PluriCourts Lunch: Why the United States Supports Some International Enforcement Institutions and Opposes Others

Guri Bang (senior researcher at CICERO), Jon Hovi (professor in political science), and Tora Skodvin (also professor in political science) will present their project, which seeks to explain why the United States supports some international enforcement institutions but opposes others. For example, the United States supports and actively participates in the WTO dispute settlement system. It also supported the inclusion of trade restrictions to promote participation and compliance in the Montreal Protocol. Finally, it supported the creation of a compliance committee with an enforcement branch authorized to impose punitive consequences on noncompliant members of the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, the United States opposes other international enforcement institutions, such as the International Criminal Court. The authors will first derive a set of hypotheses concerning why the United States supports some international enforcement institutions and opposes others. They will then conduct interviews with negotiators, observers, and scholars concerning their views on (1) the driving forces of US support for and opposition to international enforcement in general and (2) the explanatory power of the authors’ theoretically derived hypotheses in particular.

Published Aug. 14, 2014 1:27 PM - Last modified Sep. 29, 2014 6:28 PM