Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen

Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2019). Lær deg R - En innføring i statistikkprogrammets muligheter. Fagbokforlaget. 224 s.

Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2018). (Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament. Journal of Legislative Studies. 24(1), s 148-172.

Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2018). Striving for influence. The effect of performance on candidate selection. Party Politics. 24(4), s 382-396.

• Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2020). Building legitimacy: strategic case allocations in the Court of Justice of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy.  ISSN 1350-1763.  27(8), s 1215- 1235 . doi: 10.1080/13501763.2020.1714697 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Does the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) make strategic use of his members? Cases in the CJEU are prepared by a ‘judge-rapporteur’ who acts as an agenda setter. I argue that the President builds the Court’s legitimacy by strategically allocating cases to select judges. Using original data on 9623 case allocations (1980–2015), I argue that suspicions about judges’ political accountability can polarize already politicized debates. The President circumvents such dynamics by appointing a rapporteur whose government holds moderate political preferences. However, politics are relevant mainly when case law is not yet developed. The need for consistency also contributes to explain judges individual-level specialization, which arguably favors the construction of a coherent case law. The results speak to the lingering effect of judges’ renewable terms – despite secret voting – as well as the importance of courts’ internal organization for judicial independence.

• Chiou, Fang-Yi; Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder & Høyland, Bjørn (2019). Delegation of committee reports in the European Parliament. European Union Politics.  ISSN 1465-1165.  21(2), s 233- 254 . doi: 10.1177/1465116519894059 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  Committee coordinators face a classic delegation problem when assigning reports to their committee members. Although a few theoretical developments have focused on the effects of expertise on delegation, empirical studies have commonly assumed monotonic effects. Based on existing informational models, we argue that a more loyal committee member, everything else being equal, is more likely to be appointed as a rapporteur and that more expertise, holding preference divergence constant, has anon-monotonic effect because of informational credibility. Employing accumulated committee service as an expertise measure, these theoretical expectations are tested on all committee report delegations in the European Parliament from 1979 to 2014. Our empirical analysis with non-parametric and parametric hierarchical conditional logit models renders strong support for these expectations. The results hold across member states, political groups, procedures, committees and over time.

• Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2018). (Self-)selection and expertise among decision-makers in the European Parliament. The Journal of Legislative Studies.  ISSN 1357-2334.  24(1), s 148- 172 . doi: 10.1080/13572334.2018.1444631 Vis sammendrag

  Rapporteurs in the European Parliament (EP) are the most influential members interms of the legislation they handle. They are appointed by their political groups.In making these appointments, these groups need to accommodate both theircollective needs and individual requests. This article explores situations in which the collective need for information isprioritised: the codecision procedure. The data includes allocations over a 10-year period (2004–2014) in three of the most powerful EP committees, as wellas key career choices among members. EP groups emphasise policy-specific knowledge. They also pay attention toindividual members’ requests for exposure, but only when the expectedpolicy drift is minimal. Harsh selection during the allocation of codecisionreports creates pressure to accommodate a greater selection of legislatorsduring other attractive report allocations. Own-initiative reports thereforeaffect allocation of codecision reports negatively.

• Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2018). Striving for influence. The effect of performance on candidate selection. Party Politics.  ISSN 1354-0688.  24(4), s 382- 396 . doi: 10.1177/1354068816663036 Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  I consider how asymmetric information between the party selectorate and members of Parliament affects the renomination of incumbent candidates. By applying an adverse selection model, I argue that the selectorate looks to past performance to select candidates it expects will gain influence. However, the impact of performance varies according to the need for and availability of information. The European Parliament (EP) provides a most-likely case for information asymmetry. Studying three elections in 11 member states, I find that the allocation of influential positions in office improves chances of reselection. The effect increases when the allocation is more selective, and when the prior uncertainty around candidacies is high. The study thus proposes a new approach to the relationship between national parties and transnational groups in the EP. It also suggests venues for research on parliamentary politics and candidate selection in general.

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• Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2019). Lær deg R - En innføring i statistikkprogrammets muligheter. Fagbokforlaget.  ISBN 9788245022131.  224 s.

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• Siv, Cheruvu; Naurin, Nils Daniel & Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2019). Does Merit Selection Matter for Judicial Performance? Evidence from the Court of Justice of the European Union.
• Naurin, Nils Daniel & Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2018). Will Do? Selecting Judges on the Basis of Policy Preferences or Performance Indicators.
• Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2017). Choosing Agents: Members of the European Parliament and their Political Organizations Seen through Report Allocation.. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv. Vis sammendrag

  This dissertation treats with partisan organization in the European Parliament (EP) and its impact on members’ (MEPs) career opportunities. National parties organize elections. Parliamentary work is organized around transnational political groups. They do not share any overarching organizational structure. My contributions pertain to the interconnected choices made by MEPs and their two party organizations. Parliamentary groups face a trade-off between the need for expertise and the risk of agency drift. Groups allocate reports to maximize the value added by the rapporteur while limiting the drift. They prefer policy experts to generalists and – up to a point – experienced MEPs to newcomers. Groups also balance individual demands with the collective need. National parties do not have institutionalized presence in the EP. They enter into an outcome-based contract similar to voters. MEPs are either rewarded by reselection or kicked out of office. Report allocations dissipate uncertainty about MEPs’ ability. They thus improve MEPs’ career prospects to the extent that parties need new information about agent quality, and to the extent that parliamentary groups can provide it.

• Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder (2010). Report Allocation in the European Parliament Selection Criteria of Key-Legislators in EU’s Directly Elected Assembly. Vis sammendrag

  Using an original dataset, the study sets out tomodelreport allocationin the European Parliament(EP).Putting asidethe debate on the relative importance of national delegations, the reviewtakes into accountanother specificity which has largely been ignored in previous empirical research: Only parts of the elected members are inclined to investin European legislative work. Once the free-riders are filtered out, it appearsthe EP has developed much of the organizational aspects neededto assert its powers. The study adapts American theories of legislative organization to the European context, and finds transnational political groups to becentralplayers in a largely consensual arrangement.Expertise is of increasing importance, and is put to use for the common good. Legislative drafts are objects of an informational two-level game between the floor majority and caucuses.As Parliament matters more, report allocation becomes more competitive;thereby enhancing the traditional organizational featurespredicted by theory

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