Julius Rumpf

Rumpf, Julius (2024). Quaternary Law in EU Electricity Regulation: Stretching Meroni too Far?
European Energy and Environmental Law Review  33(1) p 2–15.

Rumpf, Julius & Banet, Catherine (2023). Energy Law, in Scholten, Miroslav (Red.), Research Handbook on the Enforcement of EU Law p 365–380. doi: 10.4337/9781802208030.00033.

Rumpf, Julius (2023). Statutory Transmission Monopolies in EU and EEA Law—Why a European Energy Union cannot Tolerate National Transmission Monopolies
European Law Review 48(2) p 167–186.

(This material was first published by Thomson Reuters, trading as Sweet & Maxwell, 5 Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5AQ, and is reproduced by agreement with the publishers. Note that the paper may not be distributed further after download and copies may only be printed for own internal use.)

Rumpf, Julius & Hancher, Leigh (2021). Baltic Cable AB v Energimarknadsinspektionen (C-454/18): The CJEU Decides on Congestion Income Regulation of Single Electricity Interconnector Companies and Applies Classic Remedies for Modern Issues
European Law Review 46(2) s 242–257.

(This material was first published by Thomson Reuters, trading as Sweet & Maxwell, 5 Canada Square, Canary Wharf, London, E14 5AQ, and is reproduced by agreement with the publishers. Note that the paper may not be distributed further after download and copies may only be printed for own internal use.)

Hancher, Leigh, Kehoe, Anne Marie & Rumpf, Julius (2021). The EU electricity network codes and guidelines : a legal perspective (Second edition)
European University Institute RSCAS Research Project Report January 2021.

Rumpf, Julius (2020). Congestion displacement in European electricity transmission systems – finally getting a grip on it? Revised safeguards in the Clean Energy Package and the European network codes
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 38(4) s 409–436

Rumpf, Julius (2019). Does the Energy Union End at the Baltic Sea Coast? Capacity Curtailments on the Baltic Cable
European Competition and Regulatory Law Review (CoRe) 3(3) s 298–305

Rumpf, Julius & Bjørnebye, Henrik (2018). Just how much is enough? EU regulation of capacity and reliability margins on electricity interconnectors
Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 37(1), s 67–91

Rumpf, Julius & Wirth, Philipp (2015). Immer Ärger mit dem Widerrufsrecht
InfrastrukturRecht. s 170–173 & 194–196.

Eder, Jost & Rumpf, Julius (2015). Separierte Energiepreissysteme: Kein Fall für das Sonderkündigungsrecht nach § 41 III EnWG
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Recht der Energiewirtschaft. s 105–109.

Lehnert, Wieland, Wagner, Florian & Rumpf, Julius (2015). Die Sprache der Direktvermarktung: Die MPES 2.0 auf dem Prüfstand
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Recht der Energiewirtschaft. s 201–207.

Eder, Jost & Rumpf, Julius (2015). Preisklarheit, quo vadis? Zur Umsetzung der neuen Vorgaben zur Preisdarstellung und für Preisanpassungen in der Grundversorgung in der Praxis
InfrastrukturRecht. s 218–221 & 270–277

• Rumpf, Julius (2024). Quaternary Law in EU Electricity Regulation: Stretching Meroni too Far? European Energy and Environmental Law Review. ISSN 1879-3886. 33(1), s. 2–15. doi: 10.54648/eelr2023021.
• Rumpf, Julius (2024). Quaternary Law in EU Electricity Regulation: Stretching Meroni too Far? European Energy and Environmental Law Review. ISSN 1879-3886. 33(1), s. 2–15. doi: 10.54648/eelr2023021. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  In the European electricity sector, the delegation of rule-making has literally reached the next level. Socalled ‘methodologies’, legally binding rules developed between private electricity companies and specialized regulatory agencies, constitute a vast and growing body of ‘quaternary law’. The methodologies and their unique features raise numerous interesting questions for scholars of EU law, but they remain severely underresearched. This is regrettable, since the methodologies illustrate another pressing issue related to the delegation of rule-making: the fuzzy legal boundaries to delegation. These follow from the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ’s) non-delegation, or Meroni doctrine, which however seems to be subject to a creeping maceration. As the methodologies show, the resulting legal uncertainty encourages ever-bolder models of delegation, raising grave constitutional concerns. At the same time, the methodologies illustrate a need for delegated rule-making in technical sectors, such as electricity. The argument of this article is that the ECJ should therefore revise the Meroni doctrine to restore legal certainty with respect to delegation, while also respecting the requirements of regulatory reality. This article discusses possible approaches and proposes a starting point for a ‘Meroni doctrine 2.0ʹ.

• Rumpf, Julius & Banet, Catherine (2023). Energy Law. I Scholten, Miroslav (Red.), Research Handbook on the Enforcement of EU Law. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISSN 9781802208023. s. 365–380. doi: 10.4337/9781802208030.00033. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Enforcement of European Union (EU) energy law is a two-sided affair. In the big picture, the EU has successfully liberalized and integrated the European energy markets. It has recognized new rights for energy consumers and ensured more transparent and liquid energy trading. Whereas the energy sector used to be a national domain, today energy is traded and transported across borders, based on common EU rules. Energy is a strategic domain for States individually and for their collaboration with the EU, as revealed by the energy price and supply crisis that started in the winter of 2021/22. Yet beyond areas of common interest, differences between the EU and the Member States concerning energy policy goals remain. As per its usual approach, the EU endeavours to create an internal energy market (IEM) with minimum rights for market players and consumers, and to overcome nationalistic reservations against its energy policy goals by harmonizing the legal framework. This has resulted in a comprehensive and prescriptive legal framework that relies on a mix of substantive and technical legal requirements to facilitate enforcement. Nevertheless, the implementation of the legal framework, as well as the investigation and sanctioning of breaches, starts at Member State level. In this chapter, we explain the progressive and accelerating evolution of EU energy law from non-existence to an established vein of regulation in a matter of a few decades. We explore factors for the success in enforcing EU energy law, notably with liberalizing the sector and integrating the segregated national energy markets. Finally, we comment on current trends and outline possible legal limits to today’s enforcement strategy in EU energy law. In our view, the EU is overall successful regarding enforcement in the energy sector. However, our examples illustrate that advancement in several critical areas is delayed and erratic. The simple fact that the Commission’s and ACER’s resources are limited speaks against a hard enforcement strategy to address remaining enforcement gaps at EU level. Such an approach could also entail a hardening of opposing positions. Instead, the EU should build on the consensus represented in the adopted harmonized legislation to overcome remaining points of contention. This would likely contribute more to continued success with energy law enforcement than any particular enforcement tool.

• Rumpf, Julius (2023). Statutory Transmission Monopolies in EU and EEA Law—Why a European Energy Union cannot Tolerate National Transmission Monopolies. European Law Review. ISSN 0307-5400. 48(2), s. 167–186. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv Vis sammendrag

  Integrating the European electricity markets is among the EU’s most ambitious regulatory endeavours. Important economic and environmental aims depend for their success on continued progress with electricity market integration. In turn, this requires considerable investment in cross-border interconnectors. Nevertheless, numerous European countries have established statutory monopolies that restrict interconnector investment to a monopolist. The resulting restrictions on third-party investment were a core issue underlying the recent Aquind case. Against this backdrop, it is surprising that these statutory transmission monopolies have so far passed largely under the radar, in terms of both adjudication by the European courts and also discussion in the literature. This article argues that statutory transmission monopolies are overlooked, illegal relics from a pre-liberalised past. Regulators, such as the Commission, as well as affected stakeholders, should challenge statutory transmission monopolies where they impede interconnector investment. Based on the existing case law, free movement law appears as the tool of choice in this context.

• Rumpf, Julius (2022). Kostnadsforskyving mellom statlig eide el-selskaper. EuroRett. ISSN 0805-1232. 4.
• Rumpf, Julius & Hancher, Leigh (2021). Baltic Cable AB v Energimarknadsinspektionen (C-454/18): The CJEU Decides on Congestion Income Regulation of Single Electricity Interconnector Companies and Applies Classic Remedies for Modern Issues. European Law Review. ISSN 0307-5400. 46(2), s. 242–257. Vis sammendrag

  This article explores the impact of an important ruling in the energy sector from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). In its judgment, the CJEU narrowly avoids giving the referring court a green light to interpret a key provision of the EU internal energy market legislation contra legem. Invoking instead the principle of non-discrimination, the CJEU relies on a classic remedy to recognise that a Swedish company owning and operating an electricity interconnector should be entitled to earn a reasonable profit. Although the interconnection of energy networks is an objective enshrined in art.194(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the realisation of this objective has spawned a dense and highly technical web of regulation. This article explains the Court’s reasoning and its potential legal as well as economic impact in this complex and evolving regulatory space. We explain that while valuable progress has been made on technical harmonisation, classic fundamental principles of EU law, such as the non-discrimination principle, remain pivotal for resolving modern and central issues of electricity market integration.

• Hancher, Leigh; Kehoe, Anne Marie & Rumpf, Julius (2021). The EU electricity network codes and guidelines: a legal perspective (Second edition). European University Institute Working Papers. ISSN 1830-7728. doi: 10.2870/520736.
• Rumpf, Julius (2020). Congestion displacement in European electricity transmission systems – finally getting a grip on it? Revised safeguards in the Clean Energy Package and the European network codes. Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law. ISSN 0264-6811. s. 409–436. doi: 10.1080/02646811.2019.1707441. Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
• Rumpf, Julius (2019). Does the Energy Union End at the Baltic Sea Coast? Capacity Curtailments on the Baltic Cable. European Competition and Regulatory Law Review (CoRe). ISSN 2510-3148. 3(3), s. 298–305. doi: 10.21552/core/2019/3/8. Vis sammendrag

  The Baltic Cable case concerns a pressing issue regarding the allocation of scarce transmission capacity on electricity interconnectors: Network operators regularly curtail cross-border capacity to resolve network congestion within their grids, which often results from increased renewables production. This practice constitutes a major obstacle to the achievement of a European 'Energy Union' of unrestricted cross-border trade. A recent order from Germany - a Member State particularly affected by internal 'bottlenecks'- is noteworthy for two reasons: firstly, because it asserts the legality of systematic curtailments despite a general prohibition in the pertinent EU legislation; secondly, because it stands in stark contrast to competition law decisions of the European Commission in similar cases.

• Rumpf, Julius & Bjørnebye, Henrik (2018). Just how much is enough? EU regulation of capacity and reliability on electricity interconnectors. Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law. ISSN 0264-6811. 37(1), s. 67–91. doi: 10.1080/02646811.2018.1471802.

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• Rumpf, Julius (2022). Jusspodden §120: Hvilke grenser setter egentlig EØS for Norge? [Internett]. Jusspodden.
• Rumpf, Julius (2022). Electricity interconnectors: The 70% capacity rule—one value to rule them all? Legal and governance issues.
• Arnesen, Finn & Rumpf, Julius (2022). Må si opp EØS-avtalen om vi skal strupe strømeksporten. Dagens næringsliv. ISSN 0803-9372.
• Golombek, Rolf & Rumpf, Julius (2022). Kan politikerne kutte strømprisen? . Aftenposten (morgenutg. : trykt utg.). ISSN 0804-3116.
• Rumpf, Julius (2021). Experts dismiss call to reduce Norway power exports. [Internett]. Montel.
• Rumpf, Julius (2021). Eksperter tror EØS kan hindre struping av krafteksport. [Internett]. Montel.
• Rumpf, Julius (2021). Member in expert panel on the subject 'Legal dimensions of the network codes, guidelines and TCMs'.
• Rumpf, Julius (2021). The Regulation of Capacity Management on Interconnectors under the Clean Energy Package.
• Rumpf, Julius (2021). Tror på lykkelig utgang av Statnett-SvK-strid. [Internett]. Montel.
• Rumpf, Julius (2020). Monopolies on Interconnectors in EU/EEA Law: National Ownership to Promote a European Energy Union?
• Rumpf, Julius (2017). Just how much is enough? Legal boundaries for reliability planning in electricity transmission systems.

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