A POLITICAL CONSTITUTION FOR THE PLURALIST WORLD SOCIETY?*

The chances of the project of a “cosmopolitan order” being successful are not worse now than they were in 1945 or in 1989–90. This does not mean that the chances are good, but we should not lose sight of the scale of things. The Kantian project first became part of the political agenda with the League of Nations, in other words after more than two hundred years; and the idea of a cosmopolitan order first received a lasting embodiment with the foundation of the United Nations (UN). Since the early 1990s, the UN has gained in political significance, and has emerged as a not inconsiderable factor in the world political conflicts. Even the superpower saw itself compelled to enter into confrontation with the world organization when the latter refused to provide legitimacy for a unilateral intervention. The UN survived the subsequent attempt to marginalize it and is now about to manage the urgently needed reform of its main body and limbs. Even if the initiative of Kofi Annan failed, mainly because of the resistance of the United States, the proposals are still important and will remain on the agenda.1

The proposed reforms are the result of an intelligent analysis of mistakes. This learning process points toward a continuation of the Kantian project. We can still take our cue from Kant’s idea of a cosmopolitan condition if we simply construe it in sufficiently abstract terms. I wish to show first of all why I consider the Kantian alternative between a world of republic and a league of nations to be incomplete (section I) and will then go on to outline how we can reconceptualize the Kantian project under contemporary conditions (section II). And I shall close by addressing an actual challenge to which that project might well offer the most promising response (section III).
Kant arrives at his idea of a cosmopolitan order by extending the concept of a “constitution” (the type of constitution which, in his day, had just emerged from the American and French revolutions) from the national to the global level. In this way, he anticipates the present idea of a constitutionalization of international relations. The innovation consists in the transformation of “international” law as the law of states into “cosmopolitan” law as a law of individuals. Individual persons no longer enjoy the status of legal subjects just as citizens of a national state, but also as a member of a politically constituted world society.

Kant did not conceive of such a cosmopolitan condition in terms other than a world republic. He remained loyal to this idea throughout his life, but at one point suggested the “surrogate” of a league of nations en route to the final emergence of a commonwealth of nations (Völkerstaat). The overwhelming idea of a world republic seemed to require the intermediate step of a voluntary association of peaceable states who still remain sovereign. With the undeserved hindsight of later generations we can discover the conceptual constraints that led Kant to this dead end of a choice between either a full-blown world republic or a lose league of nations. Three reasons might have prompted him to stick to the discouraging model of a world republic.

The centralist French republic was the model Kant had in mind that the sovereignty of the people is indivisible. Yet in a multilevel system with a federalist structure, the democratic will of the people already branches into parallel channels at its very source. The model of the United States bears early testimony to this concept of “divided sovereignty.” The image of a federalist structure might have allayed Kant’s fear that the “soulless despotism” of a world-embracing “state of nations” would strip any particular nation of its cultural specificity and identity.

The crux of the matter is a second conceptual bottleneck, the compulsion to think of a constitution always as the constitution of a state. According to Rousseau’s social contract, both state and constitution arise uno actu from the will of the people. In the liberal tradition, constitution does not have the function of constituting political authority from scratch but only one of constraining existing powers. A constitution of this type establishes a “rule of law” that even without democratic origins can normatively shape existing power relations and direct the use of political power into legally binding channels. By forgoing the assumed identity of the rulers with the ruled, the liberal tradition avoids the conceptual integration of state and constitution, and thus allows to keep those elements conceptually independent.
from one another, which are empirically so closely interwoven in the nation-state—the constitution on one side, the state and democratic citizenship on the other.\textsuperscript{4} The liberal type of constitution provides a conceptual frame for a politically world society without a world government, democratically constituted from bottom up. As we will see in the end, however, any combination of the two types of constitution that have hitherto emerged in competing legal traditions creates the problem of how the communication of policy networks beyond the nation-state can be fed back into the loop of national channels of a proper democratic legitimation.\textsuperscript{5}

A third reason that may have prompted Kant to seek a surrogate for the guiding idea of a cosmopolitan republic is the improbability of revolutionary events. The two constitutional revolutions of the eighteenth century have given birth to the idea that constitutions generally emerge from a sudden act of will at a favorable historical point in time. While the occurrence of a revolutionary moment at one place was improbable enough anyway, the coincidence of such improbabilities at many places appeared quite inconceivable. In the meantime we have got used to constitutionalization as a long-term process driven not by enthusiastic masses, but primarily by nation-states and regional alliances of nations. The temporal pattern of such a long-term process, in which political intervention goes hand in glove with the growth of systemic complexity, would suggest that we should speak here of stages or degrees of constitutionalization.\textsuperscript{6}

Summing up, there are three conceptual devices for liberating the Kantian idea of transforming state-centered international law into cosmopolitan law from the misleading telos of a world republic:

1. the federalist notion of “divided sovereignty” and the by now conventional concept of a “multilevel system”;
2. the distinction between two types of constitution that might be combined in a new way in the constitution of a world society without world government;
3. the temporal pattern of incremental advances in the constitutionalization process, initiated and backed by governments rather than by citizens.

On this basis and with a view to the structures that exist today, we can put forward a conceptual alternative to the idea of a world republic (and its contemporary variants).\textsuperscript{7} To this end, we must make some further adaptations and (a) adjust the concept of national sovereignty to the new forms of governance beyond the nation-state, (b) change the conception of positive law by revising the conceptual linkage between national law and the state’s monopoly on force in favor of a supranational law that gets backing by means of sanctions still
monopolized by nation-states, and (c) introduce a learning mecha-
nism that explains how nations can change their self-image.

(a) According to the tradition of liberal nationalism, the core of
international law, namely, the sovereign status of nations and the
prohibition on intervention in internal affairs, both follow from the
principle of popular sovereignty. Military self-assertion toward
the outside would simply reflect democratic self-determination on the
inside. For shielding the identity of its democratic community, the
nation must have the right and capacity to use force against other
nations. This conception no longer works in a highly interdependent
world society. If even a superpower cannot guarantee the security and
welfare of its own population but only with the help of other nations,
then sovereignty loses its classical meaning. A state proves its exter-
nal sovereignty by being capable and willing to take equal part in
collective efforts to solve global and regional problems in the frame-
work of international or supranational organizations. And internal
sovereignty now extends, beyond mere maintenance of law and order,
to the protection of the civil rights of the citizens. This presupposes
both the renunciation of the right to go to war and the recognition of
the duty of the international community to protect the population of
a criminal or failing state against its own government or what is left of
the latter.

(b) Interestingly enough, the international community can transfer
this right to intervene, and impose sanctions, onto a world organiza-
tion without at the same time furnishing the latter with a global
monopoly on force. Contrary to the conventional conception of posi-
tive law, there is in fact a gap gradually opening between suprana-
tional agencies of law setting and national agencies that can resort to
legitimate means of force to implement that law. The individual states
retain their monopoly on force while as members of the UN ceding
the right to decide on the use of force to the Security Council (except
in the case of urgent self-defense). The European Union (EU) pro-
vides a convincing example of how higher-order legal norms can
function in a binding manner even though they are actually backed
and implemented by much more powerful member states that are
formally subordinated to those norms.

(c) This is also an example for how nation-states learn to change
their self-understanding. Legal innovations introduced by political
elites sometimes work in the mode of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Con-
stitutional law making beyond the nation-state anticipates the change
in self-perception is only triggered among the addressees in the
course of its implementation. Thus, the spirit of legal propositions, the
letter of which is first recognized only declamatorily, is gradually
internalized. This is true for governments and citizens alike. States, as
they practice sovereignly agreed rules of cooperation, discover the benefit of behaving no longer only as independent collective actors but also as members of international organizations. Without this hypothesis that anticipatory norms have an impact in the long run would hardly be possible to offer plausible empirical grounds for the Kantian project of promoting a cosmopolitan condition.

II

In the light of these clarifications, I wish to present the design for a future multilevel system that is ahead of but remains in contact with existing structures. Such a politically constituted world society could even in the absence of a world government frame the kind of global domestic politics that is so far lacking, especially in the fields of global economic and environmental policies. While the nation-based system of international law simply recognized one type of player, namely the nation-states, and two types of playing fields, namely domestic and foreign policy or internal affairs and international relations, the new structure is characterized three arenas and three types of collective actors. This tripartite model avoids mixing up distinctly different problems under the unifying label of global governance.

The supranational arena is occupied by a single actor. The international community takes the institutional shape of a world organization that has the capacity to act in well-defined fields without itself assuming the character of a state. It develops into an entity that is not just a forum, but does not assume the very features of a state. Such a world organization would be empowered, but at the same time limited, to effectively and above all nonselectively fulfill two functions, namely to secure peace and human rights on a world scale. The pending reform of the UN must therefore not only focus on strengthening core institutions, but at the same time aim to detach that core from the shell of its special organizations.11

Of course, opinion and will formation within the world organization could be more closely connected back to the communications flows of national parliaments and more effectively exposed to the monitoring of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other representatives of a mobilized world public. However, even an appropriately reformed world organization will permanently rely on power centers organized in a state basis.12 Alongside the individuals, states remain subjects of an international law, thus turned into a cosmopolitan human rights regime which is able to protect citizens if necessary even against their own government.

Nation-states must retain a privileged status also because of the far-reaching agenda which the UN recently announced under the title
of the “Millennium Development Goals.” The worldwide political efforts which such an agenda requires overtax what the international community to date is able and willing to accomplish. At present we can observe in the transnational arena networks and organizations that cope with the growing demand for coordination of an increasingly complex world society. However, “coordination” of governments, and of governments and nongovernment actors, represents a form of regulation that is only appropriate for particular categories of cross-border problems. Procedures for information exchange and consultation, for assistance and training, control and agreement suffice to handle “technical” questions (such as the standardization of measures, the regulation of telecommunication or disaster prevention, the containment of epidemics, or the fight against organized crime).

These coordination problems are not essentially “political” issues, such as the questions of global energy, environmental, financial, and economic policies, all of which touch on issues of equitable distribution. As regards such problems of world domestic politics, there is a need for regulation and positive integration, for which both the framework and the actors do not yet exist. The existing policy networks are functionally specified, multilateral, and more or less inclusive international organizations in which delegates of national government bear the responsibility and hold sway, irrespective of who else is admitted to them. At any rate, they do not provide a frame for legislation and corresponding processes of political will formation. Even if such a framework were established, there would still be (with the exception of the United States) no collective actors to fill the role of global players. I am thinking of regional or continental regimes that possess a sufficiently representative mandate for negotiation and wield the necessary powers for an implementation across large territories.

Such global players must be strong enough to form changing coalitions, create flexible checks and balances, and negotiate binding compromises. In this way, international relations as we know them would continue to exist on the transnational stage, though modified in kind. Under an effective UN security regime, even the most powerful of the global players would be denied resorting to war as a legitimate means of conflict solution. With the exception of the United States, there are at present no viable actors at the transnational level. This problem directs our attention to the third or lower level of the nation-states. This level started to emerge on a worldwide scale only with the process of decolonization. Not until the second half of the twentieth century did an international community of nation-states arise; during this period, the number of UN members rose from 51 to 192 states.
Nation-states are by historical standards a comparatively young political formation, but in the international arena they are still the most powerful actors. However, the growing interdependences of the global economy and the cross-border risks of a world society overstrain the scope the nation-states have for action, and they overtax the national chains of legitimation. Networks in all dimensions of globalization have long since taken to the point of absurdity the theoretical assumption on accountability that there must be congruency between those who are responsibly making political decisions and those who are affected by them.14

We can thus observe in all continents how individual nation-states find themselves compelled to form regional alliances or at any rate forms of closer cooperation (APEC, ASEAN, NAFTA, AU, ECOWAS, etc.). These regional alliances are, however, weak beginnings. The nation-states must grow beyond intergovernmental forms of cooperation if they are at the transnational level to assume the role of carriers of global domestic politics and deliver the democratic legitimacy for their transnational agreements. The EU has at least achieved the status of laying claim to growing into the role of a global actor. However, European unification will only be able to stand as a model for the construction of higher-order capacities for political action if it attains a degree of political integration that enables the EU to pursue democratically legitimated policies both toward the outside world and within its own borders.

III

Now, such a design may be useful for locating the most pressing problems at the right place. But it meets, of course the charge of the “powerlessness of a mere ought.” I do not wish to go into the normative superiority of the Kantian project compared with other visions of a new world order.15 But even well justified normative projects remain without consequence if reality does not meet them halfway. This was Hegel’s objection to Kant. Instead of merely confronting the idea with an irrational world, he wanted to raise the actual course history to the level of the reality of the idea. However, Hegel and then Marx both came an embarrassing cropper with this effort to provide a backing for the idea in terms of a philosophy of history. Searching for actual trends that meet the idea of a cosmopolitan condition, let me at least mention a peculiar dynamics triggered by an ever clearer sense of the legitimation deficit of current forms of global governance.

International organizations are founded in terms of multilateral treaties between sovereign states. If they come to exercise a kind of
“governance beyond the nation-state” in one or the other field, the growing need for legitimation soon exceeds the scope of legitimacy that international treaties can at best derive from the democratic character of the states represented by the signatures. Such a discrepancy appears to exist also in the case of the UN, which is expected to watch over international security and worldwide compliance with human rights standards.

This explains recommendations such as to include NGOs in the consultation process for the General Assembly, something that would enhance at least the visibility of the UN in the global public sphere. Perhaps cross-links back to the national parliaments in the member states would also help things in this regard. Let us not mislead ourselves, however: These reforms, irrespective of how desirable they are, remain insufficient to connect the supranational with the national level, so that an uninterrupted chain of legitimation would run from the nation-states to the world organization.

On the other hand, the question is whether the need for legitimation requires bridging this gap in the first place, on the assumption that in the future a reformed Security Council will properly interact with a generally recognized International Criminal Court (ICC). On closer inspection, we discover that there are different legitimation requirements at the supranational as compared with the transnational level. Ever since the development of international law has followed the intrinsic logic of an explication and extension of human rights, and international politics has increasingly complied with this trend, the issues which the world organization faces have tended to be more of a legal than a political nature. And that would be the case to an even greater degree in a perfectly constitutionalized world society.

Let us, for the sake of the argument, assume that the Security Council deals with judiciable issues of securing peace and protecting human rights according to fair procedures, that is, in an impartial and nonselective manner under the control of the ICC. This practice can be expected to receive due recognition if, as we assume, it abides by just those principles and procedures that reflect the result of long-term democratic learning processes. The confidence in the normative force of existing judicial procedures can draw on the advance of a legitimacy bonus which exemplary histories of proven democracies constitute in the collective memory of mankind.

Yet this assumed background consensus in the global public sphere does not explain why we can accord that resonating sphere a critical function. In this regard, Kant was already quite optimistic, because “a violation of justice at one place on the Earth is felt at all others.”\(^1\) Decisions taken at the supranational level on war and peace, justice
and injustice do indeed attract attention and a critical response worldwide—if we think of the interventions in Kosovo and Iraq, and in the cases of Pinochet, Milosevic, and Saddam. The negative duties of a universalistic morality of justice—the duty to refrain from crimes against humanity and wars of aggression—are rooted in all cultures, and they happily correspond to the yardsticks which the institutions of the world organization themselves would use to justify their decisions.

This is an overly slender basis, however, for regulations negotiated at the transnational level that go well beyond the classical agenda of granting security, law, and freedom. Especially the Global Economic Multilaterals (GEMs)—first and foremost the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund—are in charge of regulations that touch on substantial issues of distribution and redistribution as we know them from the national arena. And here, within the nation-state, such policies require the republican kind of legitimation which is to be provided only through proper democratic channels. Once we bid farewell to the dream of a world republic, precisely this channel is not available at the transnational level, until there will emerge an institutionalized negotiation between some legitimate continental regimes. This is why the growing legitimation problems at this level will become a more and more pressing challenge to which we have to find a response one way or the other.

A.-M. Slaughter has developed the powerful image of a disaggregation of state sovereignty. From this vantage point, functionally specified exchange relations gain predominance over territorially bound power relations to the extent that transnational networks achieve a certain degree of independence and gradually feed back into national governments from which they originated. The centrifugal forces of transnational networks extract the sovereignty of each of the member states and take their centralized hierarchies apart. State sovereignty then unravels into the sum of respective functionally autonomous subauthorities. However, this image only highlights the fact that regulatory decisions that intervene in nation-states from above are increasingly uncoupled from popular sovereignty. Certainly, the competences transferred to the GEMs remain formally speaking within the ambit of the governments involved, but the agreements reached in those distant organizations are in fact dominated by the most powerful members and no longer exposed to the public critique, deliberation, and political reaction of citizen in respective national arenas. For this lack of legitimacy at the national level, there is no substitute offered beyond the nation-state either.
A.-M. Slaughter answers the issue of a legitimation deficit at the transnational level by a proposal that illuminates the problem, rather than solves it.

The members of government networks (must) . . . first . . . be accountable to their domestic constituents for their trans-governmental activities to the same extent that they are accountable for their domestic activities. Second, as participants in structures of global governance, they must have a basic operating code that takes account of the rights and interests of all peoples.20

But to whom are the deputies of the executive branch accountable if they negotiate binding multilateral regulations that their domestic voters would not accept? And who decides what is in the interest of all the peoples affected if the negotiating power is as asymmetrically distributed in the transnational settings as are in the real world the military powers and economic weights of the participating countries?

More promising is the neoliberal strategy of deflating the claims for legitimacy. The legitimation of democratically elected governments who send their delegates to international organizations is said to be quite sufficient even if there is no open discussion of the matters at hand in countries in question. In this reading, the unequal distribution of voting power and influence within the GEMs is not a serious problem, as democratic representation is seen quite simply as the wrong model. What is lacking in terms of accountability can (apart from a greater transparency of the negotiations, better information for those affected, and the involvement of NGOs) be offset primarily by the self-legitimizing force of the rationality of experts. The model is here the professionalism of nonmajoritarian institutions such as central banks and courts.21

However, the independence of central banks is explained by the (incidentally controversial) assumption that the stabilization of a currency calls for sophisticated arguments and decisions that should be left to experts. By contrast, the decisions taken by the GEMs are a matter of political controversy, as they cut deeply into the interests of national societies and on occasion intervene into the structure of entire national economies. For this reason, the WTO features a dispute settlement level and an appellate body intended to ensure that the interests of third parties are also duly taken into consideration.22 But in the framework of the constitutional state, the legitimacy of judicial decisions relies on the fact that courts apply the law set by a democratic legislature and that court decisions can be corrected in the political process. In the WTO, there is no legislative authority that generates norms in the domain of international business law or could change it.
The argument that we should relieve governmental *policy networks* of exaggerated claims of legitimation would only work if we accepted the premise that we perceive the GEMs operations as parts of a liberal economic world order that *is presupposed to be legitimate*. There is then no further need in the process itself to justify the promotion of a worldwide deregulation of markets against government intervention. The projected division of labor between integrating the world society through liberalized markets on the one hand, and passing the costs of any remaining social and ecological obligations onto the nation-states, on the other, would render any form of global governance superfluous. From this viewpoint, the vision of global domestic politics is a dangerous pipedream.

But what is the *real* danger? The global export of the project of a neoliberal world order does not meet with much democratic agreement in the world, but rests on what we are used to calling the “Washington consensus.” And this program is in turn inspired by a fallible and highly controversial theory. The problem is not that this theory like any other could turn out to be wrong. What is far more disquieting is a consequence it will have in the course of a long-term neoliberal restructuring of the global economy. The political goal to switch from *political* forms of regulation to *market* mechanisms serves to buttress the continuation of such a politics, because a shift in policies becomes harder to the extent that the scope for political intervention has at the same time been curtailed. The politically intended self-limitation of the scope for political intervention in favor of systemic self-regulation would rob future generations of precisely those means which are indispensable if they are to be able to change the approach taken. Even if every nation “consciously and democratically decides to be more a ‘competition state’ than a ‘welfare state,’ ” this democratic decision must destroy its own basis if it leads to organizing society such that it becomes impossible to use democratic means to overturn precisely that decision.23

This evaluation of the consequences is advisable not just in the foreseeable case of the failure of neoliberal forecasts. Even if the theoretical assumptions were to be accurate *grosso modo*, the phrase of the “cultural contradictions of capitalism” could take on new meaning.24 Different social models of capitalism compete with each other already within the domain of the Western culture. Not all Western nations are prepared to pay the social and the cultural price at home and worldwide of a lack of compensation for the affluence gap, though the neoliberals encourage them, for the purpose of a faster increase in affluence, to forgo such compensation for the time being. All the greater the interest in maintaining a certain political scope for action in other cultures, who through their access to the world market and by
agreeing to the dynamics of social modernization have shown themselves willing to adjust and transform their own ways of life, but are not prepared to abandon these ways of life and to let them replace with an imported pattern of life. (sic) Many cultural faces of the pluralist world society, or multiple modernities, do not sit well with a completely deregulated world market society that has had its political teeth pulled. For this would rob the non-Western cultures, influenced as they are by other world religions, of their scope to appropriate the achievements of modernity from their own resources.

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ENDNOTES

5. Chr. Möllers analyzes this linkage taking the example of the EU in his introductory chapter on constitution and constitutionalization in A. v. Bogdandy, ed. *Europäisches Verfassungtrecht* (Berlin: 2003), 1–56. (sic)
11. For an overview of the UN family, see David Held, *Global Covenant* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 82ff.
17. Slaughter, 12ff. (sic)
18. M. Zürn (2004), 273f (sic): “The democratic decision-making process within nation states are losing their anchorage. They are superseded by organizations and actors who indeed are mostly accountable to their national governments one way or another, but at the same time quite remote and inaccessible for the nationally enclosed addressees of the regulations in question. Given the extent of the intrusion of these new international institutions into the affairs of national societies, the notion of ‘delegated, and therefore controlled authority’ . . . no longer holds.”