Jakob Elster

• Elster, Jakob (2020). Autonomy in Political Philosophy, In William R. Thompson (ed.),  Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics.  Oxford University Press.  ISBN 9780190228637.  Encyclopedia article. Vis sammendrag

  The concept of autonomy is one of the key concepts of political philosophy. It plays an important role in discussions of the limits of state coercion, in particular in arguments against paternalistic laws and policies, and in questions concerning the legitimacy and authority of the state. Although the term “autonomy” is used in different ways, a common understanding of the concept of autonomy relates to the idea of leading one’s own life: the autonomous person develops her own understanding of how her life should be and acts accordingly, without interference by others. Autonomy plays three main roles in political philosophy. First, autonomy provides a goal, to be realized through political means; this requires that the state protect people from interference with their autonomy, ensure the availability of sufficient resources, and foster the mental abilities necessary for autonomy. Not least, promoting autonomy can entail that the form of government be democratic, as citizens’ autonomy is best protected in a democratic regime. Next, autonomy can impose a set of constraints, limiting the legitimate use of coercion in realizing political goals. First, coercion can only be used for certain purposes. The most well-known constraint of this kind involves the rejection of paternalism: coercion may never be used to promote a person’s own good against her will. Next, there are constraints connected with the kind of justification that can be given for coercive actions: in order to be compatible with autonomy, these must be justified in ways that the coerced have actually accepted or could have accepted. Finally, autonomy can play a role in arguments about the grounds for political authority. Although authority and autonomy might seem to be inimical, autonomy can ground the right to command either through citizens’ consent or through their voluntary actions by which they become committed to follow a common set of rules. Autonomy can only play these roles if it is valuable, and there are several arguments why autonomy is valuable. First, there are instrumental reasons: the good both of individuals and of society is best served if people have a large degree of autonomy. Next, people have an interest in their choices and actions being their own, representative of who they are. Also, there is a strong symbolic and relational aspect to the right to autonomy: being denied this right is insulting and amounts to a denial of one’s equal standing. Finally, there might be an intrinsic value to autonomy, as only autonomy allows us to be fully human.

• Elster, Jakob & Feiring, Eli (2020). Når er registerbasert helse- og helsetjenesteforskning uten samtykke etisk forsvarlig?, I: Anne Kjersti Cecelia Befring & Inger Johanne Sand (red.),  Kunstig intelligens og big data i helsesektoren Rettslige perspektiver.  Gyldendal Juridisk.  ISBN 9788205531963.  Kapittel 13.  s 452 - 474
• Elster, Jakob (2015). Er etisk skjønn jevnt fordelt?, I: Hallvard Fossheim & Helene C. Ingierd (red.),  Etisk skjønn i forskning.  Universitetsforlaget.  ISBN 978-82-15-02655-8.  Kapittel.  s 22 - 38 Vis sammendrag

  Artikkelen drøfter om etisk skjønn er jevnt fordelt eller om noen har bedre etisk skjønn enn andre, og hvordan man i så fall kan måle etisk skjønn. Både skjønnsutøvelse ved anvendelse av regler og ren etisk skjønnsutøvelse krever evne til å identifisere de faktorene som er moralsk relevante og å forstå hvorfor de er det. Dette er egenskaper vi kan vurdere om folk har, og de som har disse i større grad enn andre, har bedre skjønn.

• Elster, Jakob (2012). Scanlon on Permissibility and Double Effect. Journal of Moral Philosophy.  ISSN 1740-4681.  9(1), s 75- 102 . doi: 10.1163/174552411X612074
• Elster, Jakob (2011). How Outlandish Can Imaginary Cases Be?. Journal of Applied Philosophy.  ISSN 0264-3758.  28(3), s 241- 258 . doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2011.00531.x
• Elster, Jakob (2011). PROCREATIVE BENEFICENCE - CUI BONO?. Bioethics.  ISSN 0269-9702.  25(9), s 482- 488 . doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01794.x
• Elster, Jakob (2010). Hvor i all verden er alle normene?. Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift.  ISSN 0800-336X.  (1-2), s 127- 141
• Elster, Jakob (2007). Hva skal vi med etiske komiteer?. Etikk i praksis.  ISSN 1890-3991.  1(1), s 11- 31
• Elster, Jakob (2005). Å velge eller ikke velge (om Jürgen Habermas, Den menneskelige naturs fremtid). Agora : Journal for metafysisk spekulasjon.  ISSN 0800-7136.  (3), s 207- 217
• Elster, Jakob (2004). How to best teach bioethics � an introduction /Innledning: Hvordan undervise i bioetikk?, I:  How to best teach bioethics. Report from a workshop March 2003 organised by The Nordic Committee on Bioethics and NorFA.  Nordisk ministerråd.  ISBN 92-893-1005-7.  Innledning.  s 11 - 20

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• Elster, Jakob (2015). Review of Fiona Woollard, Doing and Allowing Harm. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.  ISSN 1538-1617.
• Elster, Jakob (2010). The Brain and its Law.
• Elster, Jakob (2010). ”You don’t know what it’s like!” –personal experience in morality and public reason.
• Elster, Jakob (2009). Democratic authority in non-ideal theory: some thoughts on David Estlund’s defence of hopeless political theories.
• Elster, Jakob (2009). "You Don't Know What It's Like!" - The Role of Personal Experience in Moral Argumentation.
• Elster, Jakob (2008). Bioethics committees between moral epistemology and political legitimacy.
• Elster, Jakob (2008). Bioetiske komiteer – mellom etikk og politikk.
• Elster, Jakob (2008). Hvilken rolle skal moralsk motivasjon ha i velferdspolitikken?.
• Elster, Jakob (2008). Ought implies can.
• Elster, Jakob (2008). What do we explain when we explain morality?.
• Elster, Jakob; Roll-Hansen, Nils & Storm, Johan Frederik (2008). Upop-aften: Nevroetikk.
• Block, Ned; Galaaen, Øistein Schmidt & Elster, Jakob (2007, 06. februar). Empiricism in the Philosophy of Mind? An Interview with Ned Block.  Filosofisk Supplement 1, 2007, pp. 30-34. Vis sammendrag

  Metaphilosophical interview with Prof. Ned Block (NYU), 28th November 2006.

• Elster, Jakob (2007). (How) Can We Draw Normative Conclusions From Empirical Work In Moral Psychology?.
• Elster, Jakob (2007). Hjerneskadete utilitarister - Hvordan fungerer vår moralske dømmekraft?.
• Elster, Jakob (2007). How does the mind matter for the law?.
• Elster, Jakob (2007). Transforming Moral Motivation. Acta Humaniora. 293. Vis sammendrag

  The dissertation takes as its point of departure the supposition that when people fail to perform morally good actions, this is not only due to a lack of moral knowledge, but often to a lack of moral motivation. It follows that one way of making society better is by influencing the moral motivation of its members. If self-interest were sufficient to motivate all actions required by morality, transforming moral motivation would not be necessary, although it might still be a useful supplementary means. However, although theoretically possible, the assumption that self-interest is sufficient to motivate moral action is empirically implausible given any reasonably demanding conception of morality. Another way of arguing that the demands of morality do not require motivational transformation consists in saying that since ought implies can, I have no duty to perform an action I cannot be motivated to perform. However, although it is true that if a person at present cannot possibly be motivated to perform a given action she has no duty to perform the action, this does not mean that she does not have a duty to become motivated to perform the same action sometime in the future. Nevertheless, there are moral limits to what we may do to transform people’s motivation. A major constraint on motivational transformation is respect for the agent’s right to autonomy. In particular, we must respect the right to an autonomous process of motivational formation: an agent should be able to choose for herself what motives she wants to develop, based on her present motivational state. The right to an autonomous process weighs even heavier than the right to autonomous action, which might sometimes be legitimately infringed, as when a criminal is imprisoned. But this right does not impose a limit on motivational transformation when we shape the moral motives of children, because they have no capacity for, hence no right to, an autonomous process.

• Elster, Jakob & Bomann-Larsen, Lene (2007, 22. september). Deltagelse i radioprogram om moralske intuisjoner og drap i krig, mm. [Radio].  Verdibørsen.
• Elster, Jakob (2006). Legitimate Motivational Transformation.
• Elster, Jakob (2006). Om å undervise i bioetikk i skolen: Hva underviser man i og hvorfor?.
• Bomann-Larsen, Lene & Elster, Jakob (2005, 03. desember). Deltagelse i radioprogram: Debatt om moralske dilemmaer og de hvite bussene. [Radio].  Verdibørsen, NRK P2.
• Elster, Jakob (2005, 20. oktober). - Mangler moralsk motivasjon. [Internett].  Apollon.
• Elster, Jakob (2005). Can the Level of Our Moral Motivation Influence the Content of Our Moral Duties?.
• Elster, Jakob (2005, 21. desember). Gud, gener og moral. [Internett].  forskning.no.
• Elster, Jakob (2005, 20. oktober). Intervju i Østlandssendingen. [Radio].  NRK Østlandssendingen.
• Elster, Jakob (2005, 23. oktober). Intervju på P4s Helgefrokost. [Radio].  P4s Helgefrokost.
• Elster, Jakob (2005). Simone Weil on the Purificational Role of Atheism and Amoralism.
• Elster, Jakob (2005). Teaching bioethics in the secondary education – the Norwegian experience.
• Elster, Jakob (2005, 22. oktober). Umotiverte for det gode.  Klassekampen.
• Elster, Jakob (2004). Wrongful life problems and euthanasia.
• Elster, Jakob & Von Troil, Helena (2004). How to best teach bioethics. Report from a workshop March 2003 organised by The Nordic Committee on Bioethics and NorFA.
• Elster, Jakob (2003). Moral Motivation and Political and Social Institutions.

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