Svein Eng

• Eng, Svein (2020). Rettskildelære og publikasjonspraksis. Lov og Rett. ISSN 0024-6980. 59(3), s. 141–148. doi: 10.18261/issn.1504-3061-2020-03-03. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Eng, Svein (2020). "Rettskildelærens grunnlag": Problemstillingen og en hovedtese, Uten sammenligning. Festskrift til Eivind Smith 70 år. Fagbokforlaget. ISSN 978-82-450-3300-7. s. 193–239.
• Eng, Svein (2016). Legal Philosophy in Norway in the 20th Century. I Pattaro, Enrico & Roversi, Corrado (Red.), A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence. Vol. 12: Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Civil Law World. Springer. ISSN 978-94-007-1478-6. s. 761–783. doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-1479-3_23.
• Eng, Svein (2014). Why Reflective Equilibrium? III: Reflective Equilibrium as a Heuristic Tool. Ratio Juris. ISSN 0952-1917. 27(3), s. 440–459. doi: 10.1111/raju.12052.
• Eng, Svein (2014). Why Reflective Equilibrium? II: Following Up on Rawls's Comparison of His Own Approach with a Kantian Approach. Ratio Juris. ISSN 0952-1917. 27(2), s. 288–310. doi: 10.1111/raju.12039.
• Eng, Svein (2014). Why Reflective Equilibrium? I: Reflexivity of Justification. Ratio Juris. ISSN 0952-1917. 27(1), s. 138–154. doi: 10.1111/raju.12035. Vis sammendrag

  Abstract. In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls introduces the concept of "reflective equilibrium". Although there are innumerable references to and discussions of this concept in the literature, there is, to the present author's knowledge, no discussion of the most important question: Why reflective equilibrium? In particular, the question arises: Is the method of reflective equilibrium applicable to the choice of this method itself? Rawls's drawing of parallels between Kant's moral theory and his own suggests that his concept of "reflective equilibrium" is on a par with Kant’s concept of "transcendental deduction". Treating these two approaches to justification as paradigmatic, I consider their respective merits in meeting the reflexive challenge, i.e., in offering a justification for choice of mode of justification. My enquiry into this topic comprises three parts. In this first part, I raise the issue of the reflexivity of justification and question whether the reflexive challenge can be met within the framework of A Theory of Justice.

• Eng, Svein (2013). "Lovene spør ikke om beveggrunner" Ibsen og Kant om handlingsmotivasjon og rett. I Stub, Marius & Kraby, Ida Hjort (Red.), Forsker og formidler. Festskrift til Erik Magnus Boe på 70-årsdagen 17. april 2013. Universitetsforlaget. ISSN 978-82-15-02201-7. s. 110–137.
• Eng, Svein (2011). Lost in the System or Lost in Translation? The Exchanges between Hart and Ross. Ratio Juris. ISSN 0952-1917. 24(2), s. 194–246. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2011.00482.x. Vis sammendrag

  ABSTRACT. According to the received opinion there is a theoretical incompatibility between Herbert Hart's The Concept of Law and Alf Ross's On Law and Justice, and, according to the received opinion, it stems above all from Hart's emphasis on the internal point of view. The present paper argues that this reading is mistaken. The Concept of Law does not go beyond On Law and Justice in so far as both present arguments to the effect that law is based on a shared understanding between participants in a project perceived by every participant to be a project in common. The paper demonstrates that there are substantive parallels between Hart's combination of "acceptance" or "acknowledgement" and a "critical reflective attitude" and Ross's combination of "motivation" or "feeling" and a "coherent whole of meaning and motivation". The main conclusion is that the views of norms and normativity put forward in The Concept of Law and On Law and Justice are very close in essential respects, and, more specifically, that the two works are at root identical in their representation of the basis of normativity in reality.

• Eng, Svein (2009). Kant om rettens videreføring: borgernes lydighetsplikt og de styrendes reformplikt. I Leirfall, Anita & Sandmel, Thor (Red.), Enhet i mangfold. Festskrift i anledning Johan Arnt Myrstads 60-årsdag. Unipub forlag. ISSN 9788230311790. s. 97–105.
• Eng, Svein (2005). Fused Modality. An Integral Part of Lawyers' Form of Life. Ratio Juris. ISSN 0952-1917. 18(4), s. 429–433. Vis sammendrag

  ABSTRACT. In this reply to Dahlman (2004), the focus is on aspects that I take to be of general interest. The point to be emphasised is the absence of a critically reflexive mode of questioning on the part of Dahlman and, in general, on the part of the position he represents, namely, an empiricist and logical paradigm of atemporal cognition and control. It is argued that lawyers' thinking de lege lata – with its distinctive connection to normativity and morals, through the unity of the temporal and institutional dimensions in fused modality – can never be understood within such a framework.

• Eng, Svein & Skard Dokka, Trond (2004). Om studiet av tekster. I Ariansen, Per; Bostad, Inga; Mathisen, Steinar & Rabbås, Øyvind (Red.), Tekster i filosofi- og vitenskapshistorie. Filosofisk Institutt ved Universitetet i Oslo. ISSN 82-91670-47-1. s. 1–18.
• Eng, Svein & Skard Dokka, Trond (2003). Vitenskapelig rasjonalitet og studiet av tekster. I Asheim, Olav & Wiestad, Else I (Red.), Filosofi og Vitenskapshistorie. Unipub - Universitetet i Oslo. ISSN 82-91670-43-9. s. 287–325.
• Eng, Svein (2002). Legislative Inflation and the Quality of Law. I Wintgens, L (Red.), Legisprudence: A New Theoretical Approach to Legislation. Hart Publishing. s. 65–80.
• Eng, Svein (2000). Does the Doctrine of Precedent Apply to Judicial Arguments Concerning the Doctrine of Sources of Law? I Krawietz, Werner; Summers, Robert S.; Weinberger, Ota & Wright, Georg Henrik von (Red.), The Reasonable as Rational? On Legal Argumentation and Justification. Duncker & Humblot. ISSN 978-3428092659. s. 483–502.
• Eng, Svein (2000). Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions. The concepts of 'Descriptive Proposition' and 'Normative Proposition' as Concepts of Degree. Ratio Juris. ISSN 0952-1917. 13(3), s. 236–260. Vis sammendrag

  ABSTRACT. I introduce the concept of 'fused descriptive and normative proposition'. I demonstrate that and how this concept has a basis in reality in lawyers' propositions de lege lata, and I point out that and why we do not find fused modality in language qua language, morals and the relationship between parents and children. The concept of 'fused descriptive and normative proposition' is of interest in a number of contexts, inter alia in relation to law, cf. the debate about the status of lawyers' propositions de lege lata ("exactly what kind of propositions are lawyers' propositions about what is the law?"), and in relation to philosophy, cf. the debate about the relationship between "the is" and "the ought". As a consequence of the reality basis and interest of this concept, I see the concepts of 'descriptive proposition' and 'normative proposition' as the extreme points on a graduated dimension, from the purely descriptive to the purely normative.

• Eng, Svein (2000). The Doctrine of Precedent in English and Norwegian Law - Some Common and Specific Features. Scandinavian Studies in Law. ISSN 0085-5944. 39, s. 275–324.
• Eng, Svein (1999). Criteria That Are Used In The Setting Up Of And Choice Between Descriptive Characterisations. Law and Philosophy. ISSN 0167-5249. 18, s. 475–495.
• Eng, Svein (1997). Precedent in Norway. I MacCormick, Neil & Summers, Robert S. (Red.), Interpreting Precedents - A Comparative Study. Ashgate. ISSN 1-85521-686-8. s. 189–217.
• Eng, Svein & Summers, Robert S. (1997). Departures from Precedent. I MacCormick, Neil & Summers, Robert S. (Red.), Interpreting Precedents - A Comparative Study. Ashgate. ISSN 1-85521-686-8. s. 519–530.
• Eng, Svein (1997). Hidden Value-Choices in Legal Practice. I Aarnio, Aulis; Alexy, Robert & Bergholz, Gunnar (Red.), Justice, Morality and Society. Juristförlaget. ISSN 91-544-2401-1. s. 123–145.
• Eng, Svein (1997). Får prejudikatlæren anvendelse på domsargumenter vedrørende rettskildelæren? Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap. ISSN 0040-7143. s. 21–44.
• Eng, Svein (1993). "Hva er en viljeserklæring?" - Er det logisk umulig at disposisjonsvilje er begrepsmessig kjennetegn ved privatrettslig disposisjon? Svensk Juristtidning. ISSN 0039-6591. s. 1–42.
• Eng, Svein (1992). Teoristruktur og teorivalg. Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap. ISSN 0040-7143. s. 496–504.
• Eng, Svein (1992). Plassering av offentlig kompetanse hos private - noen hensyn for og imot. Lov og Rett. ISSN 0024-6980. s. 544–551.
• Eng, Svein (1991). Noen synspunkter på en teori om etikk, rett og erkjennelse. Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap. ISSN 0040-7143. s. 279–305.
• Eng, Svein (1990). Sondringen mellom regler og retningslinjer. I Christie, Nils (Red.), den urett som ikke rammer deg selv : festskrift til Anders Bratholm 70 år. Universitetsforlaget. ISSN 82-00-21011-1. s. 473–483.
• Eng, Svein (1990). Begrepene 'kompetanse' og 'gyldighet' i juridisk argumentasjon. Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap. ISSN 0040-7143. s. 625–671.

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• Nguyen Duy, Iris; Bragdø-Ellenes, Sunniva Cristina; Backer, Inge Lorange; Eng, Svein & Rasch, Bjørn Erik (2020). Uten sammenligning. Festskrift til Eivind Smith 70 år. Fagbokforlaget. ISBN 978-82-450-3300-7. 713 s.
• Eng, Svein (2007). Rettsfilosofi. Universitetsforlaget. ISBN 978-82-15-01176-9. 692 s.
• Eng, Svein (2005). Rettsfilosofi -- Foreløpig utgave. Universitetsforlaget. ISBN 82-15-00964-6. 569 s.
• Eng, Svein (2004). Forskersamfunn uten fagfellesskap? Opposisjon ved en doktordisputas [scientific community without common disciplines?]. Institutt for Offentlig rett. ISBN 82-8063-043-0. 108 s.
• Eng, Svein (2003). Analysis of Dis/agreement - with particular reference to Law and Legal Theory. Kluwer Academic Publishers. ISBN 1-4020-1490-2. 610 s.
• Eng, Svein (1998). U/enighetsanalyse - med særlig sikte på jus og allmenn rettsteori. Universitetsforlaget. ISBN 82-00-22921-1. 670 s.
• Eng, Svein (1990). Notater i almenn rettsteori. Institutt for Offentlig Rett. ISBN 82-8063-043-0. 70 s.

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• Eng, Svein (2020). Context or Concept? The Exchanges Between Kelsen and Ross on Valid Law and Efficacy.
• Bragdø-Ellenes, Sunniva Cristina; Nguyen Duy, Iris; Backer, Inge Lorange; Eng, Svein & Rasch, Bjørn Erik (2020). Eivind Smith 70 år, Uten sammenligning. Festskrift til Eivind Smith 70 år. Fagbokforlaget. ISSN 978-82-450-3300-7. s. 7–9.
• Eng, Svein (2019). Context or Concept? Kelsen and Ross on Valid Law and Efficacy. Vis sammendrag

  In the history of the philosophy of law in the twentieth century, Hans Kelsen and Alf Ross are two central interlocutors. At various points in time they had occasion to comment directly upon each other’s works. A common feature of these exchanges is that they both declared their own theory to stand in a marked contrast to the theory of the other as regards the nature and place of normativity in the concept of valid law. In my presentation I shall argue that Kelsen’s and Ross’s analyses of valid law are closer to each other than what is generally assumed to be the case. Kelsen may be seen as being in agreement with Ross as regards the basis of normativity in reality; that is to say, in the end, Kelsen, no less than Ross, bases his reasoning on a psychological concept of norm. To show this, I shall argue for two theses: First, the differences between the conceptualisations in Kelsen and Ross follow a distinct pattern; they represent what I term different “reconstructions and redefinitions” – of normativity in general as well as of legal normativity in particular. Secondly, their disagreement on valid law and efficacy may be seen as a disagreement on which conceptual framework to choose –efficacy qua criterion in the concept of valid law or efficacy qua contextual presupposition for speaking of valid law – where the choice of framework is to be made on pragmatic grounds, that is, on the basis of considerations of “operationalisability”, “purpose”, “fruitfulness”, etc. Summing up, my main claim is that Kelsen and Ross can agree that their disagreement is a matter of a pragmatic choice between conceptual frameworks, not a matter of philosophical principle.

• Eng, Svein (2009). Begreper og begrepsdannelse i jus og rettsvitenskap.
• Eng, Svein (2009). Some Kantian Concepts of Relevance in an Analysis of Kelsen's Basic Norm.
• Eng, Svein (2009). Can the Doctrine of Precedent Serve as a Basis for the Doctrine of the Sources of Law?
• Eng, Svein (2009). Lost in the System or Lost in Translation? The Discussion Between Hart and Ross.
• Eng, Svein (2009). Begreper og begrepsdannelse i jus og rettsvitenskap.
• Eng, Svein (2008). Begreper og begrepsdannelse i jus og rettsvitenskap.
• Eng, Svein & Sibbern, Kai (2007). Verdibørsen: Om Rettsfilosofi.
• Eng, Svein (2005). Law and Practice, Introduction. ARSP. Archiv für Rechts- und Socialphilosophie. ISSN 0001-2343. Beiheft 97.
• Eng, Svein (2001). Tolking av traktater.
• Eng, Svein (2001). Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions.
• Eng, Svein (2001). Legal Theory - «Hyphen Philosophy» or Theory Sui Generis?
• Eng, Svein (2001). Why Reflective Equilibrium?
• Eng, Svein (2000). Konkurrerende culpakriterier.
• Eng, Svein (2015). Rettspositivismedebatt. Akademika forlag.

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