taraldla

• Berge, Tarald Gulseth & Peat, Daniel (2026). Litigating the limits: preliminary objections and State strategy in ISDS. Journal of international economic law. ISSN 1369-3034. 29(2), s. 202–225. doi: 10.1093/jiel/jgag014. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Preliminary objections in international legal disputes are ubiquitous and yet are curiously overlooked. Taken at face value, the submission of preliminary objections may reflect a deeply held belief about the bounds of consent a disputing party has given to international third-party adjudication. But it may also manifest strategic action on the part of the respondent to make the dispute settlement process more costly or time-consuming for the complainant, or to signal to future, would-be complainants that they will face similar treatment if they launch a case. In this article, we ask three interrelated questions. First, what types of preliminary objections exist in international legal disputes? Second, to what extent are different preliminary objections used by different States in practice, and how does usage vary over time? Third, what practical and political considerations do States make when filing preliminary objections? We propose a first look at these questions using a unique dataset on preliminary objections in investor–State dispute settlement that draws data from 795 cases over a 25-year period. In creating the dataset, we develop a typology of preliminary objections. We next explore some high-level tendencies in the practice of preliminary objections in investor–State disputes over time. Finally, we present in-depth case studies of Argentine and Canadian litigation practices, respectively, before we discuss future applications of our data and the transposition of our research to other fields.

• Berge, Tarald Gulseth & Kuyper, Jonathan William (2025). Rhetorical entrapment in international negotiations: A new pathway and mechanisms. International Political Science Review. ISSN 0192-5121. s. 1–17. doi: 10.1177/01925121241260431. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Rhetorical entrapment plays a key – but often overlooked – role in the theory and practice of international relations. In this article, we develop a new pathway and mechanisms of rhetorical entrapment. Our key argument is that current literature has focused too much on normative forms of rhetorical entrapment. Although insightful, this misses empirical forms of rhetorical entrapment. Drawing on Habermasian theory, we suggest that normative and empirical validity claims give rise to alternate pathways and mechanisms of rhetorical entrapment: the normative pathway encapsulates framing, identity and legitimacy; whereas the empirical pathway is mediated by information, reputation and trust. To explore this theoretical argument, we engage in a plausibility probe of international investment agreement negotiations. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with various state negotiators, we find that empirical rhetorical entrapment is pervasive. We document this pathway and mechanisms. We conclude by developing the broader causal and normative implications of our argument.

• Strain, Nicola Claire; Lie, Runar Hilleren; Chernykh, Yuliya; Espelid, Even; John, Taylor St & Langford, Malcolm [Vis alle 20 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2024). Compliance politics and international investment disputes: a new dataset. Journal of international economic law. ISSN 1369-3034. 27(1), s. 70–92. doi: 10.1093/jiel/jgae004. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  The ability to ensure compliance with investor-state arbitral awards is often regarded as one of the strengths of the international investment regime. Yet, there have been few systematic studies of compli- ance to assess the extent to which states have actually complied with adverse investor-state compensa- tion awards. This paper presents a new dataset that enables empirical research on compliance with these decisions; it is the first publicly available dataset to focus on what happens after awards are handed down, and in this way complements other databases on international investment law. This paper explains the data collection process (and its associated challenges), discusses the design choices made in selecting inputs and variables, presents a descriptive overview of the data, and examines how variables can be used in future research. Moreover, various cases are used as illustrations of the challenges of collecting and coding data on post-award processes and we explore what missing data can tell us abou

• John, Taylor St; Langford, Malcolm; Chernykh, Yuliya; Stiansen, Øyvind; Berge, Tarald Gulseth & Puig, Sergio (2024). Bargaining in the Shadow of Awards. European journal of international law. ISSN 0938-5428. 35(3), s. 603–622. doi: 10.1093/ejil/chae053. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  International investment disputes occupy a curious place in the research programme on compliance. On the one hand, there is a widespread presumption that respondent states generally pay the compensation that they are ordered to pay because not doing so risks more litigation or less investment. On the other hand, these disputes frequently continue long after awards are handed down, there are visible instances of non-payment and there is little evidence about if or how most disputes are actually resolved. Compliance with investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) awards has also been difficult to study because much of what occurs after an arbitral decision falls outside traditional understandings of compliance processes. Therefore, in this article, we introduce a broader term – resolution – and look beyond payment at a wider landscape of post-award dynamics. We also introduce a framework to bring these dynamics into view. This framework places awards in the context of longer-term bargaining and articulates how bargaining is different when it occurs in the shadow of an award. We present three mechanisms through which awards can shape outcomes – as a legitimate outcome, as a coordinating focal point, or as a bargaining endowment – before arguing that the third mechanism is the most common in the context of ISDS.

• Berge, Tarald Gulseth & Fauchald, Ole Kristian (2023). International Organizations, Technical Assistance, and Domestic Investment Laws. World Trade Review. ISSN 1474-7456. 22(1), s. 147–172. doi: 10.1017/S1474745622000453. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Can supranational actors influence domestic policy? In this article, we study how international organizations have sought to shape the contents of domestic laws aimed at protecting foreign investment. Traditionally, the influence of international organizations on public policy has been assumed to run through loan conditionalities. We build on a recent strand of literature indicating that international organizations can also influence public policy through technical assistance. Empirically, we present a cross-sectional mapping of the protection that states offer foreign investors in domestic investment laws, and a mapping of the advisory activities of the three main organizations offering technical assistance on foreign investment laws: the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Bank. We find that there are significant variations in protection offered under domestic investment laws, and variation in international organizations’ technical assistance over time and across organizations. To explore technical assistance as a causal mechanism for influence on public policy more closely in this field, we conduct a case study of the development of domestic investment legislation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

• Berge, Tarald Gulseth & Stiansen, Øyvind (2022). Bureaucratic capacity and preference attainment in international economic negotiations. The Review of International Organizations. ISSN 1559-7431. doi: 10.1007/s11558-022-09475-z. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  What determines states’ ability to influence the contents of international institutions? Extant scholarship on international economic negotiations highlights the importance of political and economic capacity in negotiations. In this article, we argue that another structural source of negotiating power has been overlooked: bureaucratic capacity. Building on in-depth interviews with a large sample of international economic negotiators, we develop a theory of how differences in bureaucratic capacity can give states advantages in bilateral negotiations. We test our theory on a dataset of bilateral investment treaties. To measure preference attainment, we combine a unique repository of states’ public negotiating mandates called model treaties and the texts of finalized investment treaties to compute the verbatim distances between states’ stated preferences and the treaties they negotiate. We then show that states with greater bureaucratic capacity than their counterparts tend to achieve higher preference attainment in investment treaty negotiations. Our results have important implications for scholarship on international negotiations and for policy-makers engaged in investment policy reform.

• Berge, Tarald Gulseth & Berger, Axel (2021). Do Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases Influence Domestic Environmental Regulation? The Role of Respondent State Bureaucratic Capacity. Journal of International Dispute Settlement. ISSN 2040-3585. 12(1), s. 1–41. doi: 10.1093/jnlids/idaa027. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Does international politics influence domestic politics? In the investment treaty regime, there is currently a debate about whether investor-state dispute settlement cases influence respondent state domestic regulation. We present a systematic test of this relationship. Using two unique datasets, we examine whether investor-state cases targeting environmental measures influence respondent states’ environmental regulation. We make two theoretical contributions. First, we present an integrated typology of potential regulatory responses to investor-state dispute settlement cases. Second, we propose a novel, conditional theory of regulatory responses to investor-state cases. We argue that states’ responses should depend on their bureaucratic capacity. In our analysis, we find that respondent state bureaucratic capacity conditions the relationship between investor-state cases and subsequent domestic regulation. There is a more pronounced negative relationship between investor-state cases and regulatory behavior in states with high bureaucratic capacity than in low-capacity states.

• Berge, Tarald Laudal & John, Taylor St. (2020). Asymmetric diffusion: World Bank ‘best practice’ and the spread of arbitration in national investment laws. Review of International Political Economy. ISSN 0969-2290. 28(3), s. 584–610. doi: 10.1080/09692290.2020.1719429. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Globally, 74 countries have domestic investment laws that mention investor-state arbitration and 42 of these laws provide consent to it. That is, they give foreign investors the right to bypass national courts and bring claims directly to arbitration. What explains this variation, and why do any governments include investor-state arbitration in domestic legislation? We argue that governments incorporate arbitration into their domestic laws because doing so was labelled ‘international best practice’ by specialist units at the World Bank. We introduce the concept of asymmetric diffusion, which occurs when a policy is framed as international best practice but only recommended to a subset of states. No developed state consents to arbitration in their domestic law, nor does the World Bank recommend that they do so. Yet we show that governments who receive technical assistance from the World Bank’s Foreign Investment Advisory Service are more likely to include arbitration in their laws. We first use event history analysis and find that receiving World Bank technical assistance is an exceptionally strong predictor of domestic investment laws with arbitration. Then we illustrate our argument with a case study of the Kyrgyz Republic’s 2003 law.

• Berge, Tarald Laudal (2020). Dispute by Design? Legalization, Backlash, and the Drafting of Investment Agreements. International Studies Quarterly. ISSN 0020-8833. 64(4), s. 919–928. doi: 10.1093/isq/sqaa053. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Abstract The investment treaty regime is currently going through extensive reform. Driven by a raft of investor–state dispute settlement cases, states are asking: How should we draft future investment agreements? This article presents the first empirical analysis of what drives risk in investment agreements. Drawing on states’ own reform narratives, and on unique data on the content of over two thousand investment agreements, I analyze how legalization in investment agreements is associated with the risk of attracting investor–state dispute settlement claims. I find that the only legalization dimension that robustly predicts investor–state dispute settlement claims in investment agreements is substantive obligation, and that this risk is not significantly affected by introducing more flexibility or precision. These findings have important implications for states engaged in reform of their international investment policies. Most prominently, they suggest that states should focus more on what substantive clauses they include in their investment agreements, rather than on how these clauses are written.

• Berge, Tarald Laudal & Hveem, Helge (2018). The International Regime for Investment: A History of Failed Multilateralism. I Nölke, Andreas & May, Christian (Red.), Handbook of the International Political Economy of the Corporation. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISSN 9781785362521. s. 311–328. doi: 10.4337/9781785362538.00028. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  In this chapter, we discuss two interrelated questions: (1) Why is there no multilateral agreement on investment? (2) Do we need a multilateral investment agreement? We begin with a broad examination of the historical roots of investment protection, and revisit hallmark efforts at reaching a multilateral accord. We then elaborate on the decentralized regime that has been instituted instead, with a focus on bilateral investment treaties and investment treaty arbitration. Next, we consider three sets of explanations for why the formal efforts at reaching a multilateral agreement have failed – an ideational account, political explanations, and various technical explanations. We also discuss why some actually view the decentralized treaty-based regime as a multilateral system in and of itself. We end our discussion by reviewing the recent legitimacy crisis surrounding the investment regime, and debate whether regionalism may be an expedient alternative to formal multilateralism in future global investment protection.

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• Berge, Tarald Gulseth & Mehranvar, Ladan (2025). Time and Compromise in UNCITRAL’s Working Group III – EJIL: Talk! doi: https:/www.ejiltalk.org/time-and-compromise-in-uncitrals-working-group-iii/. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Pending a decision by UNCITRAL’s governing body, there may be only a few WGIII meetings left to finalize outstanding issues. This post examines how the scarcity of time is shaping WGIII’s negotiation dynamics on the issue of SfC. We look at how delegations leverage time to define what counts as a reasonable compromise; how the very term ‘compromise’ can entrench rather than reduce asymmetries; and what these framing battles reveal about State influence and leverage.

• Berge, Tarald Gulseth; Rasmussen, Magnus Bergli & Thorsen, Dag Einar (2024). Et bærekraftig universitet? Om effekten av kortsiktighet og New Public Management ved USN. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• John, Taylor St; Langford, Malcolm; Chernykh, Yuliya; Stiansen, Øyvind; Berge, Tarald Gulseth & Puig, Sergio (2023). Bargaining in the Shadow of Awards. SSRN Electronic Journal. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Berge, Tarald Gulseth (2023). UNCITRAL-forhandlingene om reform av investeringsvoldgift. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Berge, Tarald Laudal & John, Taylor St (2020). Why Do States Consent to Arbitration in National Investment Laws? Investment Treaty News Quarterly. ISSN 2519-8467. 11(2), s. 12–16. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Behn, Daniel Friedrich; Berge, Tarald Laudal & Langford, Malcolm (2018). Poor states or poor governance? Explaining outcomes in investment treaty arbitration. Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business. ISSN 0196-3228. 38(3), s. 333–389. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Berge, Tarald Laudal (2018). Jonathan Bonnitcha, Lauge N. S. Poulsen and Michael Waibel. 2017. The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime (Oxford: Oxford University Press). The Review of International Organizations. ISSN 1559-7431. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Berge, Tarald Laudal & Langford, Malcolm (2018). Hvor var Norge? Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Berge, Tarald Laudal & Kuyper, Jonathan William (2018). Book Review - The Rise of Investor-State Arbitration: Politics, Law, and Unintended Consequences. Global Policy. ISSN 1758-5880. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Berge, Tarald Laudal & Alschner, Wolfgang (2018). Reforming Investment Treaties: Does treaty design matter? Investment Treaty News Quarterly. ISSN 2519-8467. s. 7–10. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Berge, Tarald Laudal (2018). Investment Treaty Drafting and Investor Claims for Arbitration - implications for policymakers. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Langford, Malcolm; Behn, Daniel Friedrich & Berge, Tarald Laudal (2016). Poor States or Poor Governance? Explaining Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Kirkebø, Tori Loven & Berge, Tarald Laudal (2016). Metodiske synder fra NUPI. Klassekampen. ISSN 0805-3839. s. 24–24. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Andresen, Martin Eckhoff & Berge, Tarald Laudal (2015). BSU-ordningen bør avvikles. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Sending, Ole Jacob; Bones, Stian; Neumann, Iver Brynild; John, Taylor St; Berge, Tarald Gulseth & Beaumont, Paul David Hagen [Vis alle 37 forfattere av denne artikkelen] (2025). Trump 2.0 og internasjonal politikk. Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

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