INTRODUCTION


Until the middle of the 1990s, human rights was a marginal issue for the oil industry. Like most business, oil companies were concerned with making profits within the constraints set by national governments. Most of them had taken on board a commitment to protecting the environment against accidents and illegal discharges of pollutants and were preoccupied with implementing this ”green” agenda into their operations. Then, in the last half of the 1990s they were overtaken by a new wave of public concern with yet another political agenda: the protection of human rights. Within a few years, civil liberties, political freedom, economic and social rights and democratic governance became matters of high priority in the public relations and strategic planning of major oil companies.
This book is about (i) how this change took place, (ii) how the oil industry has responded to the new challenge and (iii) which problems arise from the human rights agenda in its relations with specific countries.
A number of diverse factors contributed to the turnabout in the late 1990s: The human rights agenda, as witnessed in numerous UN for a, kept expanding, as shown by Eide and van Genugten in their contributions to this volume. The trust in big business, as in other dominating institutions in society, was crumbling while their importance as economic agents were rising in the wake of the globalisation process. International law was slowly developing from a purely state-centric position towards encompassing in one form or another non-state actors like transnational companies (Eide, van Genugten and Schierbeck). Time was ripe for change, when unexpected events in Nigeria suddenly unleashed the uproar against Shell in 1995. The intensity and scope of the protest took both the company itself and the rest of the industry by surprise (Chandler). Not having recovered from the Brent Spar shock earlier the same year, Shell was badly prepared for another wave of large-scale public criticism. The other companies watched in silence, and anxiety, as the trendsetter in the industry began its deep soul-searching.
Shell’s subsequent conversion to the cause of human rights is the major event in the story of the relationship between the oil industry and international society in the 1990s. It is therefore analysed from different angles by several of our contributors (Chandler, van Genugten and Tangen, Rudsar and Bergesen). They all point out the profound nature of the change of heart, and policy, that took place after 1995, but also the open-ended character of the outcome; how Shell will manage to live up to the expectations created by its high-ringing rhetoric remains to be seen.
But Shell is not the only company that has felt the heat of public concern over human rights. A large part of the industry has been exposed to criticism from nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and the press for conniving at abuses and violations in oil producing countries. In response, many of them have developed either human rights policies or at least put up a minimum of rhetorical defence against the critics. Few, if any, would now dare to say openly that human rights is none of our business (even if that may still be a prevalent view in some of the board rooms), but many have preferred to remain silent. As pointed out by Nordskag and Ruud, the majority of transnational oil companies with international exploration and production activities have so far not formulated or published guidelines for dealing with other social responsibility in general or human rights in particular. However, the companies that have taken the lead in this field are the largest and by far the most important actors and trendsetters in the industry, including all the traditional majors.
Among companies claiming that human rights are taken into account in their policies, considerable differences can be detected measured by the vagueness or precision of the reference to human rights and by the transparency with which monitoring takes place. The establishment and publication by a company of a code of conduct is an indication that monitoring can - but not necessarily does - take place. The next question is whether human rights are explicitly included in the code of conduct, and with what content. The concept of human rights is often used in vague and non-committal ways. Only when there is an explicit endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and/ or the main international human rights conventions is it possible to determine whether the company takes into account the internationally recognised human rights. At present, only two major companies fulfil the criteria of having an explicit international code of conduct referring to the Universal Declaration, namely BP Amoco and Shell (Chandler, Table 4) A third company, the Norwegian Statoil, also explicitly refers to the Universal Declaration in its operative policies (Nordskag and Ruud). When explicit references to internationally recognised human rights are incorporated in the policies or codes of conduct of the company, compliance can become a legal necessity (van Genugten).
Accepting responsibility for human rights is one thing, doing something about it is another. Implementing corporate commitments turns out to be complicated and cumbersome. Several of our contributors underline the need to a systematic approach that includes entire companies (Chandler, Schierbeck). Others point to the responsibilities that will follow as international law develops and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) become more actively involved. (Eide and van Genugten).
As for the impact in specific countries, we have no intention of covering the universe of oil producing countries, but three of our contributors focus on the experience of the energy and oil industries in selected areas. Ganesan covers several cases, inter alia from Nigeria and Turkmenistan, pointing out the tendency for large energy companies to end up supporting corrupt government practices and thereby implicitly condoning human rights abuses. With reference to the experience from South Africa, he underlines the difficulties inherent in the concept of ’constructive engagement’, which can easily be used as an excuse for maintaining a profitable operation in a country marked by violations of human rights.
Kaldor and Said reach similar conclusions in their study of Azerbaijan and Le Billon in his paper on Angola. In both cases, the international oil industry is heavily involved in countries where the government is authoritarian and beset by corruption. The companies involved supply most of the revenue the government needs to stay in power (or the prospect of future income in the case of Azerbaijan). Hence, they can be held responsible for the general political and economic development in the countries, even if their direct influence is limited. Our general conclusion is that the companies have no choice but accepting a responsibility that goes beyond running a proper business and making donations to charity. The companies that have made a public commitment to human rights have reached a point of no return. There is no turning back to the early 1990s.

Stavanger/Oslo, May 2000

Helge Ole Bergesen Asbjørn Eide




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