage historical work, I propose an overall framework for understanding the evolution of criminology, reaching back to the late eighteenth century and continuing into the present. My overall framework is that of scientific modernism, within which I identify the following three primary phases: exploratory modernism, confident modernism, and agonistic modernism. In conclusion, I suggest ways to stimulate histories of science in the field of criminology.

Memory is a kind of accomplishment, a sort of renewal, even an initiation, since the spaces it opens are new places . . . .

—William Carlos Williams, “The Descent”

*I owe many thanks to Peter Becker, Michelle Brown, Mary Gibson, Robert Hahn, Frances Heidensohn, Paul Rock, Geoff Ward, and Per Ystehede for their help with earlier drafts of this talk. Direct correspondence to Nicole Rafter, College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University, 360 Huntington Avenue, Boston, MA 02115 (e-mail: n.rafter@neu.edu).

© 2010 American Society of Criminology
Four miles west of Boston, on the Cambridge–Watertown line, you will find Mount Auburn Cemetery—America’s first landscaped burial ground and a spectacularly beautiful parkland along the lines of Olmsted’s great creations. Before Mount Auburn was laid out, in 1831, Americans interred one another as Europeans had done for a thousand years—almost anonymously, in graves topped with nearly identical slate stones and lined up in crowded ranks. These graves were recycled periodically—emptied out to make room for new corpses. You can find an example of the old-style cemetery on Copp’s Hill, in Boston’s North End—the earliest part of the city to be inhabited by colonists—where an ancient graveyard, founded in 1659, survives. Slate stones remain, but many of them are broken and illegible, and even the gravesites of Increase and Cotton Mather (the illustrious Puritan ministers) are marked only by the scarred stone box that holds the dynasty’s remains. Most of these older cemeteries, which were established in the centers of what became thriving cities, have been destroyed—a destruction that has silenced their testimonies about the past.

When Mount Auburn Cemetery opened in the early 1830s, it broke with this centuries-old approach to burial. Located on what was, at the time, a rural fringe of Boston, it kept the dead out of the population center—a step that, as city planners were realizing, was important for sanitation. Mount Auburn’s landscaping, reflecting the Romanticism of the era in which it was founded, was calculated to offer the consolations of nature to those visiting their dead: tombs and monuments were scattered through bosky dells and around quiet ponds; at the foot of ancient trees, and in the shade of flowering shrubs.

But Mount Auburn was designed for yet another purpose—the one of interest to me here—and that was to give Bostonians a sense of their own history. It was to be a place where they could commemorate their ancestors and civic heroes, creating what one historian calls “sacred repositories to which they could repair for philosophic or patriotic contemplation of the past” (Linden, 2007: 97). Mount Auburn attempted to engineer civic memory. Its founders, anxious to create a sense of social stability in a city that recently had led a revolution, realized that Boston—and, indeed, the entire nation—needed traditions and a collective memory. The cemetery’s establishment reflected their sense of history and desire to weave connections between the present and the past. It offered “landscapes of memory” (Linden, 2007: 4).

It seems to me that, as criminologists, with regard to our own history, our circumstance is much like that of the Bostonians before they had the inspired idea of establishing Mount Auburn. We have little awareness of criminology’s development and almost no monuments or touchstones that can help us recollect our past and establish a sense of tradition. Where we
SILENCE AND MEMORY IN CRIMINOLOGY

need words, we have silence. Where we need traditions, we have forgetfulness. Where we need reflexivity, we have ignorance. What we need is a history—or rather, histories—of our science.


The field of criminology lacks a sense of its own history. . . . There is a “presentism” in our field that I find contrary to the spirit of a healthy, intellectually vibrant enterprise. . . . “[N]ew” developments in our field are constantly offered in an environment characterized by a collective amnesia. . . . [W]e can rectify this by taking our past more seriously so that we will be better able to create our future.

In what follows, I want to propose a specific historical framework that will enable us to take Laub’s general advice and make it concrete.

First, however, I want to ask why related disciplines, such as psychology and sociology, are so much richer than criminology in the histories of their sciences. Is it because criminology is too new as an area of academic inquiry? Perhaps, although one might note that nearly a century or more has passed since criminology first was taught in England and in the United States (Rafter, 2004; Rock, 1994; Rock, Paul E. [personal communication, 11 May 2009]), and that more than 130 years have passed since Lombroso (1876) founded the field. Or is our historical laggardness the result (as some contend) of the fact that criminology is not really a discipline at all but a field without a disciplinary core (Savelsberg and Sampson, 2002)? Perhaps, but the same charge of lacking a core could be brought against psychology—an area of inquiry on which historians have lavished considerable attention despite its being all spokes and no hub or all branches with no trunk. Is the dearth of histories of criminology perhaps due to the

1. Other important sources are cited in Rafter (2009).
2. According to Rock (personal communication, 11 May 2009), what was probably the first criminology course in the United Kingdom was taught in the 1920s at the University of Birmingham by the psychologist M. Hamblin Smith. In my 2004 article on Earnest Hooton (Rafter, 2004: 744), I suggested that the first criminology course in the United States might have been that which Hooton introduced at Harvard University in the anthropology department in 1916. However, I must have been wrong because in a 1942 address, Edwin Sutherland (1956: 13) mentioned that at the University of Chicago, he “had taken a course in criminology in 1906 under Charles Richmond Henderson,” and that he himself started regularly offering a criminology course in 1913.
relatively small size of the field? Maybe, but one could point to the richer history of even smaller fields; there are more histories of optics and ocular devices than of criminology.

Or should we explain our silence about the past in terms of what Robert J. Bursik (2009: 6) has termed a “newness fetish,” a mistaken “belief that criminology has generated bodies of theory and research of steadily increasing quality and creativity over time” (also see Laub, 2004: 8)? Bursik’s explanation hits near the truth, I think, and it relates to the way in which many criminologists misunderstand the nature of science. Throughout time, criminologists have tended to adopt what one might call the gold-digging model of doing science, interpreting their work as a search for precious truth—for a definitive cause of crime, or at least for an unshakable scientific step in that direction. If we dig deeply enough, according to this model, and work with sufficiently powerful tools, then we eventually will hit pay dirt—at which point we can toss the fool’s gold of earlier efforts in the trash. This belief probably stems from an impression that the hard sciences follow the gold-digging model, which is another misunderstanding.3

Whatever its explanation, criminologists’ disdain for memory condemns us to operate with one hand—maybe two—tied behind our backs. We lack a sense of our work as part of a project in time. Large chunks of our memory have fallen away, leaving us, like victims of Alzheimer’s disease, stripped of our identity. We have to function not only without a past but also without a sense of criminology’s possible futures. When we allow our past to atrophy and disappear, we lose track of who we are, where we come from, and where we are going (Zerubavel, 2003). We become scientific, pretending to resemble hard scientists, and we have to struggle along without the sustenance of traditions and without a sense of the field’s identity.

History, on the other hand, molds individual and collective identities. It can contribute to the sociology of criminological knowledge, for example, by illuminating the life course of theories of crime. It can disabuse us of myths about early criminologists, on whom we might draw for support when, in fact, what we think we know of their work is mainly misinformation. History enables us to be reflexive—to modify what we do as a result of learning about the past; for example, knowing more about how racial categorizations entered the Uniform Crime Reports and what their effects have been over time would enable us to counteract those effects better. History can improve our understanding of social change in the field of criminology; it gives us a long view. Knowing our history teaches us about

3. According to the philosopher of science Karl Popper, “all science rests upon shifting sand” (Giddens, 1990: 39).
not only where our ideas came from but also where we are going and who we are. As John H. Laub (2004: 1) remarked, “if we knew our history, we would realize that ideas about crime matter.” History, like a cemetery that memorializes the past, is a civilizing influence.

In what follows, I first propose a chronology for criminology and a framework for thinking about its development. The framework is that of scientific modernism—a set of scientific principles derived from Enlightenment thought. After outlining the general principles of scientific modernism, I propose that within that framework, criminology developed in three stages—those of exploratory modernism, confident modernism, and agonistic modernism. I define these three periods in some detail before returning to the general problem of establishing lineages and reconstituting memories. In conclusion, I recommend steps that criminologists can take to begin reconstituting their past, thereby gaining a clearer sense of where their field has come from, what it is today, and where it is going.

A CHRONOLOGY FOR CRIMINOLOGY

Laub (2004) has proposed a life-course approach to criminology, identifying three eras from 1900 to the present and within those areas five “turning points” or key shifts in criminology’s intellectual trajectory. This proposal provides a framework for studying the development of twentieth century American criminology, but it needs extension, for two reasons. First, it starts in 1900 and focuses on the United States, but criminology is much older and geographically broader. If we define criminology as efforts to study crime and criminals scientifically, then we must recognize that the field began in the late eighteenth century in Europe and its colonies as well as in the United States with, for example, attempts to identify the impact of climate and alcohol on criminal behavior (Rush, 1947 [1786]), to research the condition we now call psychopathy (Pinel, 1806 [1801]), and to study the correlations between physiognomy and antisocial conduct (Lavater, 1789; see also Rafter, 2009). We need a framework for thinking about criminological history that goes back at least to the 1780s and covers not only North America but also Europe and its colonies.

Second, although Laub’s (2004: 5) analysis acknowledges the impact of “external forces outside of the discipline,” its “turning points” approach emphasizes internalist history—history built on changes within the field. But to understand the development of criminology, we need both internal and external analyses and, therefore, an analytical framework that begins with intellectual movements and issues that had nothing directly to do with criminology.

As I see it, criminology has developed within the framework or overall
set of philosophical assumptions of scientific modernism.\textsuperscript{4} Scientific modernism has provided the intellectual foundation for criminology from the late eighteenth century to the present, setting its parameters and shaping its content. Like modernism more generally, it consists of ideas derived from Enlightenment thought.\textsuperscript{5} Scientific modernism incorporated positivism; it called for objectivity and neutrality as well as for experimentation and verification; and it insisted that truth be determined by empirical evidence. It assumed that scientific knowledge was concerned with the general rather than with the unique and that the job of science should be to simplify—to find common elements. Its model of science, based on that of the natural sciences, implied that the social sciences would look for causes and, to some degree, be deterministic. In its applications of science to daily life, scientific modernism called for practicality, efficiency, technical expertise, pragmatism, social planning, and social engineering. Some of the principles of scientific modernism can be found, at least in embryonic form, in On Crimes and Punishments—the little book by Cesare Beccaria (2009 [1764]). Although not itself a scientific work, Beccaria’s legal treatise, like scientific modernism, builds on the philosophic foundations of Enlightenment thought; thus, the two have much in common.\textsuperscript{6}

Within the overall framework of scientific modernism, criminology unfolded in three main stages. First came what I call exploratory modernism—a period that lasted from the 1780s to the 1870s, and during which researchers tried to figure out how to apply the principles of scientific

\textsuperscript{4} Terminology in this area is particularly confusing; we need to differentiate between 1) modernity and modernism as well as between 2) aesthetic and scientific modernism. “Modernity” generally is used to refer to the period in the Western world that followed feudalism and was characterized by the rise of capitalism, an emphasis on rationality, a reliance on empirical evidence and scientific explanation, a belief that the world can be changed by human interventions, and an evolutionary or progressionist understanding of history—faith that whatever is under discussion, be it a profession or life itself, is advancing toward perfection. Melossi (2008: 36–7) defined modernity simply and usefully as “the idea of following one’s own path without being led by the hand of any higher authority.” Some scholars date modernity to 1200 (Smith, 1997), others to 1500, 1600, or 1700; some say we are still in the period of modernity, others say that we have passed beyond it (see, especially, Giddens, 1990).

“Modernism” is a narrower term, but it, too, is defined variously, and the concept is particularly difficult to define in relation to the sciences because “modernism” originated as an aesthetic term and most often has been used to analyze tendencies in the arts and architecture. However, in recent years, some scholars have looked for manifestations of modernism in the sciences as well as in the arts; see, for example, Berman (1994) and Rosenau (1992).

\textsuperscript{5} The following generalizations are based on ideas developed in Rosenau (1992); also see Giddens (1990) and Milovanovic (1997).

\textsuperscript{6} The introduction to the new translation of On Crimes and Punishments (Beccaria, 2009) discusses scientific aspects of Beccaria’s work.
modernism to the study of crime, criminals, and social-control systems. Second came the lengthy period that we might term “confident modernism,” which started in the 1870s and lasted into the 1970s; during this century, modernism’s scientific project realized itself in criminology as well as in other social sciences. Obviously, there were many phases within this century-long period of confidently modernist criminology; a central task facing criminological historians is to identify and explain those phases.7 Third came the period of agonistic modernism.8 Starting in about 1970 and continuing into the present, confidently modernist criminology lost its nerve, entering into an agon, or serious struggle, in which factions have fought over the basic tenets of scientific modernism. The field has experienced a splintering of its hitherto sturdy disciplinary model and challenges to its fundamental epistemological and scientific assumptions. You might wonder why I do not simply call this third period “postmodernist” criminology, since the phenomena of splintering, fragmentation, and recombination, not to mention that of epistemological upending, are characteristics of postmodernist theory. I do not because so few of those who caused the splintering and became protagonists in the agon (feminist criminologists, for example) subscribed in any detail to the philosophical positions of postmodernist theory.9 Thus, agonistic modernism seems a better (if less chic) term.

Let me now identify these three stages in more detail.

EXPLORATORY MODERNISM

During the first period, of exploratory modernism or protodisciplinary criminology, researchers began to study crime and criminals using what they considered to be scientific methods. This was an exploratory period because researchers were scouting out new territory, prowling and probing without as yet having agreed on how to proceed. For example, phrenologists developed a biological and empirical (although not experimental) explanation for criminal behavior of all sorts (Rafter, 2005), and in France, Andre-Michel Guerry (1833) compiled the first national database on crime, using arrests for his baseline. Adolphe Quetelet (1835) recognized that the consistency shown by crime statistics year after year and independent of reactions by the criminal justice system meant that crime must be a

---

7. We also can distinguish recurrent variations within modernist criminology, such as the antimodernist reactions that I have identified elsewhere (Rafter, 2007).
8. This term comes from Ross (1994: 19); however, she used it in a different context.
9. Although it seems useful to analyze the history of criminology in terms of modernism, I think it is better to reserve “postmodernism” to analyze changes in the arts. In fact, the very idea of postmodernist social science (including postmodernist history) seems to me almost a contradiction in terms; see Rosenau (1992), but compare Arrigo, Milovanovic, and Schehr (2005).
social, and not an individual, phenomenon. Henry Mayhew conducted his monumental study of the prisons of London, speculating en route on the causes of crime (Mayhew and Binny, 1862), and Fredrich Engels (1993 [1845]) began to develop a theory of urbanization and crime.

However, these and other early investigators did not think of themselves as criminologists, nor did they conceive of their work as a contribution to a specific science of crime and criminals. They thought of themselves as physicians, or lawyers, or statisticians, and so on, contributing to medicine, or law, or the compilation of governmental statistics. Without realizing it, they were assembling tools and materials for confidently modernist criminology, but it was not until the 1870s that researchers realized that they actually might be creating the building blocks for a new field—a science of crimes and criminals.

CONFIDENT MODERNISM

During the period of confident modernism, which lasted from the 1870s to the 1970s, researchers applied the principles of scientific modernism to understanding crime and criminals. This was a confident period because investigators fully expected that the methods of scientific modernism, if applied correctly, could identify the causes of crime. It began in the early 1870s when British physicians and psychiatrists began producing something that sounded very much like criminal anthropology, although they still had no independent name for such work nor any clear idea of how it might be made scientific (Maudsley, 1898 [1874]; Thomson, 1870a, 1870b; also see Davie, 2005; Garland, 1994). The changeover to a fully confident modernist criminology had to wait until 1876 when Cesare Lombroso introduced his theory of criminal anthropology and demonstrated that the study of crime and criminals could be a science. From today’s perspective, his positivism was crude both epistemologically and methodologically; however, its very crudeness demonstrates, not only that Lombroso (like others of his generation) was unsophisticated as a research scientist but also that to develop scientific methods for the study of crime was an exceedingly difficult task.

In what ways was Lombroso’s research scientific? What methods did he develop for studying criminals? In other words, in what ways did his work represent a move into confident modernism? First, Lombroso used numbers, looking to verify his claims through aggregations and generalizations, such as recidivism rates. He measured skulls and reported his results in tables that broke them down by offense type. He introduced control groups, comparing the criminal man with the “healthy” or law-abiding man and with the insane. He compared female criminals with male criminals and compared all criminals with the African and Australian “savages” that he saw as evolutionary prototypes of the criminal. Drawing
on the hard-sciences model, Lombroso insisted on complete determinism, at least in the case of the anthropological criminal. In his view, the born criminal had no free will whatsoever but rather physically was doomed to kill and steal.

Quite apart from these specifics, Lombroso was a confident modernist simply by virtue of his insistence that criminal anthropology adopt scientific methods. “We must abandon the sublime realms of philosophy,” he wrote, “and even the sensational facts of crime itself and proceed instead to the direct physical and psychological study of the criminal, comparing the result with information on the healthy and the insane” (Lombroso, 2006: 43). The iconoclastic nature of this statement becomes clearer if one notes that, previously, most criminological discussions had been based on either philosophical principles or horrific anecdotes. Today Lombroso’s science seems careless, racist, and sexist; but there is no denying that he was doing something revolutionary—inventing a confidently modernist criminology. His achievement brought him respect, as well as occasional ridicule, throughout the Western world.

A key transition within the period of confident modernism occurred around 1900 when researchers rejected criminal anthropology but renewed their interest in the field that now was being called “criminology.” Key figures in this transition included W.E.B. DuBois (1899), Émile Durkheim (1960 [1895]), Frances Kellor (1901), and Gabriel Tarde (1890). Like their Lombrosian predecessors, this new generation of criminologists confidently embraced positivism, but they were far less deterministic; they had a clearer understanding of what scientific methods entailed, and they generated theories that were more sociological in cast. Their approach persisted into the present; we are their heirs.

However, these changes of about 1900, although deeply influential, fundamentally continued the trajectory initiated in the 1870s. The sociological positivists of the early twentieth century, like their more naturalistic predecessors of the 1870s, did not question the power of science to solve criminological mysteries. They shared their predecessors’ epistemological assumptions about the field’s methods and mission. They too were confident in their modernism.

AGONISTIC MODERNISM

Threats to confident modernism appeared around 1970 when criminology’s scientific and epistemological assumptions were fractured by the advent of feminism, radical racial politics, the revival of Marxism, student revolutions, the sexual revolution, drug cultures, and the entry into the academy of a generation of young liberals eager to challenge tradition.
Such dramatic challenges naturally had many points of origin, but for convenience, we might peg them to 1968 when, in the *British Journal of Sociology*, the young feminist Frances Heidensohn (1968: 160) observed that “[t]he deviance of women is one of the areas of human behavior most notably ignored in sociological literature,” an observation that led her to suggest, ever so politely, that criminologists’ supposedly objective science was contaminated deeply by sexism. A few years later, in the United States, Dorie Klein (1973) made similar points about the field’s gender biases. At the same time, in *The New Criminology*, a trio of British radicals invoked Marx to attack the political and epistemological underpinnings of traditional criminology (Taylor, Walton, and Young, 1973). Black voices, too, joined the critical chorus (Brown, 1990 [1969]; Davis, 1971; Jackson, 1970; Ladner, 1973); what they all were demanding was not the end of science, but better science—a criminology and criminal justice system shorn of social class, racial, and gender biases as well as of exclusionary practices and of uncritical correctionalism. More recently, other new voices have inserted themselves into criminological discourse, including those of criminologists focused on human rights and genocide (e.g., Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 2009), cultural criminologists (e.g., Ferrell, Hayward, and Young, 2008), and postmodernist criminologists (e.g., Young, 2007).

In sum, since about 1970, we have seen a breakdown of basic assumptions and the rise of self-reflexive, standpoint criminologies—discourses self-consciously generated from specific viewpoints, such as that of critical criminology. However, aside from a few fully postmodernist works, these new criminologies seldom have been antiscience; nor have they, even collectively, replaced traditional, confident criminology. Indeed, although they might have made some traditionalists uncomfortable, they have had little effect on business as usual; for example, despite the development of feminist criminology, the establishment of an ASC Division on Women and Crime, and the publication of two journals devoted to feminist criminology, many criminologists still do not grasp the difference between sex and gender. In sum, criminology has been going through a struggle or contest, an agon that has been anguishing at times but fatal to none of the combatants. Traditionalists have continued generating theories and addressing social problems as usual, without paying much attention to

---

10. Compare criminology in this respect with sociology: “Gender has for the last twenty years been . . . one of the four or five most central research topics in sociology” (Abbott, 2001: 106, n. 24). Also see Ferree, Khan, and Morimoto (2007).
critiques of methodological positivism, even while new voices, fresh approaches, and strong critics have entered the field, fragmenting the old consensus.11

My proposed framework, its chronology, and its labels are necessarily tentative and speculative; too little is known about the history of criminology to speak definitively. Moreover, it is clear that my framework applies better to some countries than others and that other frameworks will need to be devised for nations beyond North America and Western Europe. It is also clear that historical periods do not simply drop dead on a given date but taper off and intermingle with what follows. The reason I am taking the trouble to propose this framework at all is to push the history of criminology into motion. My hope is to stimulate specific studies—of the history of quantification in criminology, for example, or of shifts in epistemological criteria for determining truth. I will have succeeded if people challenge my chronology with different periodizations and my labels with other terminology.

One final point before returning to the graveyard: Most people define criminology as a social science, perhaps even a subdivision of sociology—maybe even a subdivision of deviance studies (Short and Hughes, 2007: 606). But I am starting to think that social science is perhaps too narrow a category for criminology, at least if we want to do a history of a field that began with anthropology, biology, medicine, and psychiatry, and today again is ballooning out toward biology, including genetics and neuroscience, and also toward cultural phenomena, such as the media and crime. We could limit our ambitions to histories of criminology as a social science, but we might do better to nest the field among the human sciences—meaning all those disciplines concerned with the nature of human beings, including anthropology, biology, economics, philosophy, political theory, psychology, and sociology.12 Reclassifying criminology as a human science

11. Of postmodernism, Rosenau (1992: 5) perceptively wrote: “Ironically, on occasion this flamboyant approach arrives at conclusions that merely reinforce those already evident in the social sciences. Threads of post-modern arguments weave in and out of those advanced by more conventional critics of modern social sciences, and so post-modernism is not always as entirely original as it first appears.” Similarly, see Ross, (2003: 235). But even if traditional criminologists and their post-1970s critics are not as far apart as they may like to think, it is nonetheless true that a major change began around 1970 with the questioning of the principles of scientific modernism, on which criminological research had rested from the start. Confidence was lost, to be replaced by something approaching theoretical and epistemological chaos.

might annoy some sociologists, but it could lead to more inclusive and accurate histories of the field—not to mention, to a clearer understanding of what criminology is today.

ESTABLISHING LINEAGES, RECONSTITUTING MEMORIES

Now, to return to Mount Auburn Cemetery, which I used earlier as a metaphor for writing history, for getting to know our ancestors, and for maintaining our past. We do not need to sing hosannas to great forerunners as did those at Mount Auburn who memorialized their ancestors with life-size angels and towering obelisks, but we do need to find ways to break our silences, preserve our memories, and connect with earlier generations of criminologists. “Remembering,” as the philosopher Paul Ricoeur (2004: 4, 57) points out, “is not only welcoming, receiving an image of the past, it is also searching for it, ‘doing’ something.” Memory involves more than just passively having images of the past pop into our heads; it also involves the active process of recollection. We need to write chapters of our past (equivalents to Mount Auburn’s tombstones and grave markers), to build collective memories and give criminology what other fields and disciplines already have—a past and sense of scholarly traditions.

How is criminology to recover its past through writing histories? The problem needs to be addressed structurally. Faculties should start requiring courses in the history of criminology for both undergraduate majors and graduate students, and they should give annual prizes for the best historical papers.13 Criminology and related journals need to make room for articles on the history of the field so that historical research is rewarded by publication. This enlargement would depend not only on editors’ making space but also on reviewers reading such work with open minds. In this connection, let me mention two rejection letters I received from reviewers of my own historical articles. The first reviewer advised the journal (Criminology) to publish only articles on experimental criminology; the second, reacting to my intellectual biography of the psychologist Hans Eysenck, asserted that no one should write about Eysenck “until the resurrection.” Such responses hardly are calculated to encourage historical research, and the responsibility falls on all of us to review historical research as though it mattered. We also should encourage historians to join our faculties, and criminologists should reach out collaboratively to historians of science. Perhaps the ASC should start giving an annual award for the best article on the history of criminology.

13. I realize that there is a problem of finding texts for such course and hope it will not seem self-serving to mention that I have recently published a work, Origins of Criminology: A Reader (Rafter, 2009) designed to serve as such a text.
SILENCE AND MEMORY IN CRIMINOLOGY

In other words, we need to create our own Mount Auburn. It will not be made of marble because history is always changing, and each generation has to interpret it anew. There are fashions in history, just as there are fashions in grave monuments and cemetery design. But if we write our history, then future generations will have something to reinterpret, and the field will have a clearer sense of its own identity—where it has been, what it is, and where it is going.

REFERENCES


SILENCE AND MEMORY IN CRIMINOLOGY


SILENCE AND MEMORY IN CRIMINOLOGY


Tarde, Gabriel. 1890. La criminalité comparée. Paris, France: Ballière et Félix Alcan.


Nicole Rafter teaches in the College of Criminal Justice at Northeastern University. Her research interests include intersections of crime films with formal criminology, the history of criminology, and the work of Cesare Lombroso. Her most recent books include Origins of Criminology: A Reader (2009), The Criminal Brain: Understanding Biological Theories of Crime (2008), Shots in the Mirror: Crime Films and Society (2nd ed., 2006), and a new translation of Lombroso’s Criminal Man (with Mary Gibson, 2006). With Michelle Brown, she currently is working on Criminology Goes to the Movies, a book examining intersections among films and criminological theories (forthcoming, New York University Press, 2011).