Global Constitutionalism without Global Democracy? Some explorative analysis.
Special issue in EUI Working Paper Law Series edited by Claudio Corradetti and Giovanni Sartor.
International law is undergoing several profound transformations. New sectors develop as with the consolidation of the regime of Investment Arbitration or with the advancement of already existing areas as with the WTO. At the same time, claims about the "judicialization" of international law and processes of "global constitution" call for more precise definitions of terms such as ‘constitutionalism’, ‘constitution’ and ‘constitutionalisation’.
The starting assumption is that domestic and global constitutionalism have in common several structural features but not that of democracy and legitimacy. Should global constitutionalism incorporate mechanisms and standards of democratic rule? If so how?
Legitimate democratic rule might only occur within a constitutional system, but does legitimate global constitutionalism — or alternatively a global constitution — need democratic legitimacy? Is the "we the people" the same constituent source of legitimacy for both domestic and global constitutionalism? And at the institutional level, is the implication to democratize and strengthen centralized bodies, such as reforming the UN General Assembly as well as fostering the role of global governance institutions such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank? Or can incorporation of international law within domestic democratic contexts render international law under sufficient democratic control?