Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen

Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2019). Lær deg R - En innføring i statistikkprogrammets muligheter. Fagbokforlaget. 224 s.

Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2018). (Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament. Journal of Legislative Studies. 24(1), s 148-172.

Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2018). Striving for influence. The effect of performance on candidate selection. Party Politics. 24(4), s 382-396.

• Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2018). (Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament. Journal of Legislative Studies.  ISSN 1357-2334.  24(1), s 148- 172 . doi: 10.1080/13572334.2018.1444631 Show summary

  Rapporteurs in the European Parliament (EP) are the most influential members interms of the legislation they handle. They are appointed by their political groups.In making these appointments, these groups need to accommodate both theircollective needs and individual requests. This article explores situations in which the collective need for information isprioritised: the codecision procedure. The data includes allocations over a 10-year period (2004–2014) in three of the most powerful EP committees, as wellas key career choices among members. EP groups emphasise policy-specific knowledge. They also pay attention toindividual members’ requests for exposure, but only when the expectedpolicy drift is minimal. Harsh selection during the allocation of codecisionreports creates pressure to accommodate a greater selection of legislatorsduring other attractive report allocations. Own-initiative reports thereforeaffect allocation of codecision reports negatively.

• Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2018). Striving for influence. The effect of performance on candidate selection. Party Politics.  ISSN 1354-0688.  24(4), s 382- 396 . doi: 10.1177/1354068816663036 Full text in Research Archive. Show summary

  I consider how asymmetric information between the party selectorate and members of Parliament affects the renomination of incumbent candidates. By applying an adverse selection model, I argue that the selectorate looks to past performance to select candidates it expects will gain influence. However, the impact of performance varies according to the need for and availability of information. The European Parliament (EP) provides a most-likely case for information asymmetry. Studying three elections in 11 member states, I find that the allocation of influential positions in office improves chances of reselection. The effect increases when the allocation is more selective, and when the prior uncertainty around candidacies is high. The study thus proposes a new approach to the relationship between national parties and transnational groups in the EP. It also suggests venues for research on parliamentary politics and candidate selection in general.

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• Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2019). Lær deg R - En innføring i statistikkprogrammets muligheter. Fagbokforlaget.  ISBN 9788245022131.  224 s.

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• Naurin, Nils Daniel & Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2018). Will Do? Selecting Judges on the Basis of Policy Preferences or Performance Indicators.
• Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2017). Choosing Agents: Members of the European Parliament and their Political Organizations Seen through Report Allocation.. Full text in Research Archive. Show summary

  This dissertation treats with partisan organization in the European Parliament (EP) and its impact on members’ (MEPs) career opportunities. National parties organize elections. Parliamentary work is organized around transnational political groups. They do not share any overarching organizational structure. My contributions pertain to the interconnected choices made by MEPs and their two party organizations. Parliamentary groups face a trade-off between the need for expertise and the risk of agency drift. Groups allocate reports to maximize the value added by the rapporteur while limiting the drift. They prefer policy experts to generalists and – up to a point – experienced MEPs to newcomers. Groups also balance individual demands with the collective need. National parties do not have institutionalized presence in the EP. They enter into an outcome-based contract similar to voters. MEPs are either rewarded by reselection or kicked out of office. Report allocations dissipate uncertainty about MEPs’ ability. They thus improve MEPs’ career prospects to the extent that parties need new information about agent quality, and to the extent that parliamentary groups can provide it.

• Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2010). Report Allocation in the European Parliament Selection Criteria of Key-Legislators in EU’s Directly Elected Assembly. Show summary

  Using an original dataset, the study sets out tomodelreport allocationin the European Parliament(EP).Putting asidethe debate on the relative importance of national delegations, the reviewtakes into accountanother specificity which has largely been ignored in previous empirical research: Only parts of the elected members are inclined to investin European legislative work. Once the free-riders are filtered out, it appearsthe EP has developed much of the organizational aspects neededto assert its powers. The study adapts American theories of legislative organization to the European context, and finds transnational political groups to becentralplayers in a largely consensual arrangement.Expertise is of increasing importance, and is put to use for the common good. Legislative drafts are objects of an informational two-level game between the floor majority and caucuses.As Parliament matters more, report allocation becomes more competitive;thereby enhancing the traditional organizational featurespredicted by theory

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