An unlikely rights revolution: Legal mobilization in Scandinavia since the 1970s

**Johan Karlsson Schaffer**, University of Gothenburg (corresponding author)

**Malcolm Langford**, University of Oslo

**Mikael Rask Madsen**, University of Copenhagen

This work was supported by the Swedish Research Council, grants no. 2017-02877, 2019-03111.

**Abstract**

Why have civil society groups in Scandinavia increasingly turned to legal mobilization in recent decades? In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, a legal-political culture based on parliamentary supremacy, deferential judiciaries, strong-state corporatism, and jurisprudential skepticism towards rights talk supposedly discourages groups in civil society from seeking societal change through litigation. However, in all three countries, diverse groups and organizations in civil society have increasingly adopted litigation strategies for a broad range of causes.

In this paper, we seek to account for how and why this shift has occurred. Drawing on socio-legal mobilization theory, we compare Denmark, Norway and Sweden across three episodes from the 1970s to today. Litigation has gradually moved from the political margins to the mainstream.

Our findings suggest that while European law, domestic institutional reforms, and a proliferating human rights discourse has opened new ways for resourceful groups and entrepreneurial individuals to challenge the status quo, for mainstream organizations parliamentary and corporatist channels remain often viable and preferred alternatives.

The paper thus contributes to emerging literatures on how civil society groups in Scandinavia employ litigation strategies by offering a comparative, historical assessment, and contributes to knowledge about the factors that shape legal mobilization by civil society groups.

**Keywords**: Civil society, corporatism, legal mobilization, strategic litigation, Scandinavia.
1 Introduction

Why have civil society groups in Scandinavia increasingly turned to legal mobilization? Previous research suggests Denmark, Norway and Sweden provide an uncongenial environment for such organizations to pursue redress and social change through litigation. Among the factors that supposedly militate against a turn to courts are a political culture based on strong-state corporatism, a political-legal system premised on parliamentary sovereignty and judicial deference, and the predominance of jurisprudential philosophies dismissive of abstract rights talk.

However, in recent decades, diverse groups in Scandinavian civil society have mobilized law for an array of causes. Notable cases include lawsuits on climate change; Sami struggles for indigenous rights; legal action against discrimination of disabled persons, religious minorities, and LGBT persons; and challenges to the constitutionality of European Union (EU) treaty law. Thus, despite allegedly being at odds with Scandinavian politico-legal culture, legal strategies have moved from the margins to the mainstream, apparently forming today a key repertoire of contention for many groups in civil society. The region thus offers interesting possibilities for examining prevailing arguments on legal mobilization.

In this paper, we seek to account for how and why this shift has taken place. Comparing Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, we analyse how legal mobilization evolved from a marginal strategy in the 1970s to a more mainstream repertoire of contention today. We draw on socio-legal mobilisation theory to assess how shifting legal and political oppor-
tunities, access to legal mobilisation resources, and a changing rights consciousness con-
tribute to this shift. Our findings suggest that while European law, domestic institutional
reforms, and a proliferating human rights discourse has opened new ways for resourceful
groups and entrepreneurial individuals to challenge the status quo, for mainstream organ-
izations parliamentary and corporatist channels remain often viable alternatives.

The paper thus makes two key contributions: First, contributing to an emerging lit-
erature on how discrete Scandinavian civil society groups use legal strategies, we offer a
novel comparative account of the evolution of legal mobilization across Scandinavia
which allows us to identify broader patterns. Second, given that Scandinavian states may
seem unlikely cases for such a development to occur, they also allow us to advance the-
oretical knowledge about the factors that shape legal mobilization by civil society groups.
Specifically, we argue that despite the systemic similarities of the Scandinavian states,
structural conditions setting different incentives for civil society legal mobilization across
the three contexts suggest that legal mobilization may emerge differently and for different
reasons in these small but strong states.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews existing literature on Scandi-
navian politico-legal culture. Section 3 provides an analytical framework for examining
legal mobilization. Next, we compare across the region how legal mobilization evolved
in three periods: Section 4 analyses the emergent period in the 1970s and 1980s, when
legal entrepreneurs on the political fringes adopted litigation tactics as part of their cri-
tique of the corporatist strong state. Section 5 explores its gradual expansion in the 1990s
as well as the rising influence of European law. Section 6 analyses the increasing and
diversifying use of litigation strategies by civil society groups in the new millennium.
Section 7 presents the overall patterns that emerge from our analysis and reflect on them considering our analytical framework.

2 An unlikely environment for legal mobilization?

Across the world, legal mobilization has become an important repertoire of contention for civil society groups. However, judging by prevailing views in social science and legal scholarship, multiple factors make Scandinavian legal-political culture seem infertile ground for legal mobilization:¹ First, the political constitutions of Scandinavian states are based on parliamentary supremacy and majority rule, whereas the judiciaries were historically reluctant to exercise or recognize their implicit judicial review powers across public law.² Furthermore, Nordic welfare states have provided citizens with broad entitlements to services and benefits, yet few justiciable rights.³

Second, the political cultures of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden are strongly corporatist, even if corporatism may have declined in recent decades.⁴ Corporatism entails that select peak interest organizations participate in making and implementing public policy in processes based on compromise and consensus. Thus, one can expect interest groups

¹ For in-depth, historical analyses, see Malcolm M Feeley and Malcolm Langford (eds), The Limits of the Legal Complex: Nordic Lawyers and Political Liberalism (Oxford University Press 2021).


⁴ Peter Munk Christiansen, ‘Still the Corporatist Darlings?’ in Peter Nedergaard and Anders Wivel (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics (Routledge 2018).
included in corporatist arrangements to cultivate a ‘culture of advocacy’ that is disinclined to antagonize their government and other partners through by the filing of lawsuits.\(^5\)

Third, Scandinavian legal culture has been profoundly shaped by so-called Scandinavian legal realism – a pragmatic positivist legal philosophy which viewed talk of natural rights as metaphysical nonsense and jurists as engineers dispassionately operating the black letter of the law.\(^6\) With generations of jurists trained in this pragmatist doctrine, litigants appealing to fundamental rights in court would hardly be taken seriously.\(^7\)

In sum, institutions predominant in Scandinavian politico-legal culture would seem to discourage groups in civil society from employing legal mobilization strategies. Groups seeking to influence public policy may regard courts as less effective (or appropriate) arenas for pursuing their demands, compared to political spaces.\(^8\) In a comparative context, this politico-legal culture may seem to over-determine Scandinavian states to be unlikely cases for a broader turn to legal mobilization – and yet, as we will show, groups in Scandinavian civil society have increasingly adopted litigation strategies. So, what has


\(^8\) Feeley and Langford (n 1).
changed in Scandinavian societies to incentivize civil society groups to seek redress, policy reform and social change through legal mobilization?

3 Legal opportunities, resources, and framing

Existing literature has largely suggested that the increasing role of courts as political arenas result from the growing impact of European law on domestic legal-political systems driving the judicialization of politics in Scandinavia. By incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and other human rights treaties, and deepening – to varying degrees – their integration in the European Union (EU) in the 1990s, the Scandinavian states profoundly transformed their legal-political systems and – as a not necessarily intended side-effect – opened up for legal mobilization.

Yet while the impact of Europeanization can hardly be exaggerated, it’s another matter to determine how this shift has changed things on the ground. For instance, the Europeanization of law has affected groups differently. The same transformation might entail opportunities for some groups and threats for others, for example as regards labour rights. Further, ever since international human rights norms entered national political cultures in the 1980s, they have taken on different political meanings across the three states and over time. Modelling Europeanization as an exogenous process or judicialization as a redistribution of power from elected branches of government to the judiciary risks obscuring how the increasing use of courts and other legal channels for political purposes is driven by agents with an interest in societal change, exploiting the institutional and discursive openings available to them.

---

9 Hirschl (n 2).
Thus, to account for the broader litigious turn across Scandinavia, we seek to shift the attention from exogenous systemic shifts to the agents engaging (or not) in legal mobilisation and their variegated context. Legal mobilization entails that an agent purposively invokes a formal, institutional legal mechanism.\textsuperscript{10} Groups often combine legal mobilisation strategies with other action repertoires, such as protest, lobbying, advocacy, citizen initiatives or civil disobedience, and successful litigation often depends on coordinating it with broader movement strategies.\textsuperscript{11} Drawing on socio-legal mobilisation theory, we expect legal mobilization will be shaped by politico-legal opportunities facing civil society groups and organisations, what mobilization resources they can muster, and how they frame their grievances.

First, as to opportunities, groups mobilize law in a political and legal environment that sets constraints and openings for their action.\textsuperscript{12} A group’s decision to pursue legal mobilization is likely to be shaped by institutional regimes governing access to legal and political arenas, and by the contingent receptivity of the respective elites to its demands. Politico-legal opportunity is thus shaped by procedural and substantive legal rules, which


determine access to courts and what complaints groups can file; and by judicial elites’ willingness to hear their causes; but also, by their access to alternative ways of influencing policymaking, e.g., through corporatist or electoral channels.

Second, to exploit legal or political opportunities, groups must also have access to mobilization resources, such as finances, organizational networks, and legal expertise.\(^\text{13}\) Litigation entails considerable costs and risks, so the propensity of civil society groups to pursue legal mobilization will likely be shaped by the resources they can employ for their cause. Moreover, actors must be willing to sustain any direct and opportunity costs of legal mobilization, which may be material, reputational, or affective, such as public humiliation.\(^\text{14}\) However, transformational litigation can occur in the absence of strong support structures, if open and flexible rules of standing in courts have the same effect.\(^\text{15}\)

Finally, turning to motives: to engage in legal mobilization, groups need to express their grievances in terms of violations of law that can be remedied through legal action.\(^\text{16}\) Thus, we can expect legal mobilization partly to result from an evolving rights consciousness and framing of group demands in terms of legally protected fundamental rights. The

---


Nordics are not immune to the broader global turn to the rights paradigm across the political spectrum that occurred from the 1970s. However, whether grievances attract both a human rights and legal framing often depends on the relevant constellation of civil society actors and social discourse. Lawyer-dominated movements may encourage greater rights consciousness or, paradoxically, less if they are clearer over the concrete limitations.\(^\text{17}\)

In this paper, we thus shift attention from mere top-down, systemic shifts to analyse how actors in the Scandinavian context have appropriated legal mobilization as a repertoire of contention. By comparing across the three Scandinavian states in three episodes from the 1970s through the 2010s, with a focus on illustrative events and processes, we can identify patterns in the evolution of legal mobilization. We shall employ motives, means and opportunity as an analytical framework for identifying factors that may have led more actors to legal mobilization in Scandinavia. Given the historical and comparative scope of our analysis, our empirical account mainly builds on secondary sources, including our own previous works.

4 1970s–’80s: Legal entrepreneurs on the fringes

The 1970s represented both the pinnacle and an emerging crisis of the social democratic welfare state project that has been so defining for Scandinavia. At its peak, the so-called

Nordic model included strong-state corporatism,18 with tripartism and umbrella interest organizations involved in the making and implementation of public policy, and a welfare state based on universalist provision of welfare services. Yet the 1970s were also a period of crises, recession, radicalization and polarization, and the breakup of the social democratic quasi-hegemony paved the way for liberalization across many sectors in the 1980s. Thus, this was the context in which groups on the political fringes began mobilizing law as part of their challenge to a ‘strong state’ seen as increasingly stagnant.

This fringe was partly based in the critical law movement, which initiated several university-based legal aid and outreach activities and new pan-Scandinavian critical law journals.19 These networks mostly involved legal academics but also some radical practitioners, and while they debated whether it was compatible with Marxist politics to use the bourgeoisie state’s law and courts for progressive purposes, they also occasionally engaged in litigation – whether to obtain a concrete outcome or expose the system politically through a loss. For instance, law professor Ole Krarup, together with the radical communist lawyer Carl Madsen, represented the self-proclaimed Free Community of Christiania in Copenhagen in a lawsuit against the state; and while a loss in the court was expected, the media attention around the case helped the community create public sympathy for the existence of Christiania. While these groups were small and radical, they


would in the 1980s contribute to turning the critical human rights gaze toward the shortcomings of Scandinavian states.

Litigation strategies also featured early in emerging Sami ethnopoltical mobilization.\(^{20}\) In Norway, a government plan to construct a hydropower dam on the Alta-Kautokeino waterway and deluge the Sami village of Máze catalysed a broad resistance movement of Sami indigenous people and environmentalists in the late 1970s. Engaging in hunger strikes outside parliament in Oslo and civil disobedience at the construction site, hundreds of activists were arrested charged with rioting. Lawyers mobilized to represent protestors and challenge the consistency of the dam’s approval with international human rights law, but also mediated between the groups and parliament/police. The dam was eventually constructed and while the Supreme Court rejected the affected Sami villages’ appeal, its 1982 judgment represented a watershed, establishing the principled supremacy of international law in Norwegian courts.\(^{20}\) The case also prompted a comprehensive review of state policies toward the Sami, culminating in the Sami Act 1987 and Sami Parliament in 1989;\(^{21}\) and established networks between activists, lawyers, and legal academics.\(^{22}\) Simultaneously, in the Taxed Mountains Case (Skattefjällsmålet) – the most extensive case ever brought before the Supreme Court of Sweden – several Sami villages


11
had filed a lawsuit in 1966 to claim ownership to lands the state had confiscated in the nineteenth century. The Supreme Court found the disputed areas belonged to the state, yet the case set important precedents on Sami indigenous rights that would be revisited in several later lawsuits.8

In Sweden, the fringe also featured actors who challenged the expansionist social democratic state from a liberal-conservative standpoint. In the early 1970s, the weak protection of civil rights and liberties in the new constitution prompted resistance by a make-shift coalition of the liberal press, conservative legal elites, and radical jurists and intellectuals.23 However, advocacy petered out once a parliamentary compromise delegated the bill of rights controversy to a series of public inquiry commissions. In early attempts to challenge labour market corporatism, the ECtHR tried two cases against Sweden concerning freedom of association for trade unions and their members, finding no violations.24

A breakthrough for litigation strategies came in 1982, when the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in Sporrong & Lönnroth v. Sweden that the state had violated rights to peaceful enjoyment of property and to a fair trial.24 Brought by two property owners in Stockholm whose buildings the municipality had placed under an open-ended expropriation permit, the case was initiated and sponsored by a construction industry interest organization, whose legal team had sought out potential litigants to challenge discretionary expropriation laws.24 While the government refused to comply with the judgment, the number of ECHR applications against Sweden doubled every year, which led


the Strasbourg organs to try other similar complaints against Sweden, again finding violations. To avoid further embarrassing defeats on Article 6, government passed a temporary law extending the right to judicial review of administrative decisions in 1987.  

The *Sporrong & Lönnroth* case came while centre-right political elites and business interest organizations in Sweden increasingly opted out of corporatist arrangements to pursue fundamental systemic change. Tens of thousands demonstrated against the so-called Wage Earners’ Funds (*Löntagarfonderna*), a scheme for gradually socializing private enterprise. In 1984, the Confederation of Small Businesses initiated a lawsuit on the constitutionality of the scheme while the Employer’s Confederation filed an ECHR complaint; the litigation failed, but garnered much publicity. The enterprise-friendly centre-right parties could also graft lawsuits over apparent rights violations into their narrative of opposing the high-handedness of the social democratic government; in public discourse, the ECtHR was seen as a panacea to any and all perceived or real abuses of power.  

The two Swedish supreme courts also “gradually came to consider the ECHR as an important source of interpretation and inspiration” by the late 1980s. Thus, by going to Strasbourg, litigants forced legal, judicial and political elites to reconsider the ECHR’s status in domestic law.

---


In Norway, the *Sporrong & Lönnroth* Case had a domestic parallel in the *Klofta* Case, where landowners had sued to challenge a controversial 1973 law on expropriation compensation. In its 1976 landmark judgment, the Supreme Court asserted not only constitutional civil rights for ordinary citizens, but also its own judicial review powers, overturning a half-century old doctrine of judicial deference to parliament. Moreover, EHR litigation began making a mark as lawyers in Norway began experimenting with references to the ECHR: Between 1980 and 1992, they cited Strasbourg jurisprudence in 47 cases before the Supreme Court of Norway and sent approximately 100 cases to the European Commission on Human Rights (ECmHR), even if both strategies initially had meagre success. Few of these cases would qualify as strategic litigation, but they familiarized the legal community with the ECHR and cemented the ECHR in domestic legal opportunity structures. A series of cases in the Supreme Court clarified successively that domestic law must be interpreted in compliance with Norway’s international law obligations, especially the ECHR.

The most spectacular use of legal mobilization in Norway in this period was by conscientious objectors to military and civilian service. Refusal to serve entailed 16-months


imprisonment without parole. In 1981, pacifists in Norway and Sweden founded the Campaign Against Military Service, exploiting almost every possible repertoire of contention and creating ‘dilemma actions’ for the authorities.\textsuperscript{32} The campaign included public advocacy, hunger strikes in prison, breaking \textit{into} prison to sit in solidarity with imprisoned colleagues, together with legal action. While the ECmHR declared the movement’s complaint inadmissible,\textsuperscript{11} the holding of a full oral hearing demanded extensive engagement by the justice ministry and attracted much media attention.\textsuperscript{33} Moreover, the activists creatively exploited judicial spaces, including burning the conscription book in court and, in one case, successfully impersonating the prosecutor (absent due to the routine nature of the cases). These acts were much publicized, and a re-trial was required in the latter case. While all legal actions were ultimately unsuccessful, they generated media attention and prompted legal change.\textsuperscript{34}

In Denmark in the mid-1980s, legal activists and some politicians with an interest in human rights managed to successfully lobby and eventually help establish a national human rights centre: the Danish Centre of Human Rights. Initiated through a conference involving law professors, government officials, legal professionals, and civil society organizations,\textsuperscript{35} several interests converged towards the creation of the centre: The foreign

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[33]{Majken Jul Sørensen, ‘Kreative aktører i det rettslige spill – et rettssosiologisk perspektiv på Kampanjen Mot Verneplikt’ (2016) 24 Sosiologisk tidsskrift 225.}
\footnotetext[34]{ibid.}
\footnotetext[35]{Preben Søegaard Hansen and Lars Adam Rehof (eds), \textit{Det danske menneskerettigheds-projekt} (Dansk Røde Kors 1986).}
\end{footnotes}
ministry was interested in developing human rights expertise for Danish foreign policy, but the Centre was also mandated to oversee human rights in Denmark (unlike the similar but smaller centres established in Norway and Sweden at the time). Thereby, a state-funded monitoring body became the main producer of human rights activism in the country, pre-empting civil society legal mobilization of the kinds observed in the other countries. The Centre also advocated for incorporating the ECHR into domestic law. Some of the Centre’s early profiles came from the critical law environments but its state-sponsored human rights activism, even when critical of the Danish state, was different from the radicalism of the 1970s.

In 1989, the ECtHR, for the first time, found Denmark in violation of the Convention in *Hauschildt v. Denmark*, in which a bullion dealer investigated for tax fraud had been detained on remand for more than four years during the trial processes, where the same judge who had decided on his detention had also presided over the fraud trial. Concurrently, the Supreme Court ruled that national courts and authorities were obliged to base their interpretation of Danish law on the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR – pre-empting a public inquiry commission and the government’s bill on incorporation.36

Moreover, the critique of law of the 1970s evolved to include a critique of the European Communities (EC) as a capitalist undertaking undermining social justice and welfare. The campaign against the EC was a major social movement of the time, which employed legal strategies on several occasions. Even before Denmark’s accession in 1973, EC sceptics had tried to get the Supreme Court to rule that Denmark could only accede

through a constitutional amendment. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the case on grounds that there is no access to *ex ante* review in Denmark. Immediately after accession, they tried again but the SC refused the case finding that absent a sufficiently concrete and immediate interest in a ruling, the claimants lacked *locus standi*.\(^{36}\) (The question of standing had also been a key issue in the Christiania case.) Two decades would pass before the Supreme Court in a landmark ruling allowed ‘the Europe question’ to go to court.

To sum up, legal mobilization strategies were often introduced in Scandinavia by groups on the political fringes, such as radical academic lawyers in Denmark and Norway, and conservative elites in Sweden. Yet in both cases, legal strategies were part of an attempt to challenge and critique the ‘strong state’ project. Groups and organizations well-integrated in and content with corporatist arrangements often remained sceptical to enhancing opportunities for legal mobilization.\(^{37}\)

5 **1990s: Legal mobilization through European law**

In the 1990s, Denmark, Sweden and Norway incorporated the ECHR into domestic law.\(^{38}\) However, incorporation did not immediately or irrevocably expand opportunities for legal rights mobilization in the national legal system: The incorporation acts gave the ECHR


an unclear semi-constitutional status, cautioned courts to practice self-restraint in applying the ECHR, and neglected creating any domestic legal remedies to give the new rights effect. Simultaneously, Scandinavia became more integrated in the European Community: Denmark was a member since 1973, but the 1992 Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA) brought Sweden and Norway under the umbrella of EC law, and Sweden (but not Norway) eventually joined the EU in 1995. Integration into the EU legal order entailed both new opportunities for legal mobilization through the European Court of Justice and EFTA Court, respectively, and an evolving additional source of legal rights, especially in the antidiscrimination area.

Across the Scandinavian states, the numbers of individual complaints under the ECHR continued to grow, and the ECtHR continued gradually to deliver judgments finding violations. In 1990, the Court ruled against Norway for the first time, finding the state had violated the right to a fair trial when it delayed holding review proceedings for the applicant’s unlawful detention claim. Subsequently, three more judgments found convention violations, the most important of which – confirming that Norwegian press freedom legislation failed to conform to the right to free expression in the ECHR – contributed to a constitutional reform. Moreover, while the Norwegian government dragged its

---

feet about incorporating the ECHR throughout the 1990s, litigants cited the ECHR before courts and the Supreme Court was especially active in applying it to criminal procedure.40

In Denmark, following the first surprise of the Hauschildt judgment, the gates seemed to open, and the media reported several losses in Strasbourg. However, the cases going to Strasbourg during the period were not marked by strategic litigation but rather by individuals seeking to rectify flaws in the justice system or address specific issues, for example freedom of expression. Famously, in 1994, journalist Jens Olaf Jersild won in a case that established that freedom of expression was effectively governed by the ECHR rather than the Danish constitution.40 Other cases concerned lengthy proceedings,41 but they never suggested that Denmark was especially challenged by Strasbourg. Moreover, since only few people were involved, ECtHR litigation remained somewhat exotic. However, national courts welcomed incorporation, which meant that ECHR arguments became increasingly common in courts.

In the 1990s, Danish Eurosceptics again took government to court. In a 1992 referendum, a slim majority rejected the Maastricht Treaty, prompting political elites to negotiate the Edinburgh Agreement, a watered-down version of the Maastricht Treaty, subsequently approved in a new referendum. In 1993, some of the same jurists who had been involved in the 1970s EC lawsuits helped twelve citizens in a lawsuit on the transfer of sovereignty under the Maastricht Treaty. Now, the Supreme Court found that EU law so profoundly affected the lives of ordinary citizens that the conditions for locus standi were

met. Thus, the litigants gained access to challenge the constitutional relationship between the Danish Accession Act and EU law. Ultimately, the litigants lost, but like in the Christiania case 25 years prior, they created publicity and access for future public interest litigation.

The European Court of Justice also offered new options for Danish litigants through the preliminary reference procedure. Just like profiled ECtHR cases of the period involved resourceful litigants like the media, it was a trade union (HK, **Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund**) that started using EU law for their political ends. In two key cases from the period, HK (assisted by other organizations in the latter case) sought to achieve equal pay for men and women using EU antidiscrimination law. While HK had significant wins using this avenue, they were nevertheless met with ‘muted enthusiasm’ from the corporatist establishment. This suggests that strategic litigation using EU law did clash with traditional negotiated solutions in the labour market.

In Sweden, litigants continued using the ECHR to challenge corporatist arrangements. One case concerned whether special courts with judicial panels composed of interest organization representatives could be considered impartial, independent tribunals in the sense of Article 6. With the **Gustafsson** case – concerning a restaurateur refusing to sign a collective agreement for his employees – questions of the Swedish labour market model were brought to a head. Concerned by how the case might disrupt the Swedish collective bargain system, the National Confederation of Trade Unions (**Landsorganisationen**, LO) demanded that Sweden denounce the ECHR and re-ratify with reservations.

---

on Article 11. While the ECtHR’s final judgment in the case affirmed the trade union’s position, firms would later again use European law to challenge Swedish rules on collective bargain and industrial action.\textsuperscript{U}

Besides European law, some groups exploited legal opportunities of purely domestic origin.\textsuperscript{42} In Sweden, for instance, individuals and groups in civil society filed numerous administrative appeals on social rights in the late 1980s through mid-1990s. In 1986–1990, administrative courts decided ca 900 appeals on special services for persons with intellectual disabilities, overturning municipalities’ decisions in two thirds of the cases\textsuperscript{43} – a legal action campaign orchestrated by the National Association for People with Intellectual Disability (FUB). Moreover, in the early 1990s, the annual number of appeals under the Social Services Act quintupled, partly because the economic recession made more people dependent on social services. Administrative courts often overruled decisions by municipal authorities. As municipal bodies sometimes refused to comply with court judgments, local politicians were fined for misconduct and contempt of court. Finally, various pensioners’ organizations filed a series of strategic lawsuits to challenge pension cuts agreed by trade unions and employers as part of a 1992 deal to tackle the economic crisis. Winning most of these parallel lawsuits, pensioners’ organizations could

\textsuperscript{42} Johan Karlsson Schaffer, ‘Rättvisans Entreprenörer: Mobilisering För Tillgång till Rättvisa i Civilsamhället’ in Anna Wallerman Ghavanini and Sebastian Wejedal (eds), Access to justice i Skandinavien (Santérus Academic Press 2022).

extract retroactive pension raises for their members at multi-billion SEK costs to employers.\textsuperscript{44}

In Norway, similarly, a disability rights organization helped secure a landmark ruling on social rights in administrative law. In \textit{Fusa}, the Supreme Court decided that a municipality’s discretion to provide health and social services – in this case to a woman with a disability – was limited by an implied requirement to provide a certain or acceptable minimum.\textsuperscript{V} The failure to do so would be manifestly unreasonable, essentially being discriminatory or arbitrary.\textsuperscript{45} The judgment altered social welfare law\textsuperscript{46} and partly resulted from legal mobilization: The Norwegian Association of Disabled had supported the case from its instigation and was granted leave to litigate the appeal after the applicant passed away.\textsuperscript{47}

However, throughout the 1990s legal mobilisation remained a marginal repertoire of contention. European rights law continued to alter opportunities for litigation and courts signalled an increasing attention to principled issues, yet the half-hearted incorporation of the ECHR limited its effectiveness as a political strategy. Select civil society groups and interest organizations employed or supported litigation strategies, but the corporatist

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} Schaffer, ‘Rättvisans Entreprenörer’ (n 42).
\item \textsuperscript{45} Tor-Inge Harbo, ‘Social Rights in Norway and Scandinavia’, \textit{Diversity of social rights in Europe(s): Rights of the poor, poor rights} (European University Institute 2010).
\item \textsuperscript{46} Asbjørn Kjønstad, ‘Rettskapende Virksomhet, Velferdstjenester Og Pasientrettigheter’ (2004) 43 Lov og Rett 385.
\item \textsuperscript{47} see also discussion in Thomas Mathiesen, \textit{Retten i Samfunnet : En Innføring i Rettssosiologi} (Pax 2011) ##.
\end{itemize}
establishment and broad segments of civil society remained sceptical to adversarial legalism – a pattern that would partly change in the subsequent phase.

6 2000s–‘10s: The mainstreaming of legal mobilization

After the turn of the millennium, legal mobilization by civil society groups increased, diversified, and evolved in different directions in Scandinavia. In Sweden and Norway, heterogeneous civil society groups engaged in strategic litigation on a variety of causes. Disparate special interest groups – such as corporations, disability activists, religious minorities, or environmentalists – launched high-profile lawsuits, while a set of organizations developed public interest litigation as part of their mission to protect the rule of law, legal aid, and human rights. In Denmark, continuity combined with innovation: While well-oiled organizations like trade unions kept pushing their agendas on equality via EU law, there was also a renewed focus on rule of law issues by newly founded think tanks, notably Justitia, which fed into a growing concern with the performance of the legal system. In all three countries, increasingly outspoken associations of legal professionals sought to attract attention to basic rule of law issues.

In Norway, the Bar Association became increasingly activist. While it had sought to avoid politicization in the 1970s, its petitioning of the government to incorporate the ECHR in 1989 signalled a first step towards a more political role, where it began establishing itself as a public service expert organ on rule of law issues, for instance through
numerous legislative hearing responses and press releases. In the 2010s, however, the Bar Association also engaged in coordinated strategic litigation. Between 2007 and 2014, its migration law committee analysed 1,755 rejections of asylum applications and selected 74 cases for judicial review under administrative law. Handled by the Association’s members, 70 per cent of these appeals were successful.

Following the asylum campaign, the Bar Association led litigation against solitary confinement. The criminal defence group at the Bar Association, collaborating with academics and lawyers in individual cases, successfully challenged expansive solitary confinement practices in police detention in 2013 on the basis of the right to privacy in the ECHR, obtained a Supreme Court ruling that solitary confinement on remand should entail a reduced term of imprisonment in 2019, and negotiated a settlement of a case with the prison authorities, in which they acknowledged that its comprehensive use against a female prisoner amounted to torture and agreed to let her speak at the subsequent annual prisons conference.

Beyond the Bar Association, other groups have pursued strategic litigation on key issues. These episodes include, for instance, a test case seeking compensation for


transgender people forced until 2016 to be sterilized to change gender, given that Norway (unlike Sweden) had not established a legislative mechanism. The Church City Mission, coordinating with a network of organizations and academics, strategically litigated select cases against Eastern European Roma arrested for begging-related and other offences – winning a notable case in which the Supreme Court found that deportation for two minor offences was inconsistent with the Migration Act. Christian groups also supported the litigation of a Catholic doctor fired for refusing to implant contraceptive intra-uterine devices, where the Supreme Court eventually invalidated the dismissal. In a notable case of legal action through civil disobedience, activist Arne Viste employed rejected asylum seekers and encouraged the state to prosecute him, claiming that they had the constitutional right to work. Ultimately, Viste lost but the case generated significant attention to the plight of rejected asylum seekers who could not return to their home states.

The corporate sector and trade unions have also litigated to challenge public policies. Shipowners challenged constitutionally the imposition of additional taxes in their industry of NOK 21 billion – with a 6–5 majority deciding that societal interests were not sufficiently compelling to justify the retroactive measure. A Norwegian seamen’s union


challenged a 62-years age limit in the maritime industry (which also adversely affected pension rights) in a complaint in 2011 to the European Committee on Social Rights, after the Supreme Court had affirmed the limit was in line with the ECHR, which includes no right to work. However, the committee found no grounds for the differential treatment and the Norwegian government soon complied by amending legislation.

In Sweden, a heterogeneous civil society support structure for legal mobilization emerged in the 2000s. It included a network of local antidiscrimination bureaus, the public interest law firm Centrum för rättvisa (CFR, Centre for Justice) and the Swedish Helsinki Committee/Civil Rights Defenders (CRD), but also legal aid initiatives and interest organizations pursuing strategic litigation. Firstly, CFR was founded in 2002 by Gunnar Strömmer, a lawyer and former leader of the Conservative Youth, who had been inspired by his internship at a US libertarian public interest law firm to exploit the expanded opportunities for litigation opened when Sweden joined the EU and incorporated the ECHR. Organized as a fundraising foundation, CFR would cover the legal costs of its clients. It also engaged in public debate and organized training programmes for law students. In its first two decades, CFR pursued more than 250 cases against public authorities, winning 20 thereof in the highest instances. Among these lawsuits, a prominent example is the case of Blake Petterson, who had been deprived of his citizenship – in violation of an absolute constitutional right. Represented by CFR, Petterson won the case in

---


54 Based on Johan Karlsson Schaffer, ‘Rättvisans Entreprenörer: Mobilisering För Tillgång till Rättvisa i Civilsamhället’ in Anna Wallerman Ghavanini and Sebastian Wejedal (eds), Access to justice i Skandinavien (Santérus Academic Press 2022).
the Supreme Court, in a landmark judgment awarding for the first time an individual compensation for violation of a right granted by the Constitution.\^{EE}

Secondly, in 2009, the Swedish Helsinki Committee – which had supported rights activism in Eastern Europe and monitored rule of law in Sweden since 1982 – changed its name to Civil Rights Defenders, adopted a global focus, and expanded its capacity for legal action in Sweden. A much-publicized case concerned the Skåne Police Authority’s illegal register of 4,700 persons of Roma ethnicity. CRD represented eleven selected persons in the register in suing the state for ethnic profiling to seek redress and to put the issue of ethnic discrimination on the agenda. In 2017, finding the register to violate the Policing Data Act and the ECHR,\^{FF} an appellate court awarded each registered person SEK 30,000, totalling the largest reparation ever paid by the state. CRD’s legal mobilization also included causes such as rendition flights, police brutality, conditions in detention, and hate speech, often using low-cost appeals to supervisory authorities rather than court litigation.

Thirdly, several local antidiscrimination bureaus (ADBs) formed as grassroots cooperatives among organizations with stakes in discrimination. Increasingly, policymakers saw the ADBs as key in complying with EU antidiscrimination directives, complementing centralized ombudsman institutions. Successively, government funding and regulation transformed the ADBs into legal aid organizations, and the new comprehensive Antidiscrimination Act (2009) gave NGOs standing to represent individuals. The ADBs engaged in several lawsuits in the 2010s. For instance, a lawyer at the ADB in Uppsala successfully litigated in an administrative court to repeal a regulation requiring sterilization of persons seeking gender reassignment.\^{GG} Yet despite increasing public funding, the ADBs – in 2019, they were 18, serving ca 80 per cent of Swedish municipalities – had a
difficult mandate, not least since the limited remedies available in the Antidiscrimination Act restricted opportunities for seeking redress and policy change through litigation.

Concurrently, diverse groups and organizations adopted legal mobilization strategies. For instance, in 2015, the Independent Living Institute initiated a project to enhance the movement’s legal capabilities to assist its members against discrimination. Collaborating with disability organizations and ADBs, the project litigated e.g., on access to public transport and spaces, to secure rights for pupils with dyslexia to use aid tools when taking school tests, and to challenge discrimination in employment. Likewise, LGBT groups supported a series of legal actions on transgender rights and discrimination against same-sex couples. Other new actors included, for instance, Scandinavian Human Rights Lawyers, a Christian law firm whose most profiled case concerned two midwives denied employment for refusing to participate in abortion procedures, a hotly debated case that ended with a loss in the Labour Court (the ECtHR later dismissed their complaint as manifestly ill-founded\textsuperscript{III}). Progressive or left-leaning groups also began employing and advocating legal mobilization strategies, such as Centre for Social Rights (Centrum för Sociala Rättigheter), which sought to halt the eviction of a Roma migrant camp in Malmö through several administrative appeals.

In both Norway and Sweden, environmentalist groups turned to legal mobilisation. In Norway’s much-publicized so-called Climate Lawsuit, Greenpeace and the environmental organisation Nature & Youth sued the state claiming oil exploration plans in the Barents Sea violate constitutional rights to a healthy environment and Norway’s international treaty obligations. While the claimants lost the case in the Supreme Court in 2021,\textsuperscript{II} the lawsuit brought massive media attention to the moral tension between Norway’s am-
bitious climate policies and its reliance on petrol extraction. Meanwhile, in Sweden, environmentalist organisations have exploited legal strategies against extractive industries.\textsuperscript{55} In the recent so-called \textit{Aurora} case, over 600 young people filed a crowdfunded class action against the Swedish state, claiming its climate change mitigation policies violate their ECHR rights.\textsuperscript{JJ}

Furthermore, in both Norway and Sweden Sami groups continued their legal struggles for indigenous rights and recognition. Sami legal mobilization resulted in some landmark supreme court judgments expanding indigenous rights to land and culture, yet they also reflected deeper conflicts within Sami communities and between Sami groups and the broader society. For instance, after the Swedish Supreme Court’s 2020 ruling that transferred rights to administer hunting and fishing rights from the state to Girjas Sami reindeer herding community,\textsuperscript{KK} non-reindeer owning Sami opposed the outcome and Sami people experienced an outburst of hate speech and harassments.

In Denmark, the Danish Centre for Human rights, which by this time had established itself as the centre of gravity of Danish human rights activism, began engaging in litigation in the 2000s. With increasing contestation over migration, the Centre had found itself in the middle of a political storm due to its outspoken way of monitoring practices in Denmark, a legacy of its first two directors’ background in critical law and refugee law. In 2001, when a liberal-conservative minority formed government, it secured the support of the far right by offering to downsize the Centre – which prompted critique from the

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Restructured as the Danish Institute for Human Rights, operations continued as did its director for another period. However, this clash marked the beginning of a politicization of human rights, as a growing far-right minority pushed for challenging international human rights conventions.\textsuperscript{56} Interestingly, when a new director took office in 2008, the Institute started investing seriously in litigation. One key case in which the Institute involved itself concerned voting rights for persons deprived of their legal capacity, which the claimants lost first before the Supreme Court and later the ECtHR.\textsuperscript{11} Nevertheless, and possibly inspired by the logics of the critical law movement, the attention helped push for legal reform.

Groups also expanded mobilization against and with EU law. Eurosceptics again brought Denmark’s membership of the EU to court to challenge the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Launched by a mixed group of citizens, entertainers, and politicians critical of the EU, the complaint argued that the Danish government had ratified the treaty without using the proper constitutional procedure for delegating sovereignty. Following its 1996 ruling on \textit{locus standi}, the Supreme Court granted the citizens access to hear the case in Court.\textsuperscript{MM} In the ruling on the merits of the case, the Supreme Court hardened its stance on EU law, clarifying that the Court is ready \textit{ultra vires} to review decisions made by the EU, if any such decision ‘raises doubts.’\textsuperscript{NN}

In several cases, litigants fought over the applicability of EU antidiscrimination law in Denmark. The trade union HK, which had sued to secure gender-equal pay, now filed a stream of complaints to the Danish Board of Equal Treatment concerning discrimination among others.

\textsuperscript{56} This stance was to influence Danish politics. See Mikael Rask Madsen, ‘Two-Level Politics and the Backlash against International Courts: Evidence from the Politicisation of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2020) 22 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 728.
of disabled workers. Eventually, HK again successfully used the preliminary reference procedure to compel Danish courts to address flaws in disability rights jurisprudence.\textsuperscript{57} Later, when the Confederation of Danish Industry brought the \textit{Ajos} case, the Supreme Court took the European legal community by surprise by both disregarding the guidelines of the CJEU set out in a recent preliminary ruling and establishing new boundaries to the applicability of the CJEU’s rulings in Denmark.\textsuperscript{00} Concluding that the judge-made principles of EU law developed after the latest amendments of the Danish Accession Act – such as the general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age – were not binding, the Supreme Court further cemented a hardening stance towards EU law.\textsuperscript{58}

Overall, as in Norway and Sweden, the 2000s also entailed heightened interest in rule of law and legal certainty in Denmark. Emblematically, the think tank \textit{Justitia} was founded in 2014 by a jurist who had gained public attention when heading the legal policy department of the free-market liberal think tank CEPOS. Breaking with this political affiliation, \textit{Justitia} was created both to inform and educate about civil liberties and the rule of law, and to be involved in pro bono strategic litigation. Its educational programme – the Justitia Academy – sought to educate legal debaters and human rights activists, but rather than relying on the older critical law segment of the profession, the academy invited academics, politicians, high-level civil servants, and judicial officers. This general mobilization of the mainstream of the broader legal profession is also reflected by the Danish

\begin{flushright}

\end{flushright}
Bar Association increasingly becoming a voice in rule-of-law debates and even involving itself in principled litigation, including in collaboration with *Justitia* on disabled persons’ rights. In recent years, the traditionally discreet Association of Danish Judges has also participated in debates on the rule of law and judicial independence, seeking to carve out a more independent position for the judiciary, which signals a change in perceptions of state and justice.

To sum up, legal mobilization strategies have grown diversely across the three states both quantitively (number of organizations and cases) and qualitatively (nature of issues and obligations). However, the development across the region is uneven: Sweden and, to a certain extent, Norway today seem to have rather vibrant and heterogeneous ecosystems of civil society groups that provide legal aid and engage in public interest litigation, but legal strategies remain a more marginal civil society strategy in Denmark. Moreover, as we shall discuss below, even when the conditions appear conducive to legal mobilisation, some groups choose different strategies.

7 **Concluding discussion: Emerging patterns and explanations**

Why have civil society groups in Scandinavia increasingly turned to legal mobilization? Our comparative analysis of the three cases in three episodes reveal some interesting patterns and trends. Over time, legal mobilization strategies have gone from the political fringes to a more secured and sustained place in politico-legal culture. To account for the advent of legal strategies in the unlikely institutional setting of Scandinavia, we proposed an analytical framework drawing on the concepts of opportunity, means, and motives.

Firstly, the *politico-legal opportunity structure* has changed in ways that might incentivize legal mobilization. Systemic institutional developments have expanded both the
substantive and procedural law available to civil society groups, and the principled authority of courts as policy-making actors. First, EU law, the ECHR and other international human rights treaties have increasingly provided an external source of fundamental rights law, progressively recognized as justiciable since the 1990s, which CSOs have occasionally used Strategically to alter domestic practices. Second, in Norway and Sweden constitutional reforms have successively updated the domestic protection of fundamental rights. In Sweden, the Supreme Court has successively expanded public authorities’ tort law liabilities for violations of fundamental rights,\(^{59}\) thus creating the legal remedies the legislator neglected when incorporating the ECHR. Third, judicial reforms, such as expanding judicial review powers and docket reforms have transformed the judiciaries from reactive courts of appeal to proactive courts of precedent\(^{60}\) – enabling courts to act as agents of policy change. Denmark, however, may be the odd one out: the constitutional bill of rights has hardly been updated since 1849 and the ECHR remains the only incorporated IHRL treaty;\(^{61}\) and the Supreme Court, imbued with a doctrine of judicial self-restraint and lacking docket control, has only once exercised its review powers, in the 1999 T vind case.\(^{PP}\) Thus, from a systemic point of view, civil society actors seeking policy change through courts seem to face a more open legal opportunity structure in Sweden and Norway than in Denmark.

---


Paralleling the expansion of legal opportunities, the political environment in which civil society groups and interest organizations are embedded has also changed over the period in ways that would incentivize them to turn to courts. Overall, the impact of European law has been described as supplanting domestic corporatist interest mediation systems with adversarial legalism, by empowering firms, citizens, and groups to claim supranational rights against national governments.\(^{62}\) Yet the decline of corporatism also has roots in domestic political constellations – specifically social democratic hegemony declining decades earlier in Denmark than in Sweden (with Norway in the middle), which partly explains why the ECHR was politicized by the centre-right in Sweden but the centre-left in Denmark. Generally, the push by employer and business organizations to break with corporatism was stronger in Sweden than in Denmark and Norway,\(^{63}\) and in discrete sectors, groups exempted from or challenging corporatist arrangements have been more prone to legal mobilization – such as radical Swedish disability rights activists or the Danish HK trade union which partly stood outside of the collective bargain system – than groups favouring the status quo.\(^{64}\)

---


However, the adversarial legalist challenge to corporatism shouldn’t be exaggerated. With the mainstreaming of legal mobilization in the 2000s, many groups employing litigation strategies by no means sought to disrupt corporatism, and some arguably institutionalize corporatism in the rights sector, such as the Danish Centre/Institute for Human Rights or the Swedish network of antidiscrimination bureaus. Expressing the widespread resistance towards adversarial legalism among social partner organizations, a representative of a Danish industrial association stated that winning rights through court litigation is not just “against the whole idea of democracy” but also “absolutely against our interests”.\(^{65}\) Thus, while courts and rights have offered new opportunities for activists on the margins, for mainstream actors the broader political opportunities of parliamentary politics and corporatist interest intermediation offer viable, broader and often preferable alternatives.

Secondly, resources available to groups have also developed in ways that may facilitate legal mobilization and may account for some of the variation we register. As is well-established in socio-legal mobilization theory, sustained, successful legal mobilization requires finances, expertise, and organization.\(^{66}\) Since Scandinavian civil law procedure abides by the ‘English rule’ (i.e., the losing party must pay both their own and the winning party’s legal costs) and since public legal aid is limited, litigation is a costly, risky strategy. Groups that have built more sustained litigation strategies have managed to overcome such resource hurdles. For example, in its litigation campaigns the Norwegian Bar


Association could rely on the pro bono work and natural legal expertise of its members. Likewise, reliable backing from well-resourced donors allowed Centre for Justice in Sweden to guarantee its clients full coverage of the legal costs, while pro bono consultation by leading law firms has strengthened its legal capacities. Danish HK’s creative antidiscrimination litigation was enabled by its robust legal department.67 On the flip side, lack of resources can offset organizational strength, as evidenced by the Swedish network of local antidiscrimination bureaus: Lacking long-term funding and the finances to cover the legal costs of their clients, ADBs mostly resorted to small-claims litigation, which lessens both the redress value for clients and the preventative effect of litigation, citing financial risk as a key obstacle to access to justice.68 Whether public or private, deep-pocketed funders of civil society are often sceptical of supporting litigious activities.

Thirdly, increasing legal mobilisation may also reflect that organizations increasingly frame their goals in rights-based language, adjusting to evolving legal consciousness in Scandinavian societies. For example, when Scandinavian LGBT groups began mobilizing more openly in the 1970s, they chiefly framed their cause as sexual emancipation or equality, while in recent decades, they have increasingly adopted a human rights frame. Similarly, disability policy was traditionally based on a social welfare model, providing differential treatment for persons with disabilities; however, in the 1990s, policy shifted towards guaranteeing antidiscrimination rights, and eventually disability rights activists challenged what they saw as the co-opted complacency of corporatist disability

67 Miller (n 64).
Likewise, pro-life groups that used to frame their cause as protecting the unborn child increasingly employ human rights discourse, e.g., to assert the rights of healthcare professionals to conscientious exemption. Thus, many groups have reframed their causes as demands for rights, which may account for their increased propensity for legal action.

However, the increasing rights framing may represent ad hoc tactical adjustments or more sustained socialization. When groups frame their claims for tactical reasons, legal opportunity structures and available resources may be an important reason for legal mobilization. Thus, for instance the Campaign Against Military Service seemed to adopt rights language to advance court claims for purely material reasons (to potentially strike down the law) and political reasons (to use the courts as political theatre and generate attention). Other forms of legal mobilization have promotion of fundamental rights and the rule of law as their raison d’être and business model, such as the public interest law groups in Sweden, Danish Justitia or the increasingly activist Norwegian Bar Association.

These empirically distinct forms of Scandinavian legal mobilization suggest new tasks for theoretical explanation. One such issue how effective legal mobilisation is, compared to alternative movement strategies across different issues. Various interest groups have been able to secure strong legal rights protection without litigation. For instance, through protest, advocacy, and lobbying in the 1970s–2000s, Scandinavian LGBT movements secured a broad range of rights, from decriminalization and depathologization to

---

69 Lejeune (n 64).
same-sex unions and adoption. Not until the 2010s did the LGBT movement employ litigation strategies, with some notable landmark judgments securing additional rights, in Sweden and eventually Norway,\textsuperscript{70} while Danish LGBT groups eschewed litigation. Likewise, the comparatively well-organized women’s movements have refrained from legal action.

What strategic opportunities do these patterns reflect? One may speculate that the women’s movements, supported by cross-partisan majorities on advancing gender equality, have achieved their aims through lobbying and political parties. Yet the resulting gender equality legislation has often lacked justiciable rights, providing instead other mechanisms such as auditing and alternative dispute resolution.\textsuperscript{71} Moreover, building on the long-standing Scandinavian ombudsman model, anti-discrimination bodies (as well as newer national human rights institutions) provide different modes of implementing human rights, possibly mediating the need or opportunity for litigation. Analysing how particular groups strategize to exploit the politico-legal opportunities they face would enhance our understanding of the structural conditions for contentious politics in Scandinavia.

Turning to framing, one question that emerges is why similarly situated groups choose different repertoires of action even if they all frame their objectives in terms of fundamental civil rights and the rule of law. For instance, while the Swedish Helsinki


Committee, rebranded as Civil Rights Defenders, expanded its capacities for legal strategies, the Norwegian and Danish Helsinki Committees keep to monitoring and advocacy. Similarly, the litigation campaigns by the Norwegian Bar Association seem unparalleled in Denmark and Sweden. Another question is why some groups strategically avoid legal or rights-based frames. The Secretary General of the Danish Bar Association suggests it is a strategic choice: “people are looking for results and they use the terminology that will make the greatest impact in Denmark, and that is not human rights terminology”. Thus, in a political culture which privileges consensus-seeking and politicizes rights discourse, groups may be incentivized to frame their causes in less confrontational terms.

Finally, a notable feature that cuts across the three cases is the role of individual actors in collective mobilisation. Historically, this was a strong feature of public mobilisation by Nordic lawyers, and it seems that the phenomenon partly remains. In all three countries, individual mavericks, non-conformists, and legal entrepreneurs have often played a pivotal role. Whether inspired by legal Marxism or US-style cause lawyering, innovators operating from the fringes of the legal establishment, but also within and across key institutions such as academia, national human rights institutions, and NGO boards, have been able to achieve some remarkable results by exploiting legal opportunities and instigating strategic litigation. In small countries, elite actors can sometimes seamlessly ‘double hat’ in different roles, move in ‘revolving doors’ between different


institutions, or interact in weak but tight social networks, which can kickstart legal mobilization and enhance its effectiveness. However, the centrality of individual agency may also constrain or indicate the lack of long-term institutionalization of strategic litigation. Future research should theorize the role of individual avantgarde actors in collective legal mobilisation and their relationship with civil society support structures.
Appendix: Cited court cases and judgments

O e.g. A and Others v Denmark [1996] ECtHR 20826/92.
The case lost at first instance (A mot Staten [2017] Oslo tingrett TOSLO-2017-132417) and on appeal (A mot Staten [2021] Borgarting lagmannsrett LB-2018-190131.). And the Supreme Court dismissed it on appeal (A mot Staten [2021] Høyesterett HR-2021-1392-U.). The case may be taken to the ECtHR given its judgment in A.p, Garçon and Nicot v France [2017] ECtHR 79885/12, 52471/13, 52596/13.}


EE Medborgarskapet I [2014] Högsta domstolen T5516-12, NJA 323. Following creative jurisprudence where the Supreme Court expanded the tort law liabilities of the state and municipalities for violations of the ECHR (Finanschefen på ICS [2005] Högsta domstolen T72-04, 2005 NJA 462; Kommunens olaga frihetsberövande [2009] Högsta domstolen T2955-08, 2009 NJA 463.), the Blake Petterson Case established that in certain situations the constitutional bill of rights entailed similar liabilities.
At the time of writing, the suit filed on November 25, 2022, is still pending in Nacka District Court.