Governing Education for Migrant Children:
The Practice of Government-\textit{Minban} Migrant School in Shanghai

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the practise of governing migrant schools, and to investigate the underlying rationalities behind the governance of education for migrant children, as well as to analyze the extent to which the governance of access to education for migrant children makes it possible to accommodate their future educational needs.

Drawing on two months’ research in a government-minban migrant school in the Songjiang district of Shanghai, the data demonstrates that the current policy on governing migrant schools has without doubt provided a better education setting for migrant children, as these children are now supported by an annual subsidy, exempted from tuition fees, and given access to a more standardized curriculum. However, when compared to local public schools, the current situation still reveals marginality in terms of the education of migrant children.

By using governmentality theory, I seek to explain Shanghai’s current governance of education for migrant children through the analytical lens of subjectification, rationality and form of technology. The study suggests that the emergence of issues such as securing China’s future human resources and China’s changing attitude towards migrants has highlighted the importance of providing education for migrant children. Following these rationales, the current practises regarding the provision of education for migrant children lie somewhere between supporting (through subsidy and regulation of migrant schools, as well as the promotion of vocational schools) and restricting (via the continued implementation of China’s National College Entrance Examination (NCEE)).

Nevertheless, under the current wave of decentralization, each locality comes with its own concerns, which makes the practise of governing education for migrant children more varied than ever. Thus, under the current situation migrant children are still left with limited options for accessing education in urban areas.
Acknowledgements

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Last but not least, my deepest gratitude goes to all of the staff and students at Sunshine Primary School, and the people I met while I was in China. I would like to thank them for trusting me and sharing their experiences with me. I dedicate my thesis to them.

Despite the academic advice I have received, any errors in this thesis are solely mine.

November 2011

Regina Cinduringtias Pasiasti
Map of Shanghai

Source: http://www.chinatouristmaps.com/provinces/shanghai.html
Map of Songjiang District

Source: http://www.tabimado.cn/sight/map-shanghai-songjiang.htm
Illustration

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All Chinese names in this thesis are written according to standard writing in People’s Republic of China; that is surname coming first followed by the given name.

The transcriptions of Chinese characters are written according to Pinyin system.
INTRODUCTION

Research Question

Since its economic reform in 1978, China’s population demography has changed due to the great numbers of people migrating from rural to urban areas. The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security suggested that by the end of 2008 there were at least 225.42 million migrant workers. The early waves of such migration in the 1980s saw movement primarily from independent migrant workers, but by the 1990s many had begun taking their families, including their children, with them. However, getting access to formal education for their children was a burden, since they were not entitled to educational provision by the city government, as such funding was calculated based on the numbers of children who held urban household registration. Since most migrant children were not in the urban household registration system, limited options were left for parents: they could send their children either to local public schools for a high price, or to private schools, which were usually even more unaffordable for migrant workers. In an effort towards subsistence, at the beginning of the 1990s many migrants started to run schools themselves. These schools, referred to as migrant schools, operated outside of the legal system and were mostly of poor quality. Until 1998, the government’s attitude towards these schools was to neither ban nor recognize them, thus leaving the problem unsolved at that point.

In 1998 the educational problem surrounding migrant children was addressed by the government for the first time through *Temporary measures for the schooling of children and adolescents from the migrating population*. This was followed in September 2003 with the

Notice on suggestions on further improving education for migrant children. Although both reports seemed to offer solutions, they failed to address the core of the problem: which level of government was responsible for educational spending on migrant children. This failure not only left the unregulated migrant schools as the main providers of these children’s education, but also resulted in higher fees being levied against migrant parents as a common practise in public schools. A document entitled Notice on improving work for the abolishment of tuition fees for children of compulsory age in cities, issued in 2008, was the latest report on this subject to have been issued by the State Council. There were at least four main policies within this report: the urban government is responsible for educational funding, public schools should be the main education provider for migrant children, tuition fees are to be abolished, and private migrant schools must be regulated and supported by local government.

Nevertheless, not all public schools have the capacity to absorb migrant children, and neither are all local governments willing to fund them. Driven by its worries regarding the growing population, Beijing has recently taken measures to close migrant schools, leaving its 14 thousand migrant children without any access to education. As an alternative approach, in 2010 Shanghai became the first city in China to provide free education to all migrant children by waiving tuition fees and supporting migrant schools.

The study in the present thesis is based on fieldwork research conducted in 2010-2011 in a migrant school in a suburb of Shanghai. The research questions it focuses on are: How has the phenomenon of migrant schools developed in China and, more specifically, how are migrant schools governed in Shanghai today? By using Foucault's theory of

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governmentality, the rationalities behind the governing of migrant schools will be analyzed, along to what extent the governing of educational access for migrant children makes it possible to accommodate their future educational needs. This thesis attempts to demonstrate that China’s current governing of education for migrant children uses a mixture of coercive and complementary technology, sometimes supporting and at other times restricting, as it is driven by various rationalities on securing national future human resources, along with China’s changing attitude towards migrants.

**Background**

The Chinese term for migrant workers, *nongmingong*, did not appear in the Chinese dictionary until the 1970s.\(^{12}\) Taken from two words, *nongmin* which stands for peasant and *gong* which stands for labour, the term *nongmingong* used to refer to those who carried out industrial work, while remaining registered as peasants.\(^{13}\) However, throughout the current paper the term “migrant workers” will be used to replace *nongmingong*, as a gentle reminder that it was their movement from rural to urban areas which has lead to their ambiguous status, which lies somewhere between those in urban and those in rural Chinese households (*hukou*).\(^{14}\)

Migrant workers and their welfare has become a popular subject among scholars, both locally and internationally. This interest has arisen in part from the fact that once these people moved to cities, many were excluded from the social assistance that local urban *hukou* holders received; while many studies had already documented the development of China’s economy as result of migrants’ hard work,\(^{15}\) the story of migrants depicts their struggles in overcoming inequalities under the spotlight of China’s economic development.

Cai has suggested that studying the phenomenon of migrant workers provides a great opportunity to observe China’s social development.\(^{16}\) Discussions in this area have gradually

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\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) Further explanation on the using of the term will be discussed in chapter one.


\(^{16}\) He Cai, “Introduction”, *op.cit*
shifted from a focus in the 1980s on their right to obtain jobs in cities, to securing their well-being as a community, as well as their social integration with urban residents, in the 2000s. However, the hukou system, which is the root cause of the unequal treatment they have received, has never been completely abolished, and the story of migrants has become more multifaceted than ever.

As more migrant workers move their children to cities with them, the study of migrant children becomes one of the key issues when it comes to discussions of their wellbeing as a community. Many studies have considered them from different perspectives: for instance, Julia Kwong documented the development of migrant schools as places for negotiation between state and civil society17; Fei Yan and Zhu Meihua depicted conditions from a social welfare angle18; Liang Zai and Chen Yiu Por, and Chloé Froissart analyzed the situations with reference to human rights19, etc. Though the current study also focuses on migrant children, it attempts to analyze the educational situation through the angle of state governance, in contrast to the previous studies outlined above.

Methodology

This research was based on a two-month ethnographic field study conducted in a migrant school in a suburb of Shanghai (September-November 2010 and mid-December 2010-mid-January 2011). When using the ethnography method, small facts and details are important in helping to answer the research questions. Madden’s suggestion, that ethnography is a process of being with other, writing about the other and theorizing about the other,20 was followed for this research. Hammersley and Atkinson also mention that while conducting ethnographic fieldwork, one needs to use one’s body and senses as a tool to experience the world of other,21 and thus throughout the fieldwork regular notes were kept not only on dialogues or

17 Kwong, “Educating migrant…”, op.cit.
conversations that had taken place, but also on other sensory details. In order to protect the privacy of the participants, pseudonyms are used for all people and schools in this thesis.

Cheng Kai-Ming suggested that understanding the educational process in particular places and contexts is crucial when studying policy-related studies on education, since it enables the researcher to obtain first-hand data from local perspectives regarding the policy in question.\textsuperscript{22} Wolcott mentioned three procedures to be followed when carrying out ethnographic research: experiencing, enquiring and examining, which can be replaced by the general terms participant observation, interviewing and archival research or literature study.\textsuperscript{23} However, throughout the fieldwork, it was found that each of the procedures was conducted at varied levels and fell into different categories. This is shown in detail in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1 - Type of data and level of participation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participant observation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interview</td>
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</table>


\textsuperscript{23} Harry F. Wolcott, Ethnography: a way of seeing (Walnut Creek: Altamira Press, 1999).

\textsuperscript{24} This term was firstly employed by Thomas Gold. It refers to a form of interviewing people by spontaneously engaged in a subtle conversation on the street. Dorothy J. Solinger, “Interviewing Chinese People: From High-level Officials to the Unemployed” in Heimer & Thøgersen (eds.), Doing Fieldwork in China (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2006), pp. 153-167.
Archival research

On-site archives: students’ essays, school documents, English books used by local Shanghai curriculum and migrant school curriculum (for comparison).

Non-site archives: newspapers, previous research (books and journals), local gazettes, official documents from the internet, official websites.

Prior to arrival in Shanghai, I had established contact with both organizations and people engaged in the field of educating migrant children as I followed Gobo’s suggestion that being a foreigner, one will need to rely upon an intermediary to bring to the field and help to establish communication.\(^{25}\) Some negotiations were needed, and gaining access to the field often took some time, and was not always successful. It took over a month that I was finally offered the chance to teach at one of the migrant schools in the Songjiang district, Shanghai.

There are several types of migrant schools operating in Shanghai; these are basically divided according to the legal administration status of the school, namely “private-run” (mostly referred to as *siren xueiao*) and “government and people-run” (mostly referred to as *guoyou minban xueiao*).\(^{26}\) I was quite optimistic about the possibility of comparing the schools under the new regulations, however two of three principals were reluctant for the research to be conducted in their schools. I introduced myself as a foreign student who wanted to do some voluntary work in order to gain understanding of the Chinese education system, especially in relation to migrant children. In addition, I was introduced by a contact as an affiliated student at the intermediary’s university, however this caused further problems, as there was no official endorsement from any organization (as the research was being undertaken voluntarily). Following an interview with the two school headmasters in question, it was discovered that their reluctance was due to an impending inspection of migrant schools.\(^{27}\) On reflection, I felt that their reluctance might also be driven by the legal status of their schools, which were private, while the school where the fieldwork was conducted was a government-*minban* school.

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\(^{26}\) More explanation in chapter four.

Sunshine Primary School (SPS) was the third school visited. Prior to entering the site, I met with three local people working and studying in the field of education of migrant children, and the research topic was discussed with them. Since migrant children are always put in the context of migration, the concept of *hukou* inevitably arises. *Hukou* is, however, considered a sensitive topic, and I was advised to avoid referencing it whenever possible, and to mention the research intention only after gaining the informants’ trust. This presented quite a dilemma, since it was also important to be honest about the purpose of the research so the participants could decide whether or not they would take part.\(^{28}\) On balance it was decided that, considering my position as a foreigner and the shared knowledge of the field held by the professionals spoken to, the intention of conducting research on migrant schools would not be mentioned to the headmaster during the “job interview”. Due to the intention to gain data through participant observation, however, it was considered necessary to inform both students and teachers of the intention to conduct research at SPS, and they were therefore informed of this during initial classes and conversations. After one-and-a-half months of teaching at SPS, a face-to-face meeting was held with the headmaster, wherein his permission was sought for conducting the interviews and the essay assignment. Rather than rejecting the request, he was delighted that I was so interested in their situation. During a teachers’ meeting the next day, he informed the teachers of the research that was to be conducted. In hindsight, it may have been better to have been more overt about the study’s intentions in the beginning, and for me to use my position as a foreigner, following Saether’s suggestion that being a foreigner is also an advantage since one can be seen as being unfamiliar with the culture, “stupid”\(^ {29} \), and therefore less threatening.

\(^{28}\) Gobo, *Doing Ethnography…*, *op.cit.*, chap. 8, pp. 135-147.

Table 2 - Procedures on informed consent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of data</th>
<th>Procedures</th>
<th>Tools</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal interviews with teachers and headmaster</td>
<td>Prior to interview, informants were given information regarding: 1. The purpose of the interview 2. The freedom to choose whether or not they would like to take part 3. Their guaranteed anonymity 4. Their freedom to choose whether their interviews were tape recorded or not. Prior to conducting the interviews, the list of questions was provided to the headmaster.</td>
<td>List of questions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tape recorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student essays</td>
<td>During the first meeting with students, I introduced myself as a student who was doing research on the education of migrant children. After gaining permission from the headmaster regarding the essay assignment, the list of questions was provided to the headmaster as well as the classroom teachers. The essays were anonymous.</td>
<td>Essay assignment: Perspective on current school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal interview: teachers, parents, students, informants outside SPS</td>
<td>All parties were informed regarding: 1. The research intention 2. Their freedom to choose whether or not they would like to take part. For students: since they were minors, permissions were needed from guardians(^\text{30}); the data used here were obtained only from students whose parents gave their permission.</td>
<td>Fieldnotes</td>
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<td>Computer</td>
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During the period spent at SPS, I was responsible for teaching English to fourth- to sixth-grade students. These students were selected as the main focus because the research questions also pertained to the future educational opportunities provided to children after they completed primary level education. In total, six classes were conducted in a week, with two hours of English lessons for each class, compressed into three days’ teaching at the school. Although interaction with the students mainly took place at the school, there were also numerous occasions where visits were paid to some of their families, as well as shopping and playing with the students during weekends. However, the latter activities were not really fruitful from a research perspective, since there were usually ten or twelve people getting together in crowds, parks or playgrounds, thereby reducing the chance to conduct serious discussions on the research topic. On the other hand, spending time with them outside of school made it possible to gain additional insight into their daily lives as children of migrants.

In Chinese culture, being a teacher means one is vested with power over students. At the beginning of the research period, it was very difficult to overcome the gap this created between me and the students, particularly the upper-level students (fifth- and sixth-graders). My position as a foreigner added to the students’ reluctance to communicate when they were approached during recess. However, the attitude of the younger students was different; not only were they willing to speak openly, but they even raised questions inside and outside of classes. By incorporating games and quizzes into classes, however, even the older students began to be more open and relaxed. It was found that being easygoing and friendly was the easiest way to mingle with the students – and this also applied to other teachers and strangers I met and had discussions with throughout my stay in Shanghai.

The interviews conducted during the fieldwork were mainly formal, in the sense that the venues and times of interviews were arranged with informants, and were asked open-ended questions. In total, there were five formal interviews, consisting of two with headmasters and three with teachers. These three teachers were selected according to their positions at the school: (1) female – mathematics teacher for the fourth grade, fourth grade homeroom teacher, high school graduate, rural hukou holder; (2) female – English teacher for second and sixth grade, acting as coordinator assistant during the respective teacher’s maternity leave, university school graduate, urban hukou holder; and (3) female – language teacher for sixth grade, sixth grade homeroom teacher, university graduate, urban hukou holder. The two headmasters came from different economic and social backgrounds, as well as different types
of hukou: (1) male – Shanghainese, 12 years of teaching experience, a retired headmaster from a local primary school; and (2) male – Anhuinese, four years in administering private kindergarten, has held many positions prior to his current one. The interviews were all recorded with the interviewees’ permission. The records were then transcribed and translated, and notes on the gestures used by interviewees during the interviews were also made on the same day the interviews were conducted.

However, the most useful information was gained from the informal interviews, since the informants were aware of the interview purpose, as well as the daily conversations, and observations at the school. As Schensul et al. suggested, researchers should not depend solely on memory, since it is selective and easily misguided. Therefore, to ensure the observations are accurate, the use of field notes is important.31 While some studies suggest that fieldworkers sometimes need to ask permission and write their notes secretly, it was found helpful in this study to talk with teachers in the staff room, since the notes could then be typed up immediately after the conversation took place, without being subject to the curiosity of the teachers, since it was written in English. For the conversations that took place outside of the school, the notes were taken largely “in secret”. All in all, few difficulties were encountered in taking notes in and outside of the field, and during the analysis stage it was found that the field notes, which were written in a mixture of English and Chinese, served as an important source that made it possible to trace the details of the fieldwork.

Although obtaining data in the field is important, one should not enter the field without having conducted research into existing literature. According to Solinger, examining written documents will help to put the issue into better context.32 The literature review also proved to be helpful during the interviews, since it made it possible to cross-check prior knowledge with the information the informants were delivering. Since there was limited access to official documents such as regulations and reports (especially those labelled as confidential), the strategy was to find data through the internet and official websites. In this manner, access was obtained to local gazettes, university journals, newspapers, school documents and statistics. These materials were accompanied by information from a large number of books, journals and newspapers written in English.

32 Solinger, “Interviewing Chinese...”, op.cit, pp. 159.
As ethnography incorporates using the body as a tool and constantly employs perceptions and interpretations throughout the process, it is possible that some facts or phenomenon are excluded from discussions.\textsuperscript{33} Therefore, this study is only a partial representation of the development of the educational situation for migrant children.

\textbf{Thesis structure}

This thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter will document a more comprehensive background of the study by looking at the Chinese economic reform and decentralization of education. A sub-chapter will document China’s household registration system, and the history of migration post-1978, and migrant children, will also be discussed. This will be followed by explanation of Foucault’s theory of governmentality in chapter two.

Chapter three will attempt to render the theory by explaining the process of subjectification, rationalities and forms of technology which are used in governing education for migrant children. In this chapter it is argued that governing education for migrant children is important, as China needs to secure its future human resources as well as adapting to its current internal migration trends. The chapter will also present the current governing process of migrant schools, the promotion of vocational schools, and China’s National College Entrance Examination (NCEE), as the three are used as forms of technology.

The main findings from the fieldwork conducted at SPS will be documented in chapter four. An argument will be presented on how to develop the school under new management and supervision from the government, and how to promote vocational schools; these are presented alongside consideration of the nation’s reluctance to abolish the requirements of the NCEE. In the discussion section, it will be argued that governing educational access for migrant children plays between supporting and restricting role.

The final chapter will conclude the thesis. Some comments and suggestions for further research will also be provided.

\textsuperscript{33} Hammersley and Atkinson, \textit{Ethnography...}, \textit{op.cit}, pp. 19.
CHAPTER 1 - BACKGROUND

When considering the issues surrounding the governance of migrant schools and access to education for migrant children, it is important to bear in mind that the system runs against a larger background – namely that of economic reform and decentralization of education, the household registration system, and the history of migration in China. Together, these mould the way in which migrant children are given access to education in the city. This chapter will be divided into three sections: economic reform and decentralization of education, the household registration system, and migration and migrant children.

1.1. Economic reform and decentralization of education

Soon after The Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Eleventh National Party Congress, China acknowledged its need to accelerate economic development, and therefore reformed its financial and taxation system. Prior to decentralization, the Chinese financial and taxation system was centralized in the sense that all revenue in each area was collected and transferred to central government, which also supported and planned the expenditure of each area.\(^\text{34}\) The main goal of the reform was to reduce the financial burden on central government, and encourage local government to develop its economic sector.\(^\text{35}\) Following decentralization, every local government became responsible for bearing the bulk of the financial expenditure of its locality.

This financial reform also took place in the education sector. Prior to the economic reform, the main purpose of education was centred on politics: i.e. to bolster “redness” among the people. However, under the post-Mao government, education began to play a greater role in serving the economic competitiveness of the market system.\(^\text{36}\) The decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the reform of the educational structure in

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1985 highlights the decentralization which took place in education.\textsuperscript{37} The decentralization was based on the principle of “eating from a different pot”,\textsuperscript{38} in which each level of government became responsible for its own finances. From this document, local governments are given authority to administer education, while central government monitors and supervises. The result of the document was that local governments came to bear the bulk of the cost of education, while there was more diversity in terms of financial resources, and private sector education appeared. Each government level is now also responsible for different education levels: village governments are responsible for financing primary schools, township governments for junior secondary schools, and county governments for senior secondary schools.\textsuperscript{39}

As a result, some of the main principles of the Chinese education system are changing.\textsuperscript{40} First, education is perceived as a consumption item, and therefore consumers have to pay for it. Thus, until the revision of compulsory education law in 2006, a fee system has been put in place. Second, the government no longer intends to monopolize education. The former structure of centralization and control over the local financing system weakened the initiatives and enthusiasm of local governments and educational institutions. As a result, these agents took a passive role in financing education, and thus left the role to central government, who did not have adequate funding. Third, a conception of stakeholders in education comes into play. While central government only acts as a supervisor, local government now plays the main role terms of financing, provision and regulation of education. Therefore local governments can now diversify financial resources in order to provide adequate funding for education. Under this far-reaching policy, the private sector is now allowed to take a role in catering to educational needs. Fourth, with private sector enters educational services, efficiency becomes the priority of education. As result, education in China no longer follows an equity principle, but rather has become a field in which inequality has emerged.

Under the new system, educational funding is basically divided into government and non-government sources. The government source consists of government allocation for education,

\textsuperscript{38} Tsang, “Intergovernmental grants…”, \textit{op.cit.}  
\textsuperscript{40} Ngok, “Chinese Education...”, \textit{op.cit.}
educational surcharges and levies (in urban and rural areas), education tax and grants. The non-government source is made up of school contributions, school fees and school-generated funds. Education funding is used on both personnel and non-personnel expenses\textsuperscript{41}; however, a problem occurs as the revenues collected by local governments in poor rural areas are mostly limited. Moreover, since the government’s budget is no longer sufficient to finance educational spending, the bulk is left to be paid by the consumers (parents). At the same time, education as a public service has positive externalities. In the context of migrant flow, local governments in rural areas are reluctant to bear the financial costs since the fruits of these will spill into other areas.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, the governmental budget for education is mainly spent on paying teachers’ salaries and day-to-day operations, without little real attention paid to quality.\textsuperscript{43} As result, inequality in education appears very subtly in the form of gaps and disparities in school quality and educational access. The decentralization of the education system throughout the 1990s has caused two major deficiencies: inadequate resources to support education inputs, such as quality teachers, school facilities, and teaching equipment; and low rates of student enrolment in poor and underdeveloped areas.\textsuperscript{44} 

In 1994 central government, concerned with the situation in rural areas, instigated a tax sharing reform that allows central government to redistribute financial resources to poor regions. The step was followed in 2001 by central government’s move to try to recentralize education funding by implementing the idea of “county governments taking primary responsibility” (\textit{yi xian wei zhu}).\textsuperscript{45} However, this did not work as expected, since county governments in poor areas are limited in terms of their educational resources, and are only responsible for personnel costs, while non-personnel costs are still on the shoulders of consumers. In addition, as education levies have been abolished in rural areas, rural governments are facing difficulties in financing education. As Ngok suggests, where education becomes industrialized to make up for an educational deficit, the value of equity and equality is phased out.\textsuperscript{46} There is a Chinese saying regarding “three new mountains” (\textit{xin

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Li Wen, Albert Park and Wang Sangui, “School equity in rural China” in Emily Hannum and Albert Park (eds.), \textit{Education and Reform in China} (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 27-43.
\textsuperscript{44} Tsang, “Intergovernmental…”, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{45} Guo, “Persistent inequalities…”, \textit{op.cit.}
\textsuperscript{46} Ngok, “Chinese Education...”, \textit{op.cit.}
sanzuo dashan), which refers to the heavy financial burden of education, healthcare, and housing, and gives an exact picture on the current cost of education in China.47

1.2. Household registration (hukou) system

Every year, millions of migrant workers anticipate the Spring Festival break as it is usually the only time in the whole year where they can reunite with their families back home.48 This is the biggest annual migration in the world,49 and begs the question of why there are so many people who are separated from their families in a society which heralds family union. As Chan suggested, the answer to this question can be traced back to the institution called the household registration system, or huji.50

Although the huji was legally implemented in 1958, it can be traced back to the dynasty era.51 The first attempt to register households and the population was during the Xia dynasty. However, it was only during the Warring States period, which was fortified under the Qin rulers, that the registration system was implemented through a mutual responsibility system (baojia), which was used to control the population and keep it under surveillance.52 This system was well-maintained for decades, and was reshaped under Kuomintang and the Japanese occupation. However, it was only under the legacy of Mao Zedong in 1958 that hukou was officially implemented through the Regulations on household (Hukou) registration in the People's Republic of China.

Though registration has a long history in China, one of the main purposes of hukou implementation in the Mao era was to register urban residence, as well as to track down those who were suspected as being anti-government.53 Having learned from its “big brother”, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), China tried to implement a registration system

47 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
which resembled propiska. As China adopted a planned economy, it emphasized industrialization and the development of urban areas. The state assumed that rural areas could absorb the surplus labour from urban areas; rural areas were supposed to be self-reliant, while urban ones needed to be taken care of and supported by the state. Therefore, there was a need for strict regulation regarding population registration, and later on control of migration came to the fore.

The Provisional regulations on urban hukou management were imposed in 1951 to maintain social stability, and at the same time to ensure freedom of residence and movement of citizens. During the early 1950s, the state did not need to coerce citizens to leave urban areas since the remuneration of land, as well as a basic access to grain, was perceived as being beneficial. Therefore, the displacement of citizens from urban households was relatively under control. However, in the mid-1950s, as cities came to need more labour, more peasants came to work in urban areas. Although they were contributing to urban development, the state perceived them negatively and even regarded them as mangliu (blind migrant), a reverse homophone of liumang (hooligan). In the eyes of the state, these peasants had to be made to return to the countryside once their work was completed.

In an attempt to achieve this, in 1955 the state started to stress the control of migration from rural to urban areas, which then became the cornerstone of the hukou system in the later years. In order to eliminate migration from rural to urban areas, the state established a food rationing system, and guaranteed basic needs for all urban residents. At this point, hukou had already divided Chinese citizens into two societies, rural and urban, and thus started to become a means of resource allocation, along with its function within population registration and migration control.

On January 9, 1958, the Regulations on hukou registration in the People's Republic of China was introduced. If one of the purposes of imposing urban hukou management in 1951 was to ensure the freedom of citizens’ movement, the 1958 hukou regulation clearly stated its

56 Wang, Organizing Through..., op.cit.
58 Ibid.
59 Wang, Organizing Through..., op.cit.
purpose to maintain social order and serve socialist construction, and thus prohibit freedom of movement. Under the new regulations, every citizen was subject to the registration system and was divided into two types of hukou: agricultural and non-agricultural. The system was implemented under the regulations of the Ministry of Public Security, through its authorities in local government. In terms of local administration, the police in each city or rural township were in charge of their own hukou management area. A citizen could only have one official permanent hukou, and for children the type of hukou was inherited from the mother (though after 1998, a child could choose to inherit from either its father or mother). All Chinese citizens were then divided into agricultural and non-agricultural hukou holders, with the latter fully supported by the state across many sectors, including housing, food rationing, employment and so forth. The length and factual location of residency would not automatically alter the type of hukou that one was registered at. If a citizen wanted to change their permanent hukou, they could do so under the authority of the state, through college or graduate school enrolment, job assignment or military service, or other factors in line with the state’s direction. However, changing one’s permanent hukou was extremely difficult. By then the regulations had effectively prohibited rural to urban migration under the strict political and surveillance climate.

The economic reform in the 1980s acted as an open gate to the development of Chinese population mobility. The implementation of the household responsibility system, together with the development of Chinese cities, had attracted many peasants to come and work in coastal areas. As the control over mobility loosened, the state began to implement other regulations which complemented the hukou system; these were laid out in the Ministry of Public Security’s 1985 Provisional regulations on the management of temporary residents in the urban areas. The 1985 policy was intended to regulate those peasants who migrated to cities in order to find jobs, mainly in the construction sector. Every peasant who migrated to a city was required to register at the local police station if they were staying outside their permanent hukou area for more than three days. All migrants aged older than 16 were

60 Cheng and Selden, “The Origins and...”, op.cit.
61 Wang, Organizing Through..., op.cit.
62 This entitlement of benefits and social assistances between the rural and urban hukou holders explains problematic issue of the implementation of hukou nowadays. Tao Ran, “Hukou Reform and social security for migrant workers in China” in Rachel Murphy (ed.) Labour Migration and Social Development in Contemporary China (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 73-95.
64 Ibid.
required to register. Later, if one intended to stay for more than three months in a destination city, one had to obtain approval from the local official and apply for a Temporary Residential Permit (jizhuzheng or zanzhuzheng).\textsuperscript{65} Jizhuzheng was given to those who were engaged in economic activities, while zanzhuzheng was given for other reasons, not necessarily for economic purposes.\textsuperscript{66} Those who held temporary residence permits, however, were excluded from the social welfare provided by the state.

Throughout the 1980s there was not much change to the \textit{hukou} system itself, apart from the 1985 regulations on temporary residential permit. However, there were many documents which related to the regulation of migrant workers, and these will be discussed below. In the 1990s and 2000s, as a result of decentralization, more pilot projects and attempts to reform the system were implemented in different localities. Those relating to the \textit{hukou} reform in Shanghai will be discussed below.

As the most developed city in China, Shanghai has attracted many migrants from around the mainland, to the point where roughly 28\% of its population do not have local \textit{hukou} and have lived for more than six months in the city.\textsuperscript{67} Some scholars have suggested that, due to its popularity as a migrant destination, Shanghai has attempted to reform the \textit{hukou} system in four stages.\textsuperscript{68} It first began relaxing its \textit{hukou} system in 1994, as an attempt to attract investors and to stimulate the weak housing conditions at the time, through its “blue stamp” \textit{hukou} (lanyin \textit{hukou}).\textsuperscript{69} With the fee starting from 40 thousand yuan, the offer targeted investors, commodity property buyers and people with talents which the city needed.\textsuperscript{70} The system was abolished in 2002 since only one out of every ten migrants held this type of \textit{hukou}.\textsuperscript{71} The second attempt was in June 2002, whereby a “talent residence card” (\textit{rencai juzhuzheng}) was offered. This type of residence card could be granted for those with special talents and skills, and thus the holder would be entitled to some social security. The third attempt was a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{65} Chan and Zhang, “The Hukou system...”, \textit{op.cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{66} Dorothy J. Solinger, \textit{Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State and the Logic of Market} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
\item \textsuperscript{68} Zhao Litao and Rong Courtney Fu, “China's Hukou Reform: The Guangdong and Shanghai Cases”, \textit{East Asian Institute Background Brief No. 551}, 2010. \url{http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB551.pdf} accessed on February, 19, 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Li Limei Li Si-ming and Chen Yingfang, “Better city, better life, but for whom?: The hukou and resident card system and the consequential citizenship stratification in Shanghai” in \textit{City, Culture and Society}, 1, 2010, pp. 145-154.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Mallee, “China's Household...”, \textit{op.cit.}
\item \textsuperscript{71} Zhao and Rong, “China's Hukou...”, \textit{op.cit}
\end{itemize}
residence card for migrants outside the group who were entitled to the talent residence card, and this was applied in 2004. This residence card was available to migrants who had a stable job and residence in Shanghai (business and employment residence card) and those who failed to meet the requirements for talents, job or residence, but were registered with the local police station (transient residence card).\textsuperscript{72} The last attempt was to confer Shanghai \textit{hukou} to those talent residence card holders who were regarded as being highly qualified. This policy was implemented in 2009 through the \textit{Provisional regulations on Shanghai hukou application of residence card holders,}\textsuperscript{73} and the candidates needed to meet several requirements, including holding a Shanghai residence card for at least seven years, contributing at least seven years to the Shanghai social security system, already being a taxpayer, holding at minimum a mid-level professional or vocational certificate issued by the, state and having no criminal record nor violating the one-child plan. Table 3 provides more details on this.

\begin{table}[h!]
\centering
\caption{Types of registration in Shanghai}
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|}
\hline
Type of registration & Status and requirements & Rights and benefits entailed \\
\hline
Shanghai local \textit{hukou} & Permanent. & Full entitlement: \\
& Ascribed. & 1. Social insurance\textsuperscript{74}: pension, medical, work-related injury, maternity, unemployment \\
& & 2. Minimum Livelihood Guarantee Scheme (\textit{dibao})\textsuperscript{75} \\
& & 3. Housing provident fund \\
& & 4. Right to low-cost social housing in case of \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{72} Li L. \textit{et.al.}, “Better city,...”, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{73} “Shanghai huji zhengce zaici songdong, daxuesheng gongzuo shunian kehau hukou” [Shanghai’s hukou regulation is relaxed for once again: university students who had worked several years were able to obtain hukou], \textit{Xinhua}, January 13, 2009. \texttt{http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2009-01/13/content_10648260.htm} accessed February 16, 2011.

\textsuperscript{74} Tao Ran mentioned that there is difference between social insurance and social assistance. The first is linked to employment, while the latter is provided by the government. However there is common misunderstanding regarding the nature of two and the relation with holding local urban \textit{hukou}. Tao Ran, “Achieving real progress in China’s hukou reform”, \textit{East Asia Forum}. February 8, 2010. \texttt{http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/08/achieving-real-progress-in-chinas-hukou-reform/} accessed March 31, 2011. Tao Ran, “Hukou reform...”, \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{75} This \textit{dibao} scheme is a financial-help programme provides by government for the urban poor. The basic criteria for receivers is based on ‘three-without’ (\textit{sanwu}): no career, no working ability, no people to support them. Since the scheme is provided only for urban \textit{hukou} holders, migrant workers are excluded. Dorothy J. Solinger, “Dibaohu in Distress: The Meager Minimum Livelihood Guarantee System in Wuhan” \textit{Revised version of paper prepared for Provincial China Workshop 2008}: “Social Problems and the local welfare mix in China: Public policies and private initiatives,” Nankai University, Tianjin. November 2008. \texttt{http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~dorjso/Duckett__-Solinger_4th_revision.pdf} accessed on April 11, 2011.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shanghai blue stamp hukou</th>
<th>Takes seven years to convert to local hukou. A minimum purchase of 60m$^2$ of property or 1 million yuan investment.</th>
<th>Only applicable in Shanghai.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai hukou under Provisional regulations on Shanghai hukou application of residence card holders</td>
<td>Permanent. Highly qualified talent residence card holder. Seven years of holding a Shanghai residence card. At least seven years of contributing to the Shanghai social security system. Local taxpayer. Min. mid-level vocational title/technical certificate</td>
<td>Full entitlement in line with local Shanghai hukou holders. Subject to quota.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Card Type</td>
<td>Validity</td>
<td>Eligibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Talent residence card           | Valid for three to five years and renewable. | Migrant with special skills and talents.         | Entitlement: 1. Pension scheme  
                                                2. Medical care  
                                                3. Work injury  
                                                4. Maternity  
                                                5. Public school entitlement for nine years’ compulsory education (yiwu jiaoyu). |
| Business and employment residence card | Valid for one year and regularly renewed. | Steady job, Own local property,                  | Holders cannot apply for official documents in Shanghai.                     |
| Transient residence card        | Valid for half a year and renewable upon expiry, | Access to some social insurance,                 | Children are prohibited from taking national exam in Shanghai.              |
Although Shanghai began to relax its *hukou* system, the requirements were set extremely high and aimed *only* at talented migrants; they therefore still excluded most migrant workers. The highly rigid and segmented *hukou* reform in Shanghai seemed to reflect the hesitancy of central government to reform the system nationally. In March 2010, a jointly-run editorial was published by 13 big newspapers in China. The editorial called for the abolition of the *hukou* system, and was published only few days before the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which took place in Beijing. The removal of the joint editorials only a few hours after they were released, and the firing of the deputy editor in chief of *The Economic Observer* who initiated the editorial, showed that there was still a long way to go to *hukou* reform, let alone abolishment.

### 1.3. Migration and migrant children

Defining migration in China has always been a daunting task, not only due to the problem of translation, but also because in China migration cannot simply be defined by movement in terms of spatiality and length of time. The exact Chinese translation for migration is *qianyi*. However, as Malle suggested, only after having one’s *hukou* transferred can one be referred to as having migrated (*qianyi*). Chan classified those who have gone through this process as *hukou* migrants. While the number of *hukou* migrants is relatively small, most other migrants in China fall into the category of non-*hukou* migrants, referring to those who migrate without having their *hukou* altered. The last group can be further divided into two: those who are registered as temporary residents, and those who are unregistered. Having said this, most migrants in China do not actually meet the standard requirements to be referred to as having migrated (*qianyi*), even when they have moved to and resided in an urban area for some time.

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76 “Shanghai huji...”, *op.cit.*
While some scholars use the term non-*hukou* migrants interchangeably with “migrant workers”, “peasant workers” or “rural workers”, Chinese officials are still keen on using the term “floating population”. As Li Zhang suggested, “the terminology was constructed and the meanings attached to it are an integral part of social and political struggles with real consequences”. The floating population are seen as outsiders who belong neither to urban nor to rural society, and therefore they are regarded in cities as being problematic. However, this terminology is widely used in official documents, such as those pertaining to statistics, and its meaning has been reshaped over time. In 1982 the term widely encompassed “those who have lived over one year and kept residence registration elsewhere and those who have lived locally less than one year but have left their residence registration for more than one year” and in 2005 was narrowed to “those whose current status of residence at the time-point of the survey is in this community, but their permanent residence registration is kept in other towns or sub-distRICTs”. However, the term is too wide for the scope of this study, since not all of the floating population consists of migrant workers.

Throughout this thesis the term “migrant workers” will be employed instead of “peasant workers”, since many migrants do not have any experience of peasantry. It is also wise to keep in mind that it is their movement (migration) which creates their ambiguous status between the urban and the rural. Therefore, “migrant workers” in this paper refers to those rural *hukou* holders who are living outside their original *hukou* residence, with or without having temporary residence permits in the destination areas.

Another problem in discussing Chinese migrant workers is related to quantifying them. This problem is mainly caused by their mobile nature, as well as differential indicators used in reports. A recent study entitled *National population and family planning* suggested that by

81 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Wang Chunguang, “The Changing Situation of Migrant Labor” in *Social Research* 7:3, 2006, pp. 185-196. Floating population in China is also comprised by the quite numbers of migrants from small towns and cities as well as university graduates (which usually a city communal *hukou* holder). See “Nine Trends of Changes...”, op.cit.
the end of 2010, the floating population had reached 221 million, of which 160 million were migrant workers. Data from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security suggested that by the end of 2008, the number had already hit 225.42 million migrant workers. In short, discrepancies frequently arise in relation to numbers of migrants.

There are two primary factors which created the appearance of Chinese migrant workers: the implementation of the household responsibility system in rural areas, and the development of coastal areas. Nationally adopted in 1983, the household responsibility system was secretly initiated in the Anhui province. Under this system, every household was free to allocate labour as well as to contract land, as long as it met the contract agreement and collective quota. However, since the average amount of land per capita is small, this created a surplus of labour. By the mid-1980s, Township and Village Enterprises (TVE), which had previously had a role in processing sideline agricultural products, slowed down, resulting in its inability to absorb the rural labour surplus. This “push” factor from the rural side coincided with the “pull” factor from the urban side, which was the development of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and cities in coastal areas. Iredale et al. also highlighted other factors which sped up migration, for instance the loosened implementation of hukou, as well as the abolition of food coupons, decentralization which led to regional inequalities, and the new hukou entitlement system that was implemented in urban and rural areas.

Murphy suggested that migrants have often been studied and defined only in economic terms, providing pictures of them as economic labourers and therefore ignoring their complexity as social beings. During the early waves of migration, research was commonly related to the push and pull factors, and how China’s economic reform had a vast impact on decisions to migrate. However, over time, research began to illustrate the complexity and diversity of the

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90 Ibid.


92 Rachel Murphy, “Introduction” in Rachel Murphy (ed.), Labour Migration and Social Development in Contemporary China (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 1-16.
topic, highlighting the difficulties inherent in classifying them into one single social economic group. For instance, Pun Ngai and Tamara Jacka outlined stories of migrant women in terms of how their development impacted both on themselves and the rural area. Both researchers were able to challenge the dominant discourse that saw migrant women (dagongmei) as passive and weak. Li Zhang showed, with reference to migrant entrepreneurs in Zhejiang village, how these entrepreneurs were able to produce power within their space; a study from Woronov on a migrant school in Beijing showed how subjectivity is produced at school, and is taught to and learned by migrant children. Such study produced a sense of awareness of marginalities among migrants. In recent years, stories relating to second-generation or new migrants have appeared in the national news. Pictured as being more developed migrants, the second or new generation of migrants were mostly born in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Most have little or no knowledge of farming, and tend to live permanently in cities. Other reports have referred to them as being more educated, more ambitious in terms of career developments, and also aware of their rights. Some reports have depicted them as a new social threat, while others have suggested that they may be able to integrate into urban society. The studies outlined above all attempt to display migrants as a heterogeneous group, and therefore a single economic solution is no longer a sufficient response to issues surrounding their well-being.

As China has yet to abolish its hukou system, many regulations and documents have been set forth to fill the gap between migration and the implemented system. These regulations and documents demonstrate the government’s shifting attitude towards migrants. Murphy categorised three phases of regulating migration in China: permission in the 1980s, where rural peasants were allowed to move within limited areas; encouragement in the 1990s, and

94 Li, Strangers in..., op.cit.
100 Murphy, “Introduction”, op.cit.
facilitating migrants in destination areas in the 2000s. A document issued in 2006 by the State Council, entitled *Suggestion for solving problems of migrant workers*, was the first national document which acknowledged and recognized migrant workers as an essential group in China’s economic and social development, and therefore aimed to improve their livelihood.\(^{101}\) Turning from Jiang Zemin’s era, which facilitated China’s economic growth, the Hu-Wen government engaged with programmes to solve the problems of the economic growth aftermath,\(^{102}\) in order to achieve a so-called harmonious society (*hexie shehui*). Migrant workers, after being acknowledged in the 2006 State Council document, became one of the prominent groups whose needs were considered to be important.

Starting in the 1990s, more migrants came to cities with their children. The topic of migrant children has attracted attention from both domestic and international scholars since the 1990s, as more migrant workers took their families with them.\(^{103}\) Closely attached to their wellbeing is the question of how they integrate into urban living, and access education.\(^{104}\) However, as with their predecessors, there are problems in providing an accurate count of migrant children, although trends have shown that the numbers are growing each year: derived from the Chinese News Agency, for instance, Kwong suggested there were roughly 7 million children aged between 6–14 in 2004\(^{105}\); based on a study by Renmin University, there were 13.1 million migrant children under 14 years of age in 2005\(^{106}\); while Chan estimated in 2009 that there were at least 58 million children left behind by parents who migrated, and another 19 million children who migrated to cities together with their parents.\(^{107}\) In Shanghai alone, there were 343,231 migrant children by the end of 2008, accounting for 85.4% of the non-local students who received nine years of compulsory education (*yiwu jiaoyu*).\(^ {108}\)


\(^{103}\)Liang and Chen Yiu Por, “The Educational Consequences …”, *op.cit.*


\(^{105}\)Julia Kwong “Educating Migrant Children…”, *op.cit.*


\(^{107}\)Chan, “Paying the Price…”, *op.cit.*

The story of migrant children, who are overshadowed by the relatively low position their parents hold in society, illuminates how education has become unequal under market reform. Migrant children are those who are of school age, and are living in the city with their parents or guardians while their hukou status is agricultural. The educational problem for migrant children becomes more profound as migration trends in China show an eagerness for migrants to stay for longer period in cities, and thus livelihood among migrant communities becomes an issue of increasing concern.

**Summary**

This chapter provides a brief background which frames the educational situation for migrant children, and relates this background to China’s economic reform in 1978. The relaxation of the household registration system has inevitably affected the flow of migrants into cities. However, this is only one among many factors that has had an impact, as the implementation of the household responsibility system in rural areas has also contributed to the surplus of labour, which is then needed as fuel for development in coastal areas. The interwoven economic and social policies, together with China’s rapid development, have resulted in massive internal migration. Though the history of internal migration is not new, following the economic reform migration flow has formed a new field of study.

In terms of the development of migration, the emergence of migrant children has created new challenges for China, with limited access to education for migrant children in the destination cities. Under the spotlight of education decentralization, the question of who should provide these children with access to education becomes problematic. Because it is the first city in China to provide free education for its migrant children, the manner in which Shanghai governs educational access for migrant children is worth a closer look.

The following chapter will present Foucault’s theory of governmentality. As the theory originated in a liberal context, other scholars’ arguments on its application in a non-liberal context will be discussed and, thus, the discussion will be complemented using some examples of previous studies of governmentality in China.

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CHAPTER 2 - THEORY

Prior to the development of the concept of governmentality, the most widely-held assumption of most political science theories in the 1970s was that only by exercising power the act of sovereignty be understood.\(^{110}\) However, Foucault presented a different view, as he saw how pastors in the Christian tradition were able to conduct their disciples through analysis, reflection and supervision, in order to ensure their salvation.\(^{111}\)

Foucault identified several traits of this Christian pastorate, which he referred to as pastoral power: “analytical responsibility, exhaustive and instantaneous transfer, sacrificial reversal, and alternate correspondence”.\(^{112}\) The characteristics described the meticulous work of the pastor, as he should be familiar with whether disciples’ actions are good or bad, in addition to the fact that the merits and demerits of disciples are dependent on the pastor; the pastor should be ready to sacrifice himself to ensure his disciples’ salvation; and the pastor’s position in the eyes of God will be raised in accordance to his efforts with disobedient disciples. Because the pastor needed to be familiar with the disciples and their actions, he was required to supervise and observe them on a daily basis. The intensity of this led the pastor to create some form of knowledge regarding what behaviour is “good” and what is “bad”. To ensure that this form of behaviour is acted out among the disciples, the pastor was required to guide them to acknowledge a form of truth, which would direct their conscience.\(^{113}\) This pastoral form of directing, guiding and conducting mankind throughout their existence developed into the concept of governmentality.

Thomas Lemke, in his paper *Foucault, governmentality and critique*, mentioned that the term “governmentality” was derived from French *gouverner* and *mentalite*. The former means “governing”, while the latter refers to “mode of thought”. Therefore, the terminology

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\(^{113}\) Ibid.
“governmentality” indicates that an analysis of the political rationality underlying the technology of power is possible and, indeed, important. As briefly mentioned above, the concept of governmentality arose as a critique to the history of governing; in the mid-1970s the approach of state power which was exercised through the paradigms of law and war faced problems, as it was no longer possible to provide a clear analysis of the practise of subjectification, due to the fact that it consists of both subjugation and self-constitution. The critique against this paradigm only served local and specific institutions, however, and this was also insufficient. Foucault’s governmentality was an attempt to mediate the practise of subjectification, and at the same time still accentuate the act of governing.

Governmentality offers a new analysis lens through the idea of “conduct of conduct”. Governmentality seeks to explain how to conduct individuals or collectives to govern themselves, by invoking a set form of knowledge and exercising specific technology. Foucault highlights that the concept of government is not only limited to the state, but applies to all levels of society, from government of self and family, to institutions like the state. Mitchell Dean (2003, 11), quoted in Oels, suggests this broad definition of government:

Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.

There are three elements which are important in the study of governmentality: subjectification, rationality, and form of technology. Subjectification refers to a double process of cultivating a specific type of identity for individuals or collectives, and making them aware of a need to direct and articulate themselves according to this particular identity. An excellent example

115 Bröckling (et.al), “From Foucault’s Lectures…” op.cit.
116 Ibid.
117 Oels, “Rendering Climate Change…”, op.cit.
118 Ibid., pp. 188.
of subjectification takes place in the educational process: students in each grade are subjected to some set of standards, to be learnt through acts of discipline, punishment, categorization, etc. Students learn to understand what is normal and what is not, what is appropriate and what is inappropriate, and so forth, and therefore will direct themselves to conduct their behaviour according to these standards. It is by being subject to this process that individuals or collectives are governable. The second element is rationality or reasoning: this refers to the rendering of a specific form of knowledge, which is claimed to be true and thus defines problems to be solved, and on which domain intervention should be made. Form of technology refers to any instruments, mechanisms, procedures, strategies, technologies, documents, and so forth, which shape the behaviour, desires and thoughts of the subject in order to achieve desirable standards. In terms of the educational system, this form of technology widely ranges from disciplining, normalizing and punishing, to encouraging and rewarding.

Although the study of governmentality originally emerged as an attempt to explain trends of governing in the liberal context, Sigley argues that this can also be applied in non-liberal countries. In liberal reasoning, the governing of conduct is based on scepticism regarding what should be governed, therefore resulting in an indirect mode of governing; in non-liberal reasoning, especially in China during the rule of Mao, the state assumes that there is nothing it does not know. However, under Deng, China began to calculate which elements could be governed under autonomy (market or autonomy conduct of individuals), and which elements belonged to the state. As this process evolves, a closer look at the outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan 2006-2010 is worthy of note. In this document, the terminology guihua replaced the long-used terminology jihua. As quoted in Sigley, “while the latter implies detailed planning and intervention, the former applies more managerial and supervisory role of CCP and government”. Another transformation that highlights China’s changing government is the shift in perception of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a revolutionary party (gemingdang) to a ruling one (zhizhengdang). Quoted in Sigley, Wang Jiangyu, 2005.

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120 Gail McNicol Jardine, Foucault and Education (New York: Peter Lang, 2005).
121 Inda, “Analytics of The...”, op.cit.
122 Ibid.
123 Jardine, Foucault and Education, op.cit.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
described the necessity for CCP to change the way it governs in order to adapt to changing situations, as society no longer needs constant and intense control over all aspects of life. In short, the concept of the Chinese socialist market economy actually links the beliefs on CCP as the ruling party with the need to adapt to the emerging market.

The application of governmentality theory in China varies from one field to another. Woronov was among the scholars who used the theory in order to analyze how the national programme “education for quality” (suzhi jiaoyu) could be traced back to a national rationality regarding the creation of individuals who are not only intellectually competitive, but who are morally and emotionally healthy. A study from Harwood attempts to show that the free nine-year compulsory education programme is perceived as a technology for creating highly skilled workers, who can later contribute to the social and economic development of the poor area of Gongshan, Yunnan Province. These changes are taking place within the context of a quality within the rural population which represents the antithesis of modernity. The analysis focuses on how urban areas are perceived as places to reinvent and modernize young people, and therefore the rural population’s dreams are supposed to be shaped through government intervention. Another study which attempted to employ the concept of governmentality was that by Feng Xu, who analysed the way in which the government conducted migrants through various agencies and agents. She suggested that Chinese migration is an intertwined process that is coordinated by government, international and local agencies, and migrants themselves. Quoting Lei Guang, Xu refers to migration in China today as “orderly migration”, and suggests that rather than aiming to ban migration, it should be channelled through government agencies (in both sending and receiving areas), as well as through new residence permit systems. More training and seminars have been provided for migrants, so they have adequate skills and at the same time are more aware of the need to have work contracts, and to adapt to “city norms” (such as not spitting, obeying traffic lights, etc.). The whole process

132 Ibid., pp. 49.
133 Ibid., pp. 52-56.
intends to turn migrants into new people of the city, preserving the desirable characteristics of city residents while eliminating the undesirable. From a risk management point of view, the attempt to include migrants in China’s policy goals is believed to build a “future-oriented form of risk management”, as it will reduce imminent social risks driven by the unavailability of social services for migrants.\textsuperscript{134}

An exemplary and comprehensive study on governmentality and education in China can be found in Kipnis’s work on educational desire among Chinese in Zouping County, Shandong Province.\textsuperscript{135} He shows that educational desire is simultaneously moulded, and thus is an intertwined result of cultural, economic, political and social circumstances under the frame of spatiality of Zouping, China and East China. He disagrees with the argument that Chinese culture respects education, and attempts to demonstrate that although culture holds a position in shaping how each nation desires educational success, it is the process of governance that takes the main role in a process of valuation. Thus, deciding who is at the top of the social political hierarchy and how the procedures to achieve this should be regulated are central to the process of evaluating whether educational success is important. This process should also be seen through an emplacement frame, since looking at this cultural process of governance must be related to place. As a result, the educational desire that appears in his study is an interwoven process of rapid industrialization, demographic transition, literary masculinity, nation building and exemplarity, which is simultaneously produced and maintained. At the end, he explains that the habits of good students are deeply internalized, so that they desire to be outstanding in education and thus raise their children using the same approach – which then perpetuates educational desire among Chinese.

**Summary**

China has changed from being a totalitarian nation under Mao, to socialist market with Chinese characteristics (shehuizhuyi shichang jingji), which applies today. The country seems to be a battlefield of conflicting theories, as it appears to be a challenge to predict what is going to happen in China: whether CCP will stay in power, whether there will be revolutionary movement from below, whether China’s economy will collapse due to its political system, and so forth. Under the backdrop of this changing China, this thesis attempts

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid. pp. 47.

to demonstrate that China’s contemporary government consists of a mixture of coercive and complementary technology, resulting from calculation and rationalities which attempt to solve current problems, while at the same time preserving CCP power and legitimacy.

In studies of governmentality, it is important to seek the underlying rationalities behind the exercising of power. Only by understanding this rationality is it possible to understand the intention of applied coercive and complementary technology. Rationality gives reasons for what and how things are supposed to be governed. By using the concept of governmentality, this thesis attempts to explain what rationality lies behind the subjectification and form of technology which produces the changing attitudes on governing education for migrant children.

In order to see how the theory is applicable to the case study in this research, the next chapter will elaborate China’s changing government and national educational concerns as basic rationalities behind the subjectification of educating migrant children. The changing attitude on governing migrant schools will be seen as a form of technology. As the governing of migrant schools nowadays focuses mostly on the nine-year compulsory education programme, the future educational opportunities for migrant children will be considered. To do this, it is necessary to elaborate on the implementation of China’s National College Entrance Examination (NCEE) and the emergence of vocational schools as a form of technology, since both affect migrant children’s chances to pursue their education to a higher level.
CHAPTER 3 - RENDERING GOVERNMENTALITY ON GOVERNING EDUCATION FOR MIGRANT CHILDREN

This chapter will be divided into two main sections: subjectification and rationality, and form of technology of governing education for migrant children. This chapter attempts to render the theory into a case study. To understand how subjectification and rationality are involved in governing education for migrant children, two discussions on national educational concern and China’s changing governance of migrants are worth further scrutiny. The section regarding the form of technology will comprise past and current regulations and laws on migrant schools. Included in this section is China’s ongoing National College Entrance Examination system, as this limits future educational access for migrant children; it also considers vocational schools, which are currently emerging as an alternative for migrant children’s continued education.

3.1. Subjectification and rationality in governing education for migrant children

3.1.1. China’s education concerns

The importance of education has actually been on China’s national agenda for decades. Under Mao, the policy mostly emphasized political and ideological aspects of education, as it was intended to increase people’s “redness”. However, this was to change with the transition to a more market-oriented economy as Deng Xiaoping gained leadership in 1978. As China focused on economic development and modernization, the policy on education was to serve this purpose with an attempt to emphasize educational quality, vocational and technical education and decentralization of school management. Under his leadership, China’s educational policy was strengthened as the country imposed the Compulsory Education Law, and decentralized the administration and financing of primary, secondary and tertiary education. Jiang Zemin further enhanced the importance of education in his administration as his national development strategy was based on science, technology and education.

137 Ibid.
Furthermore Hu, like his predecessors, stressed the importance of cultivating talent and improving China’s workforce, as these are key to fast development and are therefore a vital focus of the state and CCP.\(^{138}\)

As China comes to realize the future challenges of competing in global world, the importance of its human resources becomes crucial. Some measurements have been taken in order to cultivate this asset, for instance developing the educational structure, improving the capability of teachers in countryside, and expanding vocational education.\(^{139}\) In the long run, the country wishes to turn itself from a labour-intensive nation to a driven-by-talent one by 2020, and to increase its government allocation fund for human resources by 15%, taken from its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), by 2020.\(^{140}\)

In July 2010 China released the *Outline of China’s national plan for medium and long-term education reform and development (2010-2020)* (hereafter refer to as the *Outline*). The *Outline*, which took one year and nine months to formulate, consists of 27 thousand words and is quite comprehensive, as it not only accommodates issues at every level of Chinese education, but also covers education issues of public concern.\(^{141}\) The *Outline* states China’s ambition to become a nation with abundant human resources, which is illiterate-free, educated and also highly skilled in order to compete in the global challenges of the 21st century. As a first step, its national fiscal educational expenditure will be increased by 4% of its GDP by 2012.\(^{142}\) The *Outline* states five strategic themes, which are: popularizing education, delivering equal education to everyone, diversifying education, building a favourable framework for lifelong education, and establishing a lively education system.\(^{143}\)


\(^{142}\)Ibid.

Nevertheless, the ambitious plan will not be achieved easily, as China has to deal with issues of inequality in its national education system. Although the Compulsory Education Law was promulgated in 1986 and thus guaranteed that all children were entitled to nine years of free education, the facts in the field, at least until 2006, showed discrepancies in the sense that it was common practice to collect fees from parents.\(^{144}\) Under decentralization, the bulk of education spending was borne on the shoulders of local government; thus, local government in poor and rural areas faced difficulties in improving educational services, therefore hampering children in rural areas.\(^{145}\) As a consequence, the educational cost was transferred to consumers. A study by Connelly and Zhang showed that the place of residence (rural or urban) continues to be the most important factor in explaining school enrolment and graduation patterns.\(^{146}\) It is here that issues of inequality arise, as educational opportunities are increasingly tied to the family economic situation; for instance, the official drop-out rate among students in rural areas in 2004 was 5%, compared to just over zero in big cities.\(^{147}\) Acknowledged the importance of ensuring all underprivileged children to enjoy their education rights, in 2006 Ministry of Education issued its Revision of Chinese compulsory education law. Within the revision, all school-age children are guaranteed to enjoy free education under nine-years compulsory education system.\(^{148}\) Since then students in primary (xiaoxue) and middle school (chuzhong) are exempted from tuition and book fees.

Solving the problem of education inequality in rural areas is also key to solving rural problems, since they remain home to nearly 800 million of China’s driving economic force.\(^{149}\) Brauw and Rozelle suggest that where land is scarce, the only possible way to modernize is to raise the productivity of labours. Education in China’s rural areas serves a double purpose: it facilitates the shift of labour from agriculture to industry, and it increases household income

\(^{144}\)“China Adopts Amendment to Compulsory Education Law” CRIEnglish, 7 July 2006. Accessed from http://english.cri.cn/3178/2006/07/07/272@111658.htm on 20 April 2011.

\(^{145}\)Teng Margaret Fu, “Unequal Primary Education Opportunities in Rural and Urban China” China Perspectives, 60, July–August 2005.


through returns to education among those who are already employed. Attempting to improve education in rural areas is mainly tackled by central government by taking a larger share of the financial burden for compulsory education. In 2001, the government stipulated the implementation of *Two Exemptions One Subsidy* (TEOS), which was later enacted throughout China. The programme exempts poor students in rural areas from tuition and miscellaneous fees, while providing subsidies for students at boarding schools.

The other group whose educational opportunities are adversely affected by the educational system is migrant children. In China, education funds are distributed among students based on the number of children of school age within the local household registration. Nevertheless, since most migrant children do not have local urban *hukou*, they are excluded from the calculation and thus are not entitled to support from the city’s local government. At least until 2003, their chances of becoming enrolled at public schools were slim, as most migrant workers could not afford the fees. These fees comprised a temporary schooling fee (*jiedufei*), selecting school fee (*zexiaofei*), and supporting school fee (*zanzhufei*), which could amount to up to 1500 *yuan* per term for the first two fees, and an average of 1900 *yuan* for the latter, while in most cases the average income for migrant households was between 800-1500 *yuan*. As a last resort, most parents sent their children to study at migrant schools, which were generally outside of the legal system, had no clear curriculum, had low teaching standards, and were built in suburban areas (close to migrant enclaves) – but were affordable. In the past few years, China’s government has tried to improve access to education for migrants by exempting students from tuition fees and absorbing them into public schools, as well as increasing funds for their education. The promotion of vocational

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150 Alan de Brauw and Scott Rozelle, “Returns to education in rural China” in Hannum and Park (*eds.*), *Education and Reform..., op.cit*, pp. 207-223.
154 The quality of migrant schools are greatly varied as regulations on them is tightening. However, these traits were mostly found in the beginning of their emergence in 1990s.
education is also a strategy to absorb current school-aged migrant children, as few continue their education in regular high school.156

3.1.2. China’s changing government

When Hu and Wen came to power, there was a great deal of work waiting for them due to the fact that the widening gap between regions, as well as income disparities, urban unemployment and rural poverty had come to the fore. At the same time, holding back China’s economic growth means risking CCP legitimacy and national stability. Therefore, the ability to sustain China’s economic growth is their primary task in economic terms.157 The content of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan is a frequent object of study for scholars, since it gives a broad picture on how national development will take form. Compared to previous five-year plans, the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (hereafter referred to as the Plan) is more focused on achieving steady development, and thus proposes a more sustainable and distributed growth.158 Minister Ma Kai and Vice Minister Zhu Zhixin of China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) have suggested that the Plan would be the first document to not only cover economic issues, but also others such as the wellbeing of society, social development and environment, and outline a development index in terms of prospective and restrictive aspects.159 The Plan seems to offer a new development strategy for the Hu-Wen administration, as it is formulated on three important concepts: scientific development (kexue fazhanguan), harmonious society (hexie shehui), and people oriented (yiren weiben). The Plan is expected to be key in tackling China’s mounting problems,160 and it is here that the issues relating to migrants come to fore.

One of the most important tasks mentioned in the Plan is to build a new socialist countryside, which generally improves livelihood in rural areas through modernized agriculture, develops new relationships between industry and agriculture, cities and countryside, and ensures farmers are more affluent.\(^{161}\) The step is taken as the numbers of people living in the countryside amounts to 800 million,\(^ {162}\) making it a basic way to sustain the national economy. Nevertheless, since problems relating to peasants mostly revolve around raising household income, the programme for building a socialist countryside is combined with the transformation of peasants into non-agriculture workers, as this will not only provide additional income, but also “cultivate” the people themselves.\(^ {163}\) Nevertheless, Thelle argues that progress with building a socialist countryside has been slow, making the transformation of farmers into migrant workers even more important, and therefore needing more attention from the government. Amongst the key goals mentioned in the Plan are improving public service in education, balancing rural urban development, and raising the urbanization rate by 47%.\(^ {164}\) At the same time, one of China’s main development targets for 2006-2010 is to transfer up to 45 million rural labourers to non-agriculture sectors within the five years.\(^ {165}\) According to Wen, this can be done by developing economies in small towns, with the aim of creating more job opportunities in order to attract more migrant workers and thus increase their income.\(^ {166}\) Creating more jobs for them, Wen adds, is one of the programmes intended to eradicate poverty in rural areas, and thus narrowing the gap between the rural and the urban.

Since the very start of their era, Hu-Wen acknowledged the important role of migrant workers, who represent 60% of the workforce; at the same time, however, the incidence of criminality and social unrest among migrants is on the increase.\(^ {167}\) According to the China Labour Bulletin in 2005, the juvenile court in Beijing reported that the criminal offence rate for migrant children is three times higher compare to locals. In Dongguan, 95% of delinquents

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162 The number of 800 million is quoted from the article where the new socialist countryside released (2006). However the number of rural population is shrinking according to the latest 2010 National Population Census to 674.15 million. Accessed from http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20110428_402722237.htm on 13 September 2011.


were migrant juveniles. The trend seems to show that their marginal position in cities has affected these young adults. An incident in 2003 involving Sun Zhigang was another turning point for this changing attitude towards migrants. Sun, a college graduate, was beaten to death in a police detention centre after being arrested as a vagrant for not carrying a residence permit. The case caused an outcry throughout China, as taking measures against vagrants and beggars was in essence a means of strengthening the hukou system, as it involved screening people’s residence permits. To further strengthen migrants’ positions and improve their living conditions, in 2006 a document by the State Council entitled Suggestion for solving problems of migrant workers became the first national document which acknowledged and recognized migrant workers as an essential group in China’s economic and social development, and therefore aimed to improve their livelihood. As a continuation of this document, the Resolution of CCP Central Committee on constructing harmonious socialist society mentions the importance of improving the policy on migrants by providing training, promoting working contracts, improving their wages and social protection, and regulating employment agents.

In recent years, fewer migrant workers have come back to cities. A report following the Chinese New Year in 2011 mentioned that there has been a drop of at least 10 thousand migrants per day, compared to the previous year. The reasons for these are mainly related to the high cost of living in urban areas, a need to take care of children in rural areas (i.e. those left behind), and development in interior areas. At the same time urban areas, especially Shanghai, are dealing with their ageing populations. A study by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences estimates that, from 2010, the number of mature adults above 60 years old will increase by 170 thousand a year over the following ten years. In light of this

168 Chan, “Paying the price…” op.cit.
170 “Guowuyuan guanyu jiejue…” op.cit.
173 Ibid.
dire situation, Shanghai needs to attract more migrants to balance its population and thus stabilize its economy.\textsuperscript{175}

The above information seeks to explain how migrant children became subject to contemporary Chinese governance. From the point of view of education, the concern of producing future human resources and eliminating inequality issues in education have led to the implementation of ensured education for migrant children. In the face of China’s changing government, guaranteeing migrants’ livelihoods has become indispensable as their growing numbers could lead to social and economic instability. As more migrants tend to stay for longer period in cities, many list the schooling of their offspring as one of the top problems that needs to be resolved.\textsuperscript{176} However, catering to the educational needs of migrant children represents an intersection between China’s changing attitude on migrant workers and national educational concern, and forming a “future-oriented form of risk management”,\textsuperscript{177} while at the same time prolonging the CCP and state power and legitimacy (see Figure 1).

\textbf{Figure 1 - How migrant children have become subject to China’s governance}

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\textsuperscript{177} This term is coined from Xu, “Governing China’s…”, \textit{op.cit.}
3.2. Form of technology on governing educational access for migrant children

3.2.1. Governing migrant schools

While the emergence of educational problems regarding migrant children is a consequence of the non-implementation of the state population movement and birth control policies, Kwong argues that the emergence of migrant schools has resulted from the government’s unwillingness to take responsibility.\(^{178}\) The Xingzhi School in Beijing was one of the first to start operating in 1994. The headmaster, Li Sumei, was formerly a teacher in her hometown of Henan province. Her school started when the parents of nine migrant children asked her to teach their children, and she was paid 40 yuan for each student. In the autumn of 1995, the number of her students grew to 50, and soon her husband came from Henan to become the school’s headmaster.\(^{179}\) Like many migrant schools established during earlier eras, Xingzhi demonstrates the self-reliance of the migrant community, who strove to fulfil the educational needs of their offspring. The unavailability of education from local city governments pushed them to form an educational sector outside of China’s legal system.

The picture of migrant schools during their era of emergence in the 1990s was mostly a picture of marginality: both in terms of physical facilities and teaching quality. Most of these schools were located in suburban areas of the city, and had tiny classrooms and inadequate lighting and ventilation, leading to unbearable heat during summer and cold in winter. Classrooms were cramped, and were often not equipped with proper chairs or desks. In terms of quality, these migrant schools were left far behind compared to public schools in both urban and rural areas. It was fortunate for Xingzhi students that Li Sumei actually had a teaching background; many migrant schools’ teachers or headmasters had backgrounds as construction workers, farmers, cooks or janitors rather than teachers, and therefore some of these schools only offered mathematics and Chinese.\(^{180}\) This resulted in poor teaching quality in migrant schools. Worse still was the fact that the “graduates” of these schools were usually unable to continue their education at high-quality schools, as migrant schools could not issue

\(^{178}\) Kwong, “Educating Migrant Children…”, op.cit.


school certificates. However, regulations on migrant children did not exist until 1998, which boosted the numbers of migrant schools as well as their quality. While some of the schools were intended to cater to the basic education needs of these children, some were operated as businesses and therefore profit-oriented. In short, though the fees and quality of migrant schools varied, they were still affordable, and the procedures were less bureaucratic.

It was in 1996 that China’s central government issued their document relating to the educational problems relating to migrant children. In this *Temporary measures for the schooling of children and adolescents from the migrating population*, which took effect in 1998, when no guardians were available in their hometown migrant children were only allowed to study in destination areas. The regulation also stipulated that the government in receiving areas had to take responsibility for providing education for migrant children, and thus public schools were allowed to collect fees. Migrant children were also allowed to enter private schools which catered to them. However, the report only served as guidance, and therefore did not offer clear solutions on the core problems with educating migrant children. Following Kwong’s suggestion, the report set forth four proposals: fund children’s admission into public schools by collecting fees for their attendance, build new schools if the local conditions allowed, help enterprises to build migrant schools, and promote private schools. This meant that the report left local government with room to manoeuvre, in terms of being able to decide whether to pick one suggestion, or simply do nothing. Under this report, the numbers of migrant schools kept growing. In Beijing there were more than 100 migrant schools in 1999, and the number increased to 150 in 2000 and to over 300 in 2001. In Shanghai, there were at least 293 migrant schools operating in 2005. In Guangzhou, one of the top migrant destinations, the number increased from 30 migrant schools in 1996 to 300 in 2006.

In 2003, the State Council issued its *Notice on suggestions on further improving education for migrant children*. This stipulated that the receiving government must provide education for

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migrant children in their areas. In some cities, the local government attempted to limit the extra fees charged against migrant children. However, the limited amount was barely enough to cover the additional costs spent by public schools. For example, the annual cost for a primary school student in Nanjing in 2003 was 1500 yuan, while in Nanjing the government set a maximum fee of 480 yuan for each migrant student enrolled at public school. This meant that each school had to spend more than 1000 yuan for each student. As result, many public schools were reluctant to accept migrant children.\textsuperscript{186} A study from Chen in 2006 showed that in nine cities studied there were 1,518,615 migrant children, of which 58\% were enrolled in public schools, while the remaining 42\% were still being taught at migrant schools.\textsuperscript{187} In big cities such as Shanghai and Guangzhou, only 49\% and 34.6\% were enrolled in public schools. In medium-sized cities, 70\% to 100\% were enrolled in public schools, while almost 100\% enrolment of migrant children in public schools was seen in small cities. This trend shows that the enrolment rate of migrant children in public schools in small and medium cities is higher than in big ones.\textsuperscript{188}

To further accommodate the educational needs of migrant children, in 2006 the Ministry of Education issued its Revision of Chinese compulsory education law. Within the revision, it was stated that the government of receiving areas must provide funding as public schools must act as the main education provider.\textsuperscript{189} Thus, migrant children were entitled to receive the same education as urban students. To further strengthen the law, a Notice on improving work for the abolishment of tuition fees for children of compulsory age in cities was issued in 2008. The new notification took effect in 2009, and under this all tuition fees for migrant children were waived (see appendix on “Policies and selected documents on education for migrant children”).

Apart from the introduction of legal regulations, China’s government has also tried to solve the educational problems relating to migrant children by conducting a series of pilot projects in some cities. One of the pilot projects that has been tested is a programme of school

\textsuperscript{186} Chan, “Paying the price…”, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
vouchers. The idea was proposed by Professor Wu Hua from Zhejiang University, and the project was first implemented in Changxing County, Zhejiang Province in 2001, and was successful in migrant schools and vocational schools. The school vouchers were linked to an educational fund, and this served to solve the financing problem for migrant children as it allowed students to go to any school they chose. It prevented schools from collecting fees and, further, educational funding came to be fairly distributed among migrant children, and thus students were given rights to choose which school to attend. There have been recent signs that this system will be implemented throughout other cities, however some have suggested that school vouchers are problematic since the problems of inequality are yet to be solved, there are discrepancies in budgeting, and authorities are unable to confirm the identity of migrants. A study from Li et al. also stressed the need to consider several things in line with the implementation of the vouchers, such as reforming the hukou system, balancing the responsibilities of the sending and receiving government, and so forth. In other words, though school vouchers seem to offer a solution to the problem, there are underlying aspects which need to be considered, and the current education system in China will affect its implementation.

Though central government seems to be in favour of solving the educational problems relating to migrant children, the issues attached to achieving this varies for each locality and, inevitably, initiatives meet with resistance from a grassroots level. The reluctance of local government to provide funding can be linked to financial issues and a fear of massive influxes of migrants. A comprehensive study from Chan suggested that in 2007 local government supported 96% of educational expense. On the other hand, controlling education access for migrant children becomes a means of limiting permanent settlement of migrants in urban areas. Using Beijing as the basis of her fieldwork, Goodburn suggests that by controlling this education variable, urban government would be able to extract only the talented migrants, and thus deter unskilled ones.

191 Ibid.
193 Li (et.al.), “Shilun jiaoyuquan…”, op.cit.
194 Chan, “Paying the price…”, op.cit.
195 Ibid., pp. 44.
In recent years, several local governments have attempted to reduce the number of migrant schools by simply abolishing them and absorbing migrant children into public schools. However, not all public schools in cities have the capacity to absorb the massive numbers of these children, nor are local governments willing to cater for their education. As a result, the closure of migrant schools often only creates new problems. For example, Beijing recently shut down 24 migrant schools, leaving around 14 thousand students without any access to education. Other cities, for instance Shanghai, took different measures by not only absorbing these migrant children into public schools, but also supporting and regulating migrant schools that met the standard requirements set by the local education bureau, and thus became the first city in China to provide free education for all migrant children.

### 3.2.2. National College Entrance Examination (NCEE)

If one asks Chinese students at high school level about the most important moment in their high school years, they will usually come up with one answer: passing the gaokao. The National College Entrance Examination, or gaokao in Mandarin (hereafter refer to as the NCEE), is indeed essential, since it is the only exam that allows students to become enrolled at public university/college in China. Despite the growing numbers of unemployed university graduates recently, ambitions to pass the exam with a high score are still high.

Because the exam is held nationally, it is often compared to keju, the test used during the imperial era that was intended to choose government officials and bureaucrats. Yu argued that both exams are comparable as they are “highly competitive in nature, maintained by state system, used as social ladder and had profound effect on society”. The NCEE was first

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201 Yu Kai, Diversification to a degree: An exploratory study of students’ experience at four higher education institutions in China (Bern: Peter Lang, 2010).
introduced in 1952, and was only suspended during the Cultural Revolution.\footnote{Ibid.} It is mostly taken by third-grade high school students, although there are also some veterans who retake the examination, and it is usually taken over a two-day period in June. In 2011, there were approximately 9.33 million students who sat the examination, out of which 72\% would be accepted to college.\footnote{“China vows ‘zero tolerance’ on cheating in national college entrance exams” Xinhuanet June 3, 2011. \url{http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-06/03/c_13909943_2.htm} accessed 11 June 2011.}

As the only means by which to become enrolled at university, the NCEE has always been perceived as the fairest thing about China’s education system, as prospective students can only be accepted based on their examination scores, and thus other factors such as social connections are eliminated.\footnote{Liang Chen, “10 million sit for the world’s biggest exam” Global Times, 8 June 2009. Accessed from \url{http://china.globaltimes.cn/top-photo/2009-06/435169.html} on 11 August 2011.} However, this perception has been challenged in recent years as the numbers of rural students accepted to key universities has dropped drastically since the mid-1990s. A study on national tertiary education fairness by Yang Dongping showed that in 2010 only 17\% of Tsinghua University students came from rural areas, although the number who registered for the NCEE accounted for 62\%.\footnote{“Higher education hopes dwindle for rural poor” Chinanews.com, 9 August 2011. Accessed from \url{http://www.ecns.cn/in-depth/2011/08-09/1497.shtml} on 11 August 2011.} The report mentioned several factors contributing to this uneven number, including the gap in educational quality, the types of questions in the NCEE, and a reluctance among the poor to continue education.\footnote{Ibid.} Across China, trends show that non-urban \textit{hukou} students account for only 50\% of university students, with most concentrated in vocational schools or less prestigious universities.\footnote{“School of Hard Knocks” The Daily Beast, 21 August 2010. \url{http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/08/21/the-rural-poor-are-shut-out-of-china-s-top-schools.html} accessed on 3 November 2011.}

While the above situation is already unfavourable for migrant children, the NCEE itself has created an institutional barrier for them, as it requires examinees to hold local \textit{hukou}. According to data from the Ministry of Education, there are several requirements students must fulfil in order to take the NCEE:\footnote{Ministry of Education in “Research on China’s National College Entrance Examination (the Gaokao)” AEI Gaokao Report, \textit{University of Sydney}, 2009. Accessed from \url{http://sydney.edu.au/ab/committees/admissions/2011/AEI_Gaokao_Report.pdf} on 13 August 2011.} they should have completed high school education or equivalent, be physically healthy, obey constitutional law and the laws of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and hold \textit{hukou} for the place where they will sit the exam. As most
migrant children only have hukou for their hometown, the requirement directly prevents them from sitting the exam in their migrant destination area. As a result, those who wish to sit the exam will mostly return to their hometowns to do so. Yet in this instance they face different textbooks and written tests than those they are used to, and have a higher number of students to compete with.\textsuperscript{209} Although there have been discussions on allowing migrant children to take the exam in the place where they live, a recent report confirmed that this plan is yet to be implemented\textsuperscript{210}. Further, many locals seemed to resist this idea since the increase number of migrant children who may take NCEE in cities means reducing the possibility of local children to be enrolled at universities.\textsuperscript{211}

3.2.3. The emergence of vocational education

Although education access for migrant children is currently higher than in previous decades, there are still holes that need to be filled. The nine-year compulsory education programme which applies in China does not provide any guarantees that students will be able to continue their education.\textsuperscript{212} While urban students will most likely continue to high school and pursue higher education through the NCEE, different circumstances are faced by migrant children, and therefore an alternative type of further education is needed.

In general, vocational education has always been perceived as being “lower” than regular education. Many even perceive vocational schools as places where frustrated parents send children with poor academic records.\textsuperscript{213} However, data from the Ministry of Education shows that almost 96% of secondary vocational school students in 2008 were likely to find jobs,\textsuperscript{214}

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\end{flushleft}
and thus this seems like a potential solution to unemployment in the face of the economic crisis.

How does vocational education become an alternative for the continuation of education for migrant children? First, migrant children who wish to continue to regular high school currently need to sit a high school admission examination (zhongkao) in their hometown province.215 However, due to poor educational background prior to high school level, migrant children find it difficult to get good marks on this examination. This condition, together with difficulties in adapting to new environments, is a cause of stress. As a result, many who are eager to continue their education end up staying at home.216

Second, in general, the cost of high school is higher than primary and middle school, and at the same time high school is commonly perceived as the only means by which to ensure students’ eligibility for the NCEE, and thus continue to higher education. Quoted in Chan, a survey by the National Bureau of Statistics and the State Council’s National Working Committee on Children and Women shows that the overall attendance rate of migrant children aged between 7 and 17 years is 90%, and that this drops to only 40% for those aged between 16 and 17 years. Further, it is estimated that only one-third of migrant children continue their education to high school level, compared with 95% of urban children.217 A study from the Rural Education Action Program (REAP) by Stanford University in 2009 might provide an explanation for this: the study shows that in order to decide whether children will be enrolled at high school or not, rural households perform a sort of cost-benefit analysis.218 While on the cost side the calculation is mostly about tuition, books, boarding fees, etc., on the benefit side the calculation focuses on students’ academic performance, the quality of education at high school level and the indirect cost of the earnings that students will have to give up during the three years of high school.219 As migrant households are usually in a well-off position compared to rural ones, the academic performance aspect becomes the main factor for deciding whether migrant children continue to regular high school or not.220

216 Chan, “Paying the price...”, op.cit., pp. 37.
217 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 Fieldnotes, Teacher Yang. 5 January 2011.
The factors above which hamper the continuity of education for migrant children meets with what Kipnis called as desire to education.\textsuperscript{221} Woronov, in her study of vocational education in Nanjing, suggested that in today’s changing China, the concept of development has resulted in the measurement of human resources in terms of educational achievement. Educated people are perceived as being more developed.\textsuperscript{222} Though vocational schools do not offer general education, they equip migrant children with the practical knowledge and skills needed to enter work. In this way, vocational education offers a solution for bridging the gap between compulsory education and future careers.\textsuperscript{223}

China’s need to produce skilled technicians for national industry has also boosted the importance of vocational education. The number of professional technicians in China only accounts for 3.5\% of all workers, which is much lower than the 20-40\% in developed countries.\textsuperscript{224} To further promote vocational education, in 2006 the Ministry of Education put 14 billion yuan towards the development of the country’s vocational education system over the next five years.\textsuperscript{225} However, the supply of local students into vocational schools is not enough to meet the demand from industry sectors. Shanghai’s municipal government seems to understand that the abundant number of migrant children who have finished compulsory education but do not continue to further education may be an answer to this problem. In an attempt to provide a solution, in 2008 Shanghai started to open its local vocational schools to migrant students.\textsuperscript{226} In 2010, at least 50 vocational schools at secondary level recruited almost 4,200 students, with a total recruitment of more than 6,000 students in two years.\textsuperscript{227} Beijing, though not yet clearly points out the standard on vocational schools recruitment on migrant children, also seems to be attracted to this idea, and to be moving in the same direction as Shanghai.\textsuperscript{228}

\textsuperscript{221} Kipnis, Governing..., op.cit., pp. 18
\textsuperscript{222} Woronov, “Learning to serve…”, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{224} “China to speed up vocational education” CRenglish.com, 5 December 2006. \url{http://english.cri.cn/2946/2006/12/05/65@171101.htm} accessed on 2 November 2011.
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{228} “Education reform” China Daily, 15 October 2010. \url{http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-10/15/content_11413037.htm} accessed on 2 November 2011.
Summary
This chapter attempts to consider existing theory with relation to how it applies to the processes of rationality, subjectification and form of technology, which are key to understanding the governance of access to education for migrant children.

From the discussion on China’s education concerns, it is clear that building a strong nation based on high-quality human resources is a major goal for China. There are two ways to achieve this: by further enhancing the quality of current human resources, and by levelling up the quality of marginal groups including the rural population and migrant children. While based on the concept of China’s concerns regarding migrant workers, the issue of providing education for migrant children has become of vital importance to the Chinese government. On the one hand, China is attempting to create a more sustainable nation which not only focuses on growth, but also on the wellbeing of its people. On the other, the growing number of migrants creates challenges as they become more aware of their rights, which could create social and economic instability. Adding to this calculation is China’s current labour shortage, especially in coastal areas. Catering to the educational needs of migrant children is one way in which to secure stability, as well as to facilitate the wellbeing of migrants.

The concept of China’s education concerns and concerns regarding migrant workers intersects with that of providing for the educational needs of migrant children. As one of the main institutions that caters for their needs, governing migrant schools in China becomes a new field to understanding how China’s contemporary government operates nowadays.

As a continuation to understanding this governance, a subsequent focus should be on the form of technology. In this chapter, three methods are proposed that have been used by China’s government in the form of technology of governing educational access for migrant children. Although current regulations seem to be in favour of providing education for migrant children in urban areas, the ongoing NCEE system still, without doubt, greatly prohibits their future educational chances. At the same time, vocational education offers an alternative for the growing numbers of migrant children who have completed their compulsory education in urban areas, while providing the future skilled technicians that China’s industry needs.
Following Goodburn’s suggestion\textsuperscript{229} that controlling educational provision for migrant children can be used as a means of limiting permanent settlement in urban areas as well as extracting talented migrants, this chapter has attempted to show how the governing of educational access for migrant children in China plays between supporting (by providing nine years of compulsory education for school-aged children and by promoting vocational schools as an alternative for their continuous education) and restricting (by allowing the NCEE requirements to remain in place).

To better understand the governance of a migrant school, a closer look at the practises of Sunshine Primary School (SPS) in Shanghai will be presented in the next chapter. While the next chapter will mainly focus on the practise of governing migrant schools from the perspective of SPS, the restricting and supporting form of technology presented in this chapter will be maintained, and thus will be further elaborated at the end of the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{229} Goodburn, “Learning from...”, \textit{op.cit.}
CHAPTER 4 - GOVERNING MIGRANT SCHOOLS IN SHANGHAI

In the following I will present how the governing of migrant schools takes place in Shanghai. The data that will be presented here has mainly been collected from my fieldwork at one migrant school, Sunshine Primary School (SPS), in Songjiang District, Shanghai.

4.1. SPS under Songjiang administration

Songjiang district, in the southwest of Shanghai, was formerly a special district (zhuanqu) attached to Suzhou, Jiangsu Province. In November 1958, the Jiangsu Provincial Government incorporated the Songjiang special district into Shanghai. Later, in 1998, its status was changed to a district of Shanghai.\(^{230}\) The district consists of 11 towns, one of which is Songjiang University Town (Songjiang daxue cheng), which is home to at least seven universities and colleges and thus is China’s biggest higher-level education hub. In terms of economic activities, the district mainly depends on industrial activity, and reached a total gross income of 233.7 million yuan in 2010, an 11.15% increase from 2009.\(^{231}\) With regards to the total number of migrant children, Songjiang ranked fourth after the districts of Pudong, Baoshan and Minhang, with 37 thousand children in 2006.\(^{232}\) This number increased to 40 thousand in 2010,\(^{233}\) thus making the problem of educating migrant children an important issue for the district.

SPS is located on a side street, around 20 meters from the main road. As a feeder road which connects Songjiang and Minhang districts, the road is always busy during daylight hours as public buses, trucks and private vehicles use it. On my first visit to the area the main road, which is surrounded by a big housing complex, did not seem to show any signs of poverty, nor of slum enclaves. It was only after some time that the picture became clearer: the big


\(^{233}\) “Songjiang nongmingong zinü xiang mianfei jiaoyu” [Migrant children in Songjiang enjoy free education], *Shanghai Xueqian Jiaoyu wang*, 16 April 2010. [http://www.age06.com/Age06.web/Detail.aspx?InfoGuid=4f8041ee-2a60-4c76-8c91-c33b9d231499](http://www.age06.com/Age06.web/Detail.aspx?InfoGuid=4f8041ee-2a60-4c76-8c91-c33b9d231499) accessed 20 October 2011.
housing complex has been turned into a collection of migrant dwellings, with three households or more living in one house of 250 square meters. Dilapidated buildings have been turned into simple and mediocre restaurants and kiosks. Surrounding these were factory workers, with their dialects and dirty clothes; young men squatted in the street to wait for buses, and there were many migrant children with torn schoolbags and unwashed hands. These were side by side with the huge factory building, which was situated behind a tall gate and an exclusive housing compound guarded by security in uniform. This represents a typical picture of Shanghai’s suburbs.

The school’s metal gate with a security post at the side welcomed me as I entered the school. With green as the dominant colours, the school took up approximately 1.100 square meters of land. In the centre was the playground, which divided the school into two with a two-storey building on the left and a one-storey building on the right. These were surrounded by school buildings on two sides and a canteen at the end of the other side, which left the land without any greenery. All in all the school consisted of 11 classrooms, three staffrooms, one canteen, one computer room, the headmaster’s office, a lavatory for each sex, a bicycle parking lot, a playground and a security post. The concrete building looked robust, and the ventilation of each room made the heat during summer and cold during winter endurable for its inhabitants.

At the time during which I was conducting my research, SPS had 11 classes, with each level consisting of two parallel classes, except for grade two. This exception arose because, when the school was opened in 2009 under new management, only one class was set up for the first grade. All the lower-level grade classes were located on the first floor on both the right and left buildings, while the upper-level classes (grades five and six) were on the second floor of the left building. Each class of 40 square meters was equipped with a standard blackboard and had adequate lighting and ventilation. Accompanying these in each classroom were a single teacher desk, a bookshelf, and uniform chairs and student desks for up to 56 students. Compared to the common picture of migrant schools, each classroom in SPS had been greatly improved and seemed to give a brighter picture of Shanghai’s migrant education conditions today.
4.2. School administration

In 2008, the Songjiang district government started to conduct its “three years providing education for migrant children” project. As part of this project, the Songjiang district government implemented four schemes to provide education for migrant children: absorb them into public school, establish centres of education (gongban xuexiao jiaoxue dian), set up government-minban migrant schools (guoyou minban nongmingong zinü xuexiao), and grant minban status to private migrant schools.\(^\text{234}\) The difference between the status of the latter two points is related to the land ownership where schools are established: while government-minban migrant schools are set up on government land, the latter are set up on private land.

\(^{234}\)“Songjiang nongmingong zinü …”, opcit.
Between 2008 and 2010, the Songjiang government built ten education centres for migrants, 11 government-\textit{minban} migrant schools, and three \textit{minban} schools. In terms of budgeting, two governments, Shanghai city and Songjiang district, covered different amounts of the expense. Shanghai’s city government spent 24.6 million \textit{yuan}, and Songjiang’s district government spent 49.6 million \textit{yuan}. In total, both governments spent more than 74 million \textit{yuan} in one year for students’ educational expenses, teachers’ salaries, school buildings and teaching facilities.\textsuperscript{235} The effort has been fruitful as per 2010, since Songjiang district was able to absorb 19 thousand of its 40 thousand migrant children into public school, while giving an annual subsidy of 2300 \textit{yuan} for a further 18 thousand students who enrolled at other types of schools.\textsuperscript{236}

Prior to 2009, SPS was privately run via funding put up by the owner. This school was set up in an old village school, which had been abandoned for a long time. Since the land belonged in principle to the local government, they took over the school in 2009, gave compensation to the previous owner and began running SPS as a government-\textit{minban} migrant school.\textsuperscript{237}

As is required under the new regulations, each government-\textit{minban} migrant school, including SPS, should be supervised both in financial terms and educational terms, which therefore requires a hierarchy system. At the top of the hierarchy is Songjiang’s district government, which in this case is represented by the Songjiang Educational Bureau (\textit{jiaoyuju}). This bureau has one work unit (\textit{danwei}) within its assets unit (\textit{zichan zhongxin}). The work unit is responsible for budget allocation of education funding and facilities. Within this unit is ABC industrial company which Songjiang Educational Bureau seeks help from to act as supervisor of SPS (see Figure 2). It is a government-asset operating company (\textit{guoyou zichan youxian gongsii}) which some or whole asset is owned by government, while maintaining an independent management system in its main business in manufacture sector.\textsuperscript{238} As the asset is owned by government, in its daily operation the company is supervised by government working unit (in this case refers to Songjiang Educational Bureau assets unit).\textsuperscript{239}

\textsuperscript{235} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{236} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{237} Interview, Headmaster Huang, 13 January 2011.
\textsuperscript{238} Email correspondence, Teacher Lan, 20 November 2011.
\textsuperscript{239} \textit{Ibid.}
The Shanghai Education Bureau also regulates who is in charge of its schools’ day-to-day supervision. Headmaster Huang informed me that the Shanghai Education Bureau required all prospective headmasters of migrant schools to be locals (Shanghainese), and to have experience as a headmaster of a local public school, and to be already retired. These requirements have remained in SPS up to this academic year, when another Shanghainese headmaster replaced Headmaster Huang. Accountants who have been employed by ABC industrial company have also been placed in each migrant school under the company’s supervision. These accountants are responsible for the schools’ daily financial reports.

The company also implemented examination system in order to assure the quality of education. Every final semester all students at 11 migrant schools under company supervision would sit in for the same exam which was designed by the company. Three subjects were being assessed: language, math and English. After the exam, a representation from the company would randomly chose one class for each subject and then assessed the works. Based on the average score and the highest score of each subject, the company would then announce which school came as winner. Implementing this method of assessment, the company would ensure that each school was assessed by the same examination and thus be

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Email correspondence, Teacher Lan, 9 November 2011.}\]
able to assess their study progress. At the same type students and teachers would be forced to put their best as they competed with other school.

Another set of regulations which applied to SPS covered the canteen unit, the health and hygiene unit, and the safety unit. The school canteen must possess a canteen hygiene certificate (shitang weishengxu kezheng), while the lavatory should meet standard requirements (such as being equipped with flushing water), and each school must have a fire extinguisher and meet the standard requirements set forth by the fire department. These regulations are written in the *Plan on improving migrant schools’ condition in Shanghai*, along with guidelines for basic improvements to school facilities and equipment, which includes an explanation on standard classroom lighting and ventilation systems, library book collection and sports facilities. Although the regulations do not mention personnel background, the SPS security guard informed me that it is a requirement for school security guards to be Shanghainese as well. Later, I also found out that three kitchen staff members were Shanghainese. However, I did not get the chance to ask whether this was also stipulated by the government or not.

Under its new management, SPS began to receive an annual subsidy of 2000 yuan per student under the supervision of the local company who oversaw the school’s operation. Because of the nine-year compulsory education regulations in China, all migrant students at SPS could now enjoy free education. However, while education fees and book fees were waived, students were still required to pay for school uniforms (xiaofu), meals (canfei) and student activities (huodongfei). While school uniform is obligatory, the latter two are optional. School uniforms can be purchased for around 100 yuan, and are a one-time expense (students are not obligated to buy uniforms every academic year). The meals fee is 5 yuan per meal (one meal per day), and the student activities fee is 100 yuan.

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244 Field notes, SPS security guard, 12 November 2011.
4.3. Curriculum, and school facilities and equipment

4.3.1. Curriculum

SPS is clearly at odds with the traditional position of migrant schools in terms of their lack of a clear curriculum. Grades one to six have a formal curriculum, as well as a daily schedule. Grades three to six use teaching materials from the People’s Education Publisher (*renmin jiaoyu chubanshe*), grades one and two have adopted the local Shanghai curriculum and use books from Shanghai’s Education Publisher (*Shanghai Jiaoyu Chubanshe*). This difference arose after SPS came to be acknowledged by Shanghai’s local government in 2009; as the headmaster explained to me, it is one of the requirements of Shanghai’s local government that all government-*minban* migrant schools use the local curriculum.245

However, my interview with the grade five language teacher, Teacher Yang, gave another perspective.246 Quoting from him, the Shanghai curriculum is well known for its “modern outlook and high quality.”247 Therefore by adopting this curriculum, the school is able to teach students about the big city’s culture (*dacheng wenhua*) and values; they will then be exposed to modernity, and thus expected to absorb these values into their daily lives.

By 2012, all *minban* migrant schools will be using Shanghai teaching materials, replacing the common People’s Education Publisher (*renmin jiaoyu chubanshe*), as outlined in the *Suggestion on strengthening the regulation and management system on minban-migrant school* (guanyu jiaqiang yi zhaoshou nongmingong tongzhu zinü weizhu de minban xiaoxue guifan guanli de ruogan yijia). Included in this plan is an attempt to implement Shanghai’s system of five years of elementary school and four years of junior school, which is a different system to the common six- and three-year programmes used in many places in China.248 Up to November 2011, SPS still holds classes for grade six, and it will not be until 2013 that the first batch of students who have begun to use Shanghai books reach grade five.249

246 Fieldnotes, Teacher Yang, *op.cit.*
249 Email correspondence, Teacher Lan, 9 November 2011.
4.3.2. School facilities and equipment

SPS was built on the grounds of an old village school, which had been abandoned before SPS’s private management began to use the building. The two-storey building on the left was the old building, and this was renovated by the local government after they took over the school’s management. Each of the classrooms is equipped with several desks, according to the room size. While there are three staffrooms, only one is equipped with computers and an air conditioner. At the time of my stay, the education bureau had just provided hundreds of books, from children’s story books up to history and science books. All the books were new and in good condition. However, since the school does not have a library, these books were put in the computer room before they got registered by respective teacher, and will then be put in bookshelves in each classroom.

Although in general SPS receives government support for facilities and equipment, the school is still far from adequate (public school). The blackboards in each classroom are the type that use chalk, while rulers and a cassette player (the latter being for the English teacher only), were the only equipment available to enhance the learning process. Compared to local public schools, which already equip their classrooms with technology such as computers, projectors and so forth, the equipment at SPS has kept the school trapped in old-fashioned way of learning. The 30 second-hand computers in the computer room were also a donation from local public schools who had upgraded theirs. The only equipment seem up-to-date was the sports equipment, with two portable basketball rings, two ping pong tables and two sets of monkey bars.
4.4. Teachers and students

4.4.1. Teachers’ education background

After the school was granted the status of a government-\textit{minban} migrant school, it became subject to certain requirements. One of the basic regulations which applies to teachers is that they must possess a teaching certificate (\textit{jiaoshi zhengshu}). Since not all of the teachers who had been teaching at the migrant school while it was still private possessed this certificate, some of them were not allowed to continue teaching. The school also began hiring young teachers (under 30 years old) with a university background. During my stay, I met four new teachers with a minimum college background (\textit{dazhuan}) of three years; two among these hold
bachelor (*benke*) degrees.\(^{250}\) However, in general, teachers at SPS were graduates of high school or secondary vocational school, and aged from 30-50. Most of these teachers had already been teaching at the school when it was under private management, or even teaching before this in their hometowns. In total there were 19 teachers, with only two male physical education (PE) teachers. Most of the teachers come from outside of Shanghai, except for one music teacher who is a female, Shanghainese retired teacher (65 years old).

4.4.2. **Teacher training**

In my interviews with the school headmasters, they provided me with information about teacher training. Training is available and provided according to the needs of teachers; teacher quality is also improved by cooperating with public schools. Headmaster Han from Happy Kindergarten said that it is now possible to ask public school teachers to come and exchange ideas with teachers at migrant schools. Via this transfer of ideas, teachers are expected to gain knowledge and thus improve their teaching methods.\(^{251}\)

Although training has been perceived as being important for the development of teachers at migrant schools, the quantity of training available is still far from adequate. For example, although Teacher Huang underwent psychology and pedagogy training, which was provided by the school in the first year of its operation, she explained to me that this was the only training she ever received from the school. The training was held every Sunday for one month, and was attended by all the teachers at SPS. Teacher Huang did state that the training was good, and that she would enjoy undergoing other training, if any were on offer.\(^{252}\) As addition to this the training are generally designed, decided by the school and followed by all teachers (not subject based).

While training seems to be rare for teachers at SPS, it is quite easy for them to receive other types of training, especially when it is in line with ongoing campaigns from the government. For instance, as concerns regarding healthy food and hygiene rise, the local government has become eager to educate people on these issues. I was invited to attend training on healthy

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\(^{250}\) Although there were two teachers with bachelor certificates, only one had obtained her bachelor education through the NCEE. In China a bachelor’s degree can be obtained through two basic channels: the NCEE (the most prestigious and therefore "real" (*benke*) graduates), or by taking on additional work or obtaining a *dazhuan* degree by continuing their education through various channels (Headmaster Zhang, *op.cit*).

\(^{251}\) Interview, Headmaster Han, 30 December 2010.

\(^{252}\) Interview, Teacher Huang, 12 December 2011
food at a local town’s adult school (chengren xuebao). The training was attended by almost all teachers at SPS, plus teachers from other migrant schools. The topic, however, was slightly mismatched with the campaign as it gave information on what kinds of viruses are found in plants, and how to plough land.\textsuperscript{253}

4.4.3. Teacher compensation and benefits

In general, the historic situation regarding the low salary provided to teachers in migrant schools has continued to this day. To put their salary into perspective, the average annual salary among teachers in public schools is 60,000 yuan, whilst for teachers at migrant schools the average salary is 20,000 yuan. Having said this, when this annual salary is compared to that of previous years when the school was still privately run, a huge amount of improvement can be seen.

The monthly salary is paid to teachers based on their basic salary, daily earnings, and in-school structural position subsidy – for instance, homeroom teachers are given a subsidy. The basic salary is flat, meaning that educational background and teaching experience do not contribute to the amount of salary teachers receive. Thus, as a homeroom teacher (banzhuren), Teacher Huang earns around 2000 yuan per month, which is a huge increase compared to the salary of around 1000 yuan that she earned during SPS’s first academic year. For her, this current salary is also better compared to the salary she earned while working in a private migrant school, where she earned only 700 yuan. In general, other teachers (who are not homeroom teachers) earn around 1700 yuan per month. In my final correspondence with the school, Teacher Lan told me that since the academic year 2011, the basic salary has risen by 350 yuan per teacher, per month.\textsuperscript{254} Assuming other elements are flat, in general teachers earn at least 2050 yuan per month.

In addition to their monthly salary, these teachers have their insurance covered by the supervisory company, along with their pension (yanglao) and medical treatment (yiliao). Every year the company pays a certain amount of insurance, which the teachers can then withdraw once they reach 55 years old. However, the amount of insurance they receive varies based on their hukou status. While those who possess city and town hukou (chengzen hukou)

\textsuperscript{253} Fieldnotes, 30 October 2010.
\textsuperscript{254} Email correspondence, Teacher Lan, \textit{op.cit.}
will receive the company-paid 1200 yuan per year, those who possess village hukou (nongcun hukou) will only receive insurance payments of around 200 yuan per year.\footnote{255 Interview, Teacher Lan, 19 January 2011.}

In recent years, the government has been trying to promote the importance of working contracts for migrant workers\footnote{256 Feng Xu, “Governing migrants...”, \emph{op.cit.}} in order to secure their rights and benefits. In SPS, a working contract is signed annually, and renewed at the beginning of the academic year. After two years, if teachers wish to continue teaching they will be offered a permanent contract for the third year onwards.

\textbf{4.4.4. Students}

During my two-month stay at SPS, there were around 500 students at the school. The number given is rough, since I noticed at least four new students arrive and two students leave during my stay. However, in general, mobility is a common trait among migrant children, as they usually follow their parents who migrate to where they find work (dagong). Mobility levels appear to be highest among fifth- and sixth-grade students, with two notable trends: firstly, those who had migrated from their hometown were concerned about their level of education, and therefore needed more time to adapt to the new curriculum; secondly, the parents of those who joined SPS were worried about their children’s poor academic performance or psychological wellbeing.\footnote{257 Teacher Huang, \emph{ibid.}} However, family problems such as divorce could also be reasons for poor academic performance, and I saw this affect two students at SPS while I was there.

On average, the number of students in each class was 50. While the numbers in the first to the fourth grades were between 52 and 55 students per class, the number dropped slightly in the fifth and sixth grades (under 50 students per class). These numbers were in line with the statistics reported in the Shanghai Educational Yearbook 2009. According to these statistics, with regards to the duration of schooling, the trend in Shanghai was that the higher the level of education, the fewer the migrant children in attendance. In percentage terms, migrant children in grades one to three accounted for up to 52.74\% of total students, while they represented only 12\% and 8\% in grades five and six respectively.\footnote{258 2009 Shanghai Jiaoyu Nianjian, \emph{op.cit.}, pp. 508.} The reasons for this are threefold: along with the migration trend, more young couples and new families have
migrated to cities, which has increased the number of small children; because of their concerns regarding older students’ chances of adapting to the local curriculum, parents send children who are in grades five and six to schools in their hometown; it is also the case that parents of children who are in the higher grades perceive their children to be able to take care of themselves back in their hometown.\textsuperscript{259}

4.5. Discussion

Looking at the current situation regarding the nine-years compulsory education programme for migrant children in Shanghai, it seems that things have taken a turn for the positive, and that migrant children are now receiving better treatment. Nevertheless, the current regulations and conditions are still not perfect, and I would like to discuss this further.

The first problem relates to the unclear regulations regarding the sharing of education expenses. Although central government has stipulated that the government in the receiving area must be responsible for migrant children’s education expenses, in practise the implementation of this is varied. Analysis from China’s reform forum (\textit{Zhongguo gaige luntan}) on the compulsory education policy\textsuperscript{260} for migrant children showed that Shanghai, Tianjin and Fujian were on the front line in terms of providing free education for migrant children. Not only are these three cities financially strong, but the local governments are willing to bear the educational expense. On the other side, Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Dongguan governments were hesitant to tackle problems relating to the education of migrants, although they are also financially capable. In Beijing, only 67\% of migrant children were absorbed into public schools, while as many as 145 thousand children were schooled at migrant schools. Only 60 out of 200 migrant schools were licensed, meaning that 140 schools did not receive any subsidy from the local government. Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Dongguan were even less supportive towards migrant children. Although there were 400 thousand migrant children in Guangzhou in 2008, it only absorbed 30\% into public schools and thus did not exempt them from tuition fees or book fees, unlike Shanghai, and left 70\% struggling to

\textsuperscript{259} \textit{ibid}

\textsuperscript{260} “Nongmingong zinü yiwu jiaoyu jingfei fudan zhengce fenxi” [Analysis on financing migrant children compulsory education policy], \textit{Zhongguo gaige luntan wang}, 15 August 2011

The second problem relates to public schools. The wording “making public schools the main provider” (yi gongban zhongxiao weizhu) can be loosely interpreted, as a 50% absorption rate of migrant children into public schools is considered to equate to meeting this goal. Although reports recognize public schools’ limitations with regards to absorbing migrant children due to the limited seats available, the practise of setting high requirements (gao menkan) for migrant students is still common. As a fruit kiosk owner in downtown Shanghai informed me,

261 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
264 Fieldnotes, Lijun, 14 January 2011.
266 Nongmingong zinü jiaoyu…”, op.cit.
My children are in our hometown [laojia] … There are no migrant schools nearby [i.e. in the downtown Shanghai area] … I have to have a temporary residence permit, a housing certificate and a working certificate to get them into public school. It’s so much trouble.268

Another aspect relating to public schools which has hampered the absorption of migrant children is location. In China, in an attempt to centralize funding and improve schools’ facilities, many schools were closed in order to build bigger ones.269 As a result, the number of public schools in suburban areas (where most migrants are located) is very limited and this has decreased their ability to absorb migrants. Because migrant parents may spend up to 12 hours a day at work, they prefer to choose schools which are located close to their dwellings.

The third concern relates to the implementation of the local (Shanghai) curriculum in migrant schools. Although the adoption of the Shanghai curriculum in SPS seems sensible, at the same time I find it to be problematic since, as a result, many students decide to go back to their hometowns to continue their study in order to avoid the change in curriculum. This is because the Shanghai curriculum is different from the one they have in their hometowns, and many students have difficulties adapting to it, which thus affects their performance. As Teacher Yang told me:

Many students face difficulties in adapting to their provincial curriculum, for example my son. My son used to study in Shanghai and got used to the local curriculum. However, I sent him back to our hometown since I would like him to continue to high school … During his first year in junior high school the grade was awful and only after a while did he manage to adapt to the curriculum. I understand that it must be hard for him.270

When the factors above meet with the education environment for migrants, the results seem to give a gloomy picture. A study of 1634 migrant children in Fengxian district, Shanghai, showed that due to the economic barrier faced by migrant households, 80% never participated

268 Fieldnote, a fruit kiosk owner, 1 November 2010.
269 Kipnis, Governing..., op.cit, pp. 22-36.
270 Fieldnotes, Teacher Yang, op.cit.
in after-school courses and therefore had no chance to improve or cultivate their interests.  

At the same time, all three of the teachers whom I had formal interviews with expressed their concerns regarding the family environment, which affected students’ study behaviour. According to these teachers, situations in migrant households often do not provide a supportive study environment for students. This can be due to a range of reasons, including an absence of education among parents (tamen meiyou wenhua), parental ignorance towards education (bu zhongshi jiaoyu), and the typical long working hours among migrant parents, through to large numbers of siblings which can reduce parents’ ability to finance their children’s education. Such factors not only contribute to students’ study behaviour, but also shape their perceptions on the purpose and importance of education.

A fourth issue is that, to date, there are still no regulations regarding what happens after the nine years of compulsory education are over. As compulsory education only covers nine years of primary (xiaoxue) and middle school (chuzhong) attendance, migrant children are on their own in deciding the future steps they would like to take. Throughout my fieldwork, I always received the same information on students’ education paths. Since they cannot join the NCEE in Shanghai, students with good academic backgrounds will return to their hometown and continue to the hometown’s middle school, while those with poor academic records will mostly stay in cities and continue to vocational school or to work (dagong). While the first group will need to work hard to adapt to the local curriculum, and will still depend on other variables to make their way to higher education, the second seems to be left with limited options.

In recent years, along with the implementation of compulsory education for migrant children, this problem of accessing education after middle school has come to the fore. A researcher from the Development Research Centre of Education Bureau, Wang Ming, argued that in general there are three types of education available after middle school: regular high school.

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272 Interview, Teacher Zhou, 11 January 2011. Interview, Teacher Huang, op.cit.

273 Interview, Teacher Lan, op.cit.

274 Interview, Teacher Zhou, op.cit.

275 Yuan Xinwen, “Jiaoyu zhuanjia: erdai yimin hui yuanji shou chuzhong hou jiaoyu bu xianshi” [Education expert: sending second generation of migrants to their hometown to receive after middle school education is not realistic], Zhongguo jiaoyu xinwen wang, 9 February 2009. [http://www.jyb.cn/Theory/jyfz/200902/t20090209_238914.html accessed on 1 November 2011.]
(putong gaozhong), secondary vocational school (zhongdeng zhiye jiaoyu) and vocational training (zhiye peixun). However, the study showed that most migrant parents’ expectations are as high as those of urban parents when it comes to their children’s future education: they wish their children to remain in school up to university level so that they will be able to find better jobs and thus have better lives.276 Sending these children back to their hometowns ignores their best interests: these children are already city natives (tusheng tuzhang), which means it will be hard for them to adapt to hometown conditions; at the same time, it contradicts migrant parents’ intentions of bringing their children to the city in order to enjoy better education.277

Another problem with regards to continuing education is the quality of vocational schools. Teacher Huang told me that many parents are still hesitant to send their children to local secondary vocational school since the quality is poor, and thus most parents choose to send their children back home.278 In an article entitled Is allowing migrant children enrolled at vocational school a good favour? (rang nongmingong zidi jin zhixiao shi kaien?), it is explained that vocational schools have long been associated with “blue collars”, and therefore the act of local government (which referred in this article to Shanghai and Beijing) which allows migrant children to become enrolled at local vocational school is discriminating.279 Not only will vocational school graduates be lower in terms of hierarchy compared to university graduates, but the reason for the act was related to the shortage of students in local vocational schools.280 A study from Woronov gave a slightly more positive view of vocational school graduates, concluding that their horizontal mobility in terms of finding jobs is fluid and flexible, although their vertical mobility is still mostly constrained due to the lack of education credentials.281

Summary
In order to ensure migrant children are given an education China, in 2008 central government stipulated free education for them. Along with this was the decision to look to local

276 Ibid.
277 Ibid.
278 Fieldnotes, Teacher Huang, 5 November 2011.
280 Ibid.
government to finance their education expenses, and for public schools to become the main providers of their education. In this chapter I demonstrated how Songjiang district, Shanghai, has made a large effort to meet the stipulation, and thus improve the educational setting for its migrant children through regulating its migrant schools.

With regards to SPS, compared to the previous situation where it was still under private management the current management and supervision system have without doubt improved the education environment, not only for the children but for the teachers as well. With a current subsidy from the Songjiang district government bearing 67% of costs, the school is able to offer affordable and regulated education. At the same time, the school’s intentions are no longer profit-oriented, but rather are focused on ensuring that education is distributed as a public good. However, when the current conditions are compared to those at local public schools, the governing of migrant schools in Shanghai needs further improvement, as migrant schools are still weak and marginal in terms of catering to the education of migrant children.

Further, looking at the whole picture of governing access to education for migrant children, the current situation is not sufficient to guarantee their rights to education. As elaborated above, the weak enforcement of regulations from central government meets with resistance from many local governments. The limited public financing system, administration barriers and migrant household conditions contribute to the limited absorption of migrant children into public schools.

Along with the implementation of compulsory education for migrant children, the problem of educational continuity has begun to emerge and becomes a profound issue that needs serious attention. While the NCEE is still in place and attempts to reform it are still far away, migrant children are left with few options: going back to their hometown, schooling at local vocational schools or, worse, becoming migrant labourers (dagongzi or dagongmei). The picture seems far from bright, since the poor quality of previous education together with personal factors make accessing high school and university seem like a steep and endless mountain. On the other hand, joining vocational school can increase their skills and practical knowledge, and thus provide a pool of semi-skilled workers for China in the future.
CONCLUSION

Throughout my thesis, I have used the theory of governmentality – subjectification, rationality and form of technology – to analyze and understand the process of governing education for migrant children. In this chapter, I would like to bring these pictures together to form a conclusion.

Looking at how Shanghai governs its migrant schools is my first step to seeking how the form of technology of governing education for migrant children takes place in China. As the first city to offer free education for all its migrant children, Shanghai is a pioneer and is on the front line in terms of following the stipulation set forth by central government. The changing structure of SPS from being privately run to becoming a government-minban migrant school appears to be an effective solution for schooling those children who have not been absorbed by local public schools. Aspects including annual subsidies, the establishment of a clear school curriculum, and the implementation of methods to maintain quality, facilities and equipment, through to improvements in teachers’ standard salaries, all show that local government has taken a big step in providing better education for these children. Compared to other cities mentioned above, Shanghai has attempted to conduct migrant schools in line with central government’s stipulations.

Nevertheless, with the implementation of compulsory education, the question of where these migrant children will be schooled after the nine years are over emerges and poses a new challenge. In seeking an answer to this, I focus on the NCEE and vocational schools as two other forms of technology for governing education for migrant children. The still rigid hukou system has excluded migrant children from taking the NCEE in the city, and thus has limited their chances of pursuing their education in a place where many of them were born and have grown up. While this form of technology is restrictive, another form of technology is supportive: the emergence of vocational schools. In an attempt to meet the demand in terms of the numbers of students, as well as reduce the numbers of dropouts migrants in urban areas, vocational schools have begun to be promoted among migrant children. Although such schools’ effects on graduates have yet to be seen, vocational schools benefit migrants as they give them practical skills and knowledge and thus contribute to the supply of semi-skilled workers that China needs.
Due to the rapid pace of industrialization, China has acknowledged the importance of securing its future human resources. As the *Outline of China’s national plan for medium and long-term education reform and development (2010-2020)* aimed to achieve illiterate-free, educated and also highly skilled human resources, advancing compulsory education and producing skilled labour has become an important task in order for China to compete globally. At the same time, based on current migration trends, central government sees two sides to migrants as a social-economic group. First, with their growing numbers, migrants could pose a threat to social stability, and therefore they need to be regulated and supervised. Second, due to the shortage of migrant labour in recent years, the government needs to cater to them in order to lure them back to cities. Therefore, ensuring migrant children are given an education becomes an indispensable task for China under the Hu-Wen administration. In this way, government hopes with a better-educated future generation of migrants will be achieved, social instability thereby will be limited, and skilled labourers will be secured. In terms of the big picture, central government and the CCP aim to attain sustainable economic growth, in order to encourage social development and thus legitimate their power in society.

However, the attempt to govern education for migrant children has not been completely smooth or efficiently implemented by central government. Hesitancy has appeared in local governments. The weak public finance, a fear of massive influxes of migrants and of having migrant children taking local children’s university seats, and the loose enforcement of education law have all contributed to local governments’ decisions to either follow or ignore central government’s stipulation that local governments be responsible for migrant children’s education. In this case, variations in forms of technology and localities’ rationalities on governing education for migrant children highlights the relevance of governmentality theory. Although the theory attempts to seek how to govern groups or individuals, it still allows room for the subject to manoeuvre. In this sense, although central government has begun to try and tackle the problems relating to the education of migrant children, the varied implementation in each locality shows that, to some extent, the local governments have the power to accept or to resist central government’s efforts. To quote from my interview with SPS’s music teacher, “shangmian you zhengce, xiamian you duice” (there are regulations from above and there are
countermeasures from below). This seems to summarize the practise of governing education for migrant children in China.

For future studies, research on the roles secondary vocational schools play in educating migrant children is worth pursuing. Questions surrounding large issues such as hukou reform, the nine-year duration of compulsory education, and the NCEE has meant that this middle education level has been subject to little attention. While the extent to which vocational schools might contribute to a better future for migrant children remains to be seen, it will also be interesting to see how vocational schools might serve as a meeting point between urban and migrant students, therefore might be reducing the negative perceptions among these two groups.

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### List of Chinese characters

#### Name of places

- **Anhui** (安徽)
- **Baoshan** (宝山)
- **Beijing** (北京)
- **Changxing** (长兴)
- **Dongguan** (东莞)
- **Fengxian** (奉贤)
- **Fujian** (福建)
- **Guangzhou** (广州)
- **Guizhou** (贵州)
- **Jiangsu** (江苏)
- **Minhang** (闵行)
- **Nanjing** (南京)
- **Pudong** (浦东)
- **Shandong** (山东)
- **Shanghai** (上海)
- **Shenzhen** (深圳)
- **Songjiang daxue cheng** (松江大学成)
- **Songjiang** (松江)
- **Suzhou** (苏州)
- **Tianjin** (天津)
- **Yunnan** (云南)
- **Zhejiang** (浙江)
- **Zouping** (邹平)

#### Chinese phrases and terms

- **Baojia** 保甲
- **Benke** 本科
- **Bu zhongshi jiaoyu** 不重视教育
- **Canfei** 餐费
- **Chengren xuexiao** 承认学校
- **Chengzhen hukou** 城镇户口
- **Chuzhong** 初中
- **Dacheng wenhua** 大成文化
- **Dagong** 打工
- **Dagongmei** 打工妹
- **Dagongzi** 打工子
- **Dazhuan** 大专
- **Dibao** 地保
高门槛
高考
革命党
公办学校教学点
公司
规划
国有民办农工子女学校
国有民办学校
国有资产有限公司
和谐社会
户籍
户口
活动费
教师证书
教育局
借读费
计划
记住正
科学发展观
蓝因户口
老家
两为主
流盲
盲流
民办
农村户口
农民
农民工
普通高中
迁移
人才记住正
人民教育出版社
上海教育出版社
上面有政策下面有对策
社会主义市场经济
食堂卫生许可正
私人学校
素质教育
他们没有文化
土生土长
校服
小学
新三座大山
养老
Yi gongban zhongxiao weizhu
以公办中小学为主

Yiliao
医疗

Yi liuru de zhengfu guanli weizhu
以流入的政府管理为主

Yiren weiben
以人为本

Yiwu jiaoyu
义务教育

Yi xian wei zhu
以县为主

Yuan
元

Zanzhufei
暂住费

Zanzhuzheng
暂住证

Zexiaofei
择校费

Zhiye peixun
职业培训

Zhizhengdang
执政党

Zhongdeng zhiye jiaoyu
中等职业教育

Zhongkao
中考

Zichan zhongxin
资产中心

Chinese documents

Guanyu jiaqiang yi zhaoshou nongmingong tongzhu zinü weizhu de minban xiaoxue guifan guanli de ruogan yijia
关于加强以招收农民工同住子女为主的民办小学规范管理的若干意见

Guanyu jinyibu zuohao jincheng wugong jiuye nongmingong zinü yiwu jiaoyu gongzu de yijian
关于进一步做好进城务工就业农民子女义务教育工作的意见

Guowuyuan guanyu zuohao mianchu chengshi yiwu jiaoyu jieduan xuesheng xuzafei gongzu de tongzhi
国务院关于做好免除城市义务教育阶段学生学杂费工作的通知

Liudong ertong shaonian jixue zanxing banfa de tongzhi
流动儿童少年就学暂行办法的通知

Shanghai shi quanmian qidong gaishan nongmingong zinü xuexiao banxue jieduan jihua
上海市全面启动改善农民工子女学校办学条件计划

Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaoyu tizhi gaige de jueding
中共中央关于教育体制改革的决定
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### Appendix

**Policies and selected documents on education for migrant children**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Document</th>
<th>Main policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1996 (effective in 1998) | Temporary measures for the schooling of children and adolescents from the migrating population | - Migrant children in nine-years compulsory education aged should attend schools in their hometowns; only when no guardians are available will they be allowed to attend school in destination areas.  
- The host government is responsible for providing the necessary infrastructure to facilitate education for migrant children.  
- Private schools are allowed to provide education for migrant children. |
| 2001 | State Council’s decision on reforming and developing elementary education  
Opinions of the State Council Rectification Office and the Ministry of Education on further curbing arbitrary fee collection | - Miscellaneous fee collection is abolished, and a “one-fee” system will be practised in selected rural areas.  
- Implementation of TEOS – “Two Exemptions One Subsidy” – in selected rural areas.  
- Two main strategies (liangweizhu): the host government is mainly responsible for providing education, and public schools are to be the main providers.  
- Private schools are subject to supplementary fees. |
| June 2003 | State Council forwarding the Circular of opinion of the Ministry of Education and other | - Fees collected for migrant children in compulsory education shall not be used to pay the salaries of school staff or for the improvement of school facilities.  
- Clarification and standardization of different |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Document Title</th>
<th>Types of School Fees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td><em>Decision of the State Council on further strengthening rural education</em></td>
<td>- Vocational schools in urban areas should be opened for migrant children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2003</td>
<td><em>Notice on suggestions on further improving education for migrant children</em></td>
<td>- The host government is responsible for the education of migrant children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td><em>Circular of the Ministry of Finance on regulating fee collection and increasing the income of peasants</em></td>
<td>- Public schools are to be the main providers.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Private schools must meet standards, or else they will be closed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Migrants are required to pay tuition fees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Migrant children should be treated the same as their urban counterparts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td><em>Some suggestions on further advancing the development of balanced compulsory education</em></td>
<td>- Migrant children are not allowed to pay higher fees than urban children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Migrant children will not be charged for <em>jiedufei</em> and <em>xuanzefei</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005</td>
<td><em>Notice on deepening reforms of compulsory education system at villages</em></td>
<td>- The government should advance the system that prioritises public schools.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Tuition fees for migrant children should be equal to those of city children.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Treatment of migrant children should be equal to that of non-migrant children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Document Title</td>
<td>Key Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2006       | *Revision of Chinese compulsory education law*                                 | • The government in receiving areas is responsible for providing equal education for migrant children.  
• Abolishment of miscellaneous fees and textbook fees for students in compulsory education.  
• Schools shall collect fees according to state regulations.  
• The government in receiving areas should provide equal education for migrant children. |
| 2008       | *Notice on improving work for the abolition of tuition fees for children of compulsory age in cities* | • Tuition fees are waived.  
• Private schools are supported by local government.  
• Local government in receiving areas are obligated to provide educational funding for migrant children.  
• Public schools are to be the main providers of education for migrant children. |

Source: Chan (2009), Han Jialing (2009); Schnack and Yuan (2010)