Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen
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Rather than asking why member states delegate to supranational institutions, I ask how decision-makers navigate the system once a delegation has been done. In doing so, I relax the assumption of unitary actors to consider choices made by political parties (in member states), on the one hand, and the membership within the supranational organization, on the other hand.
I assume that political parties are policy seekers who use their power of appointment to place policy makers in salient positions at the supranational level. They maximize two selection criteria: They appoint representatives who are
- willing to change policies in the desired direction (i.e.: they have similar preferences)
- that are able to change policies (i.e. they possess the right competencies to access positions of influence).
At the supranational level, the leadership delegates responsibilities among appointed members following largely the same selection criteria:
- They seek to delegate to members who share their preferences.
- They prefer delegating to members who are in a position to move policies.
These choices are interconnected: Parties are reliant on delegations done by the supranational leadership to access positions of influence. However, the supranational leadership is also reliant on member states to appoint members with the desired qualities. While supranational leaders may favor some members to others, they also have an obligation to use the set of members it is provided with.
During my PhD, I studied this dynamic for the selection of members of the European Parliament. They are the agents of two principals: They rely on national parties to support their election to the European Parliament, but once in office, transnational group leaders allocate positions of influence. During my postdoc, I study governmental parties' appointment of judges to the Court of Justice of the European Union as well as the internal distribution of influence within the Court. The ultimate question is how these choices connect.
- Judicial politics - with special interest in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
- Legislative organization - with special interest in the European Parliament (EP)
- Quantitative methods
- STV4020A: Research methods and statistics
- STV4020B: Statistic analysis
Higher education and employment history
- PhD in Political Science, University of Oslo, 2017. Title: Choosing Agents: Members of the European Parliament and their Political Organizations Seen through Report Allocation
- Summer Schools:
- Methods for analyzing and modeling textual data, "Series on Methods for Computational Social Science", CSS Summer School (Los Angeles), 2018
- Theoretical and Methodological Foundations and Accountability and Violence, Summer shool "Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models", EITM Europe/University of Mannheim (Mannheim), 2014
- The European Parliament: Intra- and Inter-Institutional Politics and The Rules and Functions of the European Parliament, Summer School "Parliamentary democracy in Europe, LUISS Guido Carlo School of Government (Rome), 2013
- Introduction to Applied Bayesian Modeling for the Social Sciences, Introduction to Game Theory and Advanced Game Theory, ICPSR Summer Program in Quantitative Methods of Social Research, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor), 2012
- Single Course in Hierarchical Models, Essex Summer School in Social Sciences, University of Essex (Essex), 2011
- MA in Political Science, University of Oslo, 2010
- BA in Political Science, Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne, 2005