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Compliance Politics and International Investment Disputes (COPIID)

Illustration photo of a hazy board room with chairs

Illustration photo: Colourbox.com

About the project:

International investment arbitration is a controversial topic indeed. Through a network of over 3 000-investment treaties, foreign investors can sue states for discrimination, loss of property, and unexpected legal changes. While designed to prevent conflicts, the system is a lightning rod for critique. Developing countries lose frequently, tribunals only make judgments against states and investors have challenged sensitive topics such as climate change, public health and human rights. The procedure is shrouded in secrecy, dominated by Western arbitrators, and compensation levels can be astronomically high.

Yet, while scholarship has focused on the system’s origins and dynamics, little is known about what happens after a decision is made: It is a ‘black box’.

This project asks four questions:

  • To what extent do states comply with decisions?
  • Why do they comply with such controversial decisions?
  • Do these findings change existing theories on how actors engage with international tribunals?
  • What are the implications for the ongoing reform process at The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)?

The research process and objectives:

The project relies on qualitative, quantitative, legal, and computational approaches. It will be carried out by a multi-disciplinary and multi-lingual team in three phases.

In the first phase, the compliance process for each compensation decision will be coded into Pluricourts’ award-winning Investment Treaty Arbitration Database (PITAD). This fact-finding is challenging: there is no final arbiter of compliance, enforcement processes occur in multiple courts throughout the world, and awards can be bought and sold on the open market. You can help also help us with data collection here.

In the second phase, both legal, qualitative, quantitative and computational methods are combined to understand states’ decisions over whether to comply. Is it due to financial costs and domestic politics? Or is it also driven by emotions and ideology?

The third phase involves putting the above findings in a broader context. Does arbitrators and investors adjust their behaviour in light of expected compliance? How do the research findings fit with existing theories on international tribunals?  

UNCITRAL is at moment in the process of reforming the international investment arbitration system, and the project also aims to contribute to these negotiations.

Outcomes and impact:

The research will result in a series of journal articles in leading international journals, two international conferences, and the publication of compliance data in the project team's award-wining public database, PITAD.

The academic impact can be significant as the project can:

  • Influence theories on judgment compliance for other international courts and tribunals.
  • Show how compliance outcomes and expectations affect the behaviour of investors, states, and arbitration tribunals
  • Introduce new theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches to compliance scholarship.

The societal impact can be equally significant. The project is partly motivated by requests from states in an UN reform process. The results will have consequences for how states consider the current backlash and how and whether they develop a new global court system. Information on compliance will also bring greater transparency to the field and benefit civil society actors, officials, and small and medium investors.

Funding:

The research project is funded by The Norwegian Research Council for a five year period under the project number 326269. The University of Oslo is also contributing with funding.

The project was hosted by PluriCourts Centre of excellence until 2023. 

Publications

  • Strain, Nicola Claire & Fikfak, Veronika (2025). Compliance through Enforcement in ISDS: What can UNCITRAL Working Group III learn from the ECtHR? EJIL:Talk!. Full text in Research Archive
  • Lie, Runar Hilleren & Langford, Malcolm (2024). The Computational Turn in International Law. Nordic Journal of International Law. ISSN 0902-7351. 93(1), p. 38–67. doi: 10.1163/15718107-bja10081. Full text in Research Archive
  • Kucik, Jeffrey; Peritz, Lauren & Puig, Sergio (2024). Rewriting Precedent: How International Adjudicators Influence Compliance. Michigan Journal of International Law. ISSN 1052-2867. Full text in Research Archive
  • Strain, Nicola Claire; Lie, Runar Hilleren; Chernykh, Yuliya; Espelid, Even; John, Taylor St & Langford, Malcolm [Show all 20 contributors for this article] (2024). Compliance politics and international investment disputes: a new dataset. Journal of international economic law. ISSN 1369-3034. 27(1), p. 70–92. doi: 10.1093/jiel/jgae004. Full text in Research Archive
  • John, Taylor St; Langford, Malcolm; Chernykh, Yuliya; Stiansen, Øyvind; Berge, Tarald Gulseth & Puig, Sergio (2024). Bargaining in the Shadow of Awards. European journal of international law. ISSN 0938-5428. 35(3), p. 603–622. doi: 10.1093/ejil/chae053. Full text in Research Archive
  • Kucik, Jeffrey & Puig, Sergio (2023). Towards an Effective Appellate Mechanism for ISDS Tribunals. World Trade Review. ISSN 1474-7456. 22(5), p. 562–583. Full text in Research Archive
  • Kucik, Jeffrey & Puig, Sergio (2023). The Appellate Body’s Judicial Pathway: Precedent, Resistance and Adaptation. In Krisch, Nico & Yildiz, Ezgi (Ed.), The Many Paths of Change in International Law, ed. by Nico Krisch and Ezgi Yildiz, Oxford University Press.. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780198877844. p. 249–266. Full text in Research Archive
  • Langford, Malcolm; Malaguti, M.C. & Behn, Daniel (2023). The Quadrilemma: Appointing Adjudicators in Future Investor-State Dispute Settlement. Journal of International Dispute Settlement. ISSN 2040-3585. 14(2), p. 149–175. doi: 10.1093/jnlids/idad006. Full text in Research Archive
  • Langford, Malcolm (2023). The Changing Sociology of the Investment Arbitration Market: The Case of Double Hatting. In Malintoppi, Loretta; Bull, Cavinder & Partasides, Constantine (Ed.), Arbitration’s Age of Enlightenment?. Kluwer Law International. ISSN 9789403513775. p. 591–620. Full text in Research Archive
  • Arato, Julian; Claussen, Kathleen & Langford, Malcolm (2023). The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform Process: Design, Dilemmas and Discontents. Journal of International Dispute Settlement. ISSN 2040-3585. 14(2), p. 127–133. doi: 10.1093/jnlids/idad004. Full text in Research Archive
  • John, Taylor St (2023). Three Conceptions of Sovereignty in Contemporary Investment Law. In Smith, Christopher J. (Eds.), Sovereignty: A Global Perspective. Oxford University Press. ISSN 9780197267127. Full text in Research Archive
  • Bonnitcha, Jonathan; Langford, Malcolm; Alvarez-Zarate, Jose M & Behn, Daniel (2021). Damages and ISDS Reform: Between Procedure and Substance. Journal of International Dispute Settlement. ISSN 2040-3585. 14(2), p. 213–241. doi: 10.1093/jnlids/idab034. Full text in Research Archive

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Tags: International Law, International investment law
Published Oct. 15, 2021 1:28 PM - Last modified Sep. 7, 2026 1:38 PM

Contact

Project leader: Malcolm Langford

Co-leader: Taylor St John

Participants

Detailed list of participants