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The King has the right to call up troops, to engage in war in defence of the realm and to make peace, to conclude and denounce treaties, to send and to receive diplomatic envoys.

Treaties on matters of special importance, and, in all cases, treaties whose implementation, according to the Constitution, necessitates a new law or a decision by the Storting, are not binding until the Storting has given its consent thereto.
The Constitution § 115

In order to safeguard international peace and security or to promote the international rule of law and cooperation, the Storting may, by a three-fourths majority, consent that an international organisation to which Norway belongs or will belong shall have the right, within specified fields, to exercise powers which in accordance with this Constitution are normally vested in the authorities of the state, although not the power to alter this Constitution. For the Storting to grant such consent, at least two thirds of its Members shall be present, as required for proceedings for amending the Constitution.

The provisions of this Article do not apply in cases of membership in an international organisation whose decisions only have application for Norway exclusively under international law.
The power of the courts under the Constitution

§ 88
The Supreme Court pronounces judgment in the final instance. Nevertheless, limitations on the right to bring a case before the Supreme Court may be prescribed by law.

The Supreme Court shall consist of a President and at least four other Members.

§ 90
The judgments of the Supreme Court may in no case be appealed.

And now also (since 2014) - § 89
In cases brought before the Courts, the Courts have the power and the duty to review whether Laws and other decisions made by the authorities of the State are contrary to the Constitution.
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The provisions of this Article do not apply in cases of membership in an international organisation whose decisions have application for Norway exclusively under international law.
The ICSID Convention article 54

Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.
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